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## REMOTE DELIBERATIVE.

IN the December number of the *Classical Review*, a writer signing the initials J. D. adduces reasons for rejecting an account (given in my school edition of *Agamemnon* and *Choephoroi*) of certain optatives without *ἄν*, which I have termed the Remote Deliberative. His lucid and careful argument deserves gratitude: for it is by such discussion that these perplexing and exceptional points of syntax have the best chance of being cleared up.

J. D.'s view may be briefly summarized as follows:—

(1) He first (following Prof. Jebb on *O.C.* 170 and *Antigone* 604) sifts the instances which I have adduced of the optative without *ἄν*; and, as the result of this, he would correct all the prose examples and also *Philoktetes* 895 by inserting *ἄν*; and in *Ar. Plut.* 438 (πῶς τις φύγοι;) and *O.C.* 170 (πῶς τις φροντίδος ἔλθοι;) he would (with Prof. Jebb and most editors) read the subjunctive.

(2) There would thus remain for comment two instances of direct interrogative optatives without *ἄν*, namely *Antig.* 604 (τίς ὑπερβασία κατέσχοι;) and *Choeph.* 595 (τίς λέγοι;) and five instances where the optative occurs in a subordinate clause, viz. *Agam.* 620 (οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαιμι), *P.V.* 292 (οὐκ ἔστιν ὅτω...νείμαιμι), *Cho.* 172 (οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις...κείρατο), *Eur. Alc.* 52 (ἔστ' οὖν ὅπως...μόλοι;), *O.C.* 1172 (τίς ἔστιν ὃν...ψέξαιμι;).

(3) In all he would explain the optative as *potential*: and the omission of *ἄν* he would regard as a poetic use adopted (like so many others) from Epic, or from other dialects.

(4) The subordinate instances he would explain as *relative* clauses; arguing that they all might be relative, and one of them

(*O.C.* 1172, which has *ὃν* not *ὅστις*) would most naturally be so.

With regard to (1) I may say at once that Prof. Jebb has convinced me that the prose examples ought to be given up. The omission of *ἄν*, I now agree, is so much more likely to be an oversight of the scribe in those cases, that I should now regard them as manuscript errors to be corrected; and in any future edition of Aeschylus I should modify my statement accordingly. I further think it very probable that Prof. Jebb (and J.D.) are right in reading *τί δῆτ' ἄν δρῶμ' ἐγώ*; for *τί δῆτα δρῶμ' ἐγώ*; in *Philokt.* 895.

In the other two poetic instances, *Plut.* 438 and *O.C.* 170, I still hold that the optative should be retained. For the reading is supported by the best MSS. and being opposed to the ordinary use would be certain to be altered in the copies to the commoner subjunctive. Moreover (as I have said in my discussion referred to), being the expression of terror and perplexity, they come under the same head as the examples which Prof. Jebb admits: the remoter opt. is appropriate.

On (3) and (4), which contain the gist of J. D.'s contention, he has not convinced me, and I will try briefly to explain why.

Even if we assume with J. D. that in these examples the optative is potential with *ἄν* omitted, it still has to be asked—Why is *ἄν* omitted in just these two kinds and no other? We have in Homer *ῥεῖα θεός γ' ἐθέλων καὶ τηλόθεν ἄνδρα σαώσαι* (*Od.* iii. 231), a fine Potential affirmative: *οὐ μὲν γάρ τι κακώτερον ἄλλο πάθοιμι* (*Il.* xix. 321), a Potential negative: *κτήματα δ' αὐτὸς ἔχους* (*Od.* i. 402), a Concessive: in Pindar *οὐ μὲν διώξω, κενὸς εἶην* (*Ol.* iii. 45), a Conditional:

why in Attic is it only the Interrogative, and one other very special form (about the analysis of which we differ) that are found without *ἄν*? It seems to me that a careful observer of language will suspect that he has not got to the bottom of the usage by simply saying '*ἄν* is omitted': but that there is probably some other instinct at work which *restricts the exceptional omission of ἄν to just this class (or these classes) of cases.*

And when we go further, and find that the corresponding use of the subjunctive as a principal verb survives in Attic (where a number of older uses do not appear) precisely in interrogative sentences, this suspicion is confirmed. *Τίς κατάσχοι*; is much more naturally allied to *τίς κατέσχε*; that to *τίς ἄν κατάσχοι*; Attic Greek, which said habitually *τί εἶπω*; *οὐκ ἔχω ὅ τι εἶπω*, *οὐκ εἶχον ὅ τι εἶποιμι*, would more easily extend *τί εἶπω* to *τί εἶποιμι*, than omit an *ἄν* from a potential.

The question I am arguing is not *what is the meaning* of the phrase: on that all are agreed. It is not a question as to the *original use* of the optative: J. D. himself reminds us that in older Greek it was used without *ἄν* in various ways. What I am endeavouring to discover is the answer to the much harder question: Given an exceptional Attic use, what are its *grammatical affinities* in the normal usages?

When we pass from these to the subordinate instances, the language seems to me to give us quite as strong a lead towards the correct explanation. If these are simple cases of an *ἄν* omitted in a relative potential clause, why are they all of one kind? Why do we never find them in positive clauses? On J. D.'s principle of explanation you ought to be able to say *εἰσὶν οἱ λέγοντες* or *ἔστιν ὅπως λέξαμι*, usages of which there is in Attic no trace. In the examples the principal verb is always *negative*, or, what comes to the same thing, interrogative. Why again do we find this omission of *ἄν* with the optative, not merely in subordination only to clauses actually or virtually negative, but only to *one special form* of negative phrase, *οὐκ ἔστιν* (or the logically identical *τίς ἔστιν*;)? You would expect, on J. D.'s theory, to find this abnormal optative after every variety of principal verb; and certainly (if his theory be true) on the doctrine of chances it is nothing short of startling that the principal clause in all the five instances is always of one very special kind.

The explanation I have suggested seems

to me to throw light on this restriction. It is true, as I have been careful to point out, and as J. D. further shows in a detailed analysis, that these subordinate usages are not strictly indirect interrogatives. They are, I submit, developed by analogy from the oblique deliberative: and, as frequently happens in such extensions (especially in the elastic but subtle Greek, and above all in Sophocles), while they have lost somewhat of their true character in the process, the modification still takes place along the line of the original use. It is not therefore an accident (as it would be on J. D.'s theory) that they stop with *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅπως λέξαμι*, *οὐκ ἔστιν ὅστις κείραιτο*, and do not further extend to *ἔσθ' ὅπως λέξαμι*, still less to *πέμψω ὅστις ἀγγεῖλαι* or any such usage. The subtle feeling of the analogy on which they are formed is still present, and arrests development, if I may so phrase it, at the recognizable point.

It may be asked why, if I maintain that the sentences are deliberatives, I attach any importance to the fact that the instances before us are all *negative*. If they are deliberative at all, it may be argued, the positive form is just as much deliberative as the negative. This of course is perfectly true; *οἶδα ὃ, τι δρῶ* is logically and grammatically as good a form as *οὐκ οἶδα ὃ, τι δρῶ*. But as a matter of fact the oblique deliberative is far more frequently found in the negative form, and it is not difficult to see the reason of this. It is inevitable that these forms should be most wanted to express the feelings of difficulty, hesitation, and embarrassment; that we should find—as we do find—'I don't know what to do' ten times as often as 'I know what to do.' And my argument is accordingly this: when we meet cases of disputed optative which are alleged on any ground to be deliberatives, and when we further find that they are all of the negative form, this is an additional argument in favour of their being deliberative, because the negative form is one into which the deliberative is from its very nature peculiarly liable to run.

The above are all the passages quoted or discussed in this connection by Prof. Jebb; and J. D. adduces no others of this class. But I should like to add two further usages, closely allied to the one I am dealing with, which I have not referred to in my Aeschylus, but which for a full treatment should certainly be brought into the discussion. They present certain fresh difficulties: but for that very reason throw (I think) fresh light on the points at issue.

I. In *Theſmophoriazousai*, 871, Euripides, in the character of Menelaos, and speaking in tragic style and diction, says

τίς τῶνδ' ἐρμυῶν δομάτων ἔχει κράτος  
ὅστις ξένους δέξαιτο...

Here it will be seen at once that, though the form is the same as τίς ἐστιν ὃν ψέξαμι, a real difference of character exists in the sentence. He is not saying 'there is none to receive': he says 'who is king here, to receive the guests?' If this example stood alone, I dare say I should have accepted J. D.'s contention: it is far the most favourable to his view of all the examples dealt with. But having regard to the other passages quoted, and observing that the main clause is still interrogative, I think it a truer judgment to consider this example as a further development of the oblique deliberative, where the original character of the sentence is still more, nay is in reality wholly, lost. It may seem to J. D. a bold statement; but I feel confident that this further extension did really arise, again by analogy (though this time verbal and not logical), from the former extensions. In putting forward what may seem a paradox my support is this: Aristophanes *could* say τίς...ἔχει κράτος ὅστις δέξαιτο; but he could not have said (what on J. D.'s theory he *could* have said) Πρωτεύς ἐρμυῶν δομάτων ἔχει κράτος ὅστις ξένους δέξαιτο. No Attic example of any such optative has been adduced by J. D. or by any one else.

II. In Sophocles, *Phil.* 280, we find

ὁρῶντα...ἀνδρα οὐδὲν ἔντοπον, οὐχ ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν...

and in the same play an exactly similar instance, 695,

οὐκ ἔχων...τινα...παρ' ᾧ ἀποκλαύσειεν, οὐδ' ὅς...κατευνάσειεν

a third exactly similar, Eurip. *Iph. Taur.* 528

οὐδένα γὰρ εἶχον ὅστις ἀγγεῖλαι μολών

and again, *Phil.* 938

οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω.

In the two first examples the principal verb (which lies outside my quotation) is historic. The four instances therefore differ obviously from all the previously quoted examples in that the ordinary sequence is observed. We have not to explain an optative following a primary tense as we had to do in the others.

But I adduce them as examples of another, and a different, subtle modification of the

indirect deliberative, which throws light particularly on the question of interrogative *versus* relative.

The point of course is this: if they were normal deliberatives, and therefore the subordinate clause interrogative, there would in none of the sentences be an *antecedent*. The normal deliberatives would be

οὐχ ὁρῶν ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν  
οὐκ ἔχων ὅς (or ὅστις) κατευνάσειεν  
οὐκ εἶχον ὅστις ἀγγεῖλαι  
οὐκ οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω.

[I say ὅς or ὅστις, because the use of ὅς in indirect questions is in poetry admitted.]

But these clauses have all of them antecedents: and the presence of the antecedent obviously makes them *illegitimate* deliberatives, as it converts their oblique interrogatives ὅστις, ᾧ, ὅτῳ, *practically* into relatives. They are modified out of their proper grammar: but if I am to pronounce on their grammatical affinity, and on *the way they came into being* (which is all throughout my object), I am disposed to class them as modifications of the deliberative. I may be mistaken, but I venture to think that careful observers of Greek would agree with me that, while Sophocles allowed himself to say without misgiving ὁρῶν ἀνδρα οὐδένα ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, because of its resemblance to οὐκ εἶχεν ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν, he would not have allowed himself to say παρ' ᾧ τις ὅστις ἀρκέσειεν or any other simple relative use aloof from the deliberative. In other words, the affinity to the deliberative was still present to his mind: and, in spite of the departure from the strict deliberative form, it should determine our classification.

My strongest point of course is the last example. It is exactly on all fours with the three optative instances in having an antecedent, and therefore in modifying the character of the ὅτῳ into a practical relative. But J. D.'s theory will wholly break down here. With the three first he might say, as before, *an* is omitted. What can he do with the *subjunctive* instance? Surely here the analogy is plain. From the common οὐ γὰρ οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω comes by natural (though illegitimate) extension the exceptional οὐ γὰρ ἄλλον οἶδ' ὅτῳ λέγω. λέγω is therefore, if we regard its true affinities, a deliberative modified. If so, then the other instances, which have the optative, are deliberatives modified. And in that case we only darken counsel by talking about the omission of *an*.

A. SIDGWICK.

## NOTES ON CATULLUS, HORACE, OVID, AND MARTIAL.

## CATULLUS, cxiv.

Firmanus saltus non falso, Mentula, dives  
Fertur, qui tot res in se habet egregias,  
Aucupium omne genus piscis, prata, arva,  
ferasque:

Nequiquam: fructus sumptibus exsu-  
perat.

Quare concedo sit dives, dum omnia desint.  
Saltum laudemus dum modo ipse egeat.

That *saltus* is the true reading in v. 1, not *salutis*, is, it seems to me, clearly proved by the reading of the MSS. *salutis*. This might easily be a corruption of *saltus*, not of *salutis*. On this the whole criticism of the poem depends. For if *saltus* is read, *Mentula* is vocative, and *saltus* is nominative to all the verbs: to *fertur*, *habet*, *exsuperat*, *sit*, and finally to *egeat*. This being so, I should be disposed to look for some ablative in place of *ipse*, which *egeat* might govern. 'Let us concede that the *saltus* is a wealthy one, provided we admit it lacks everything:—provided it lacks *even a fence*': for I propose to read *sepi* or *sepe* ablative of *sepes* for *ipse*.

## HORACE, Odes 1. 15. 19—20.

tamen heu serus adulteros  
Crines pulvere collines.

For *crines* there is a strongly supported variant *cultus* in many MSS. Acron's interpretation is: 'procuratam capillorum pulchritudinem pulvere inquinabis.' This seems to refer to a word which had to do with *crines*, but contained something more. Where two readings exist very often a third is wanted to mediate between them: and I suggest the true reading here is *comptus*: cf. Lucr. i. 87. This may have been accidentally written *comptos* and then *crines* and *cultus* would be rival corrections, or glosses: cf. 4. 9. 13 Non sola comptos arsit adulteri Crines.

*Ibid.* 3. 24. 19—23.

Nec dotata regit virum  
Coniunx nec nitido fudit adultero.  
Dos est magna parentum  
Virtus et metuens alterius viri  
Certo foedere castitas.

No author is more averse to repeating a word than Horace shows himself in the *Odes*. Therefore I would read *alterius tori* in v. 22. The oblique cases of *vir* and *torus* are frequently confounded in MSS. I

find a certain awkwardness in *vir*. Keller does not mention *tori*, but since writing this note I find it cited by Jani from a MS. which he calls Lips. 4.

*Epodes* 5. 29—40.

Abacta nulla Veia<sup>2</sup> conscientia  
Ligonibus duris humum  
Exhauriebat, ingemens laboribus,  
Quo posset infossus puer  
Longo die bis terque mutatae dapis  
Inemori spectaculo,  
Cum promineret ore, quantum exstant aqua  
Suspensa mento corpora:  
Execta uti medulla et aridum iecur  
Amoris esset poculum,  
Interminato cum semel fixae cibo  
Intabuissent pupulae.

For *execta*, which is the reading of AB in v. 37, many MSS. have *exsucta*, and *exesa* has been suggested. None of these words supply the proper co-ordination with *aridum*, and I suggest that *enecta* 'slowly done to death' (cf. *enecare fame*) is the true reading. The only place where Ovid uses the participle *enectus* is one which shows distinct imitation of this passage, *Met.* 4. 239:

*defodit alta*

Crudus humo: tumulumque super gravis  
addit arenae.  
Dissipat hunc radiis Hyperione natus,  
iterque  
Dat tibi quo possis defossos promere vul-  
tus.  
Nec tibi iam poteras enectum pondere  
terrae  
Tollere, Nympha, caput; corpusque exsan-  
gue iacebas.

*Ibid.* 16. 52.

Neque intumescit alta viperis humus.

I find it impossible to make any sense out of *alta*. It seems to have come from *altis*, five lines before. I first thought of *alma*, which I find is Markland's conjecture; but the true reading, I have now no doubt, is *atra*: cf. Virgil's tot pullulat *atra colubris*, *Ode* 3. 4. 17 tuto ab *atris* corpore viperis. Cf. *Met.* 4. 454, *Georg.* 1. 129, *Aen.* 4. 472.

*Ibid.* 17. 27—33.

Ergo negatum vincor ut credam miser  
Sabella pectus increpare carmina  
Caputque Marsa dissilire nenias.  
Quid amplius vis? O mare et terra, ardeo

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Quantum neque atro delibutus Hercules  
Nessi cruore, nec Sicana fervida  
Lurens in Aetna flamma.

What a miserably weak word is *increpare* contrasted with the unusually strong word *dissilire*! I admit, says Horace, that Sabellian charms can *hide* at the breast. 'Who deniges of it?' Mr. Wickham with his usual elegance renders *increpare* 'ring through' but such a rendering lacks illustration, and even so the word is too weak contrasted with *dissilire* 'to fly in pieces' and the description which follows. I propose to read *incremare* 'set the breast on fire.' I know *incremare* is used by no better author than Florus; but 'all's one for that.' There are many new words, many new senses of words, in Horace.

*Lurens* in 30 is either Professor Nettle-ship's or the late Mr. Onions's correction for *Virens*, I forget at this moment which.

Ovid, *Heroides* xi. 127, 128.

The most perfect of the *Heroides*, the eleventh, is marred by the last couplet.

Tu tamen, o frustra miserae sperate sorori,  
Sparsa, precor, nati collige membra tui,  
Et refer ad matrem socioque impone sepul-  
cro,

Urnaque nos habeat quamlibet arta duos.  
Vive memor nostri lacrimasque in vulnera  
funde,

Neve reformida corpus amantis amans.  
Tu, rogo, dilectae nimium mandata sororis  
Perfer; mandatum persequar ipsa patris.

Heinsius says of the last two lines: 'Totum hoc distichon, in officina interpola- torum conflatum, vix Latinum est, aut ad Ovidianam elegantiam adsurgit.' And no doubt so long as *rogo* was supposed to be the verb, emendation seemed hopeless. It seems however feasible to regard it as the dative of *rogus*, and then the task of emen- dation will be easier. As regards *dilectae* we have a free hand, for the word is, with the first two words, absolutely erased in P; *Tu rogo proiectae* being in marg. a ma. 2, *dilec- tae* G, *proiectae* other MSS. Let us read *Tura rogo* for *Tu rogo* and *placitae* for *dilectae*.

*Tura rogo placitae* nimium mandata sororis

*Tu* fer: mandatum persequar ipsa patris.

*Mandare* is often of instructions given by a dying person: cf. *Fast.* 5. 657 mandatum sepulcrum; *Trist.* 1. 2. 55. Not without gracefulness does Canace contrast her last *mandata*, namely the request for a little

frankincense over her pyre, with the stern *mandatum* of her father that she should slay herself. Cp. *Consol. ad Liv.* 187:

Dique latent templis neque iniqua ad funera  
vultus

Praebent nec poscunt tura ferenda rogo.

*Ibid.* 20. 177, 180.

Quem si reppuleris, nec quem dea damnat,  
amaris

Et tu continuo, certe ego salvus ero.

Siste metum, virgo: stabili potiere salute  
Fac modo polliciti conscia templa colas!

The elision of a spondee in the second half of the pentameter as *certe ego*, is absolutely forbidden in the verse of Ovid and his imitators. Yet all MSS. have *certe ego*, and no emendation yet proposed has any probability. For once in a way Planu- des, whose Greek version Dilthey despises, Gudeman exalts too much, comes to the rescue. The Puteaneus ends at the 175th verse of this poem: and in the absence of the Puteaneus the testimony of Planudes is to be weighed as carefully as that of any one of the interpolated MSS. He has a read- ing that by no possibility could have been a translation of the vulgate:

ὃν εἶπερ ἀπώσταιο καὶ ἐρασθείης, οὐπερ ἡ θεὸς  
οὐ καταψήφίζεται καὶ σὺ παραχρηματῆς  
σωτηρίας σου τῆς ἐπὶ λήψῃ. στήσον  
ὄν, παρθένη, τὸν φόβον· σταθρῆς γὰρ ἀπο-  
λαύσεις τῆς σωτηρίας. Here is nothing about *certe ego salvus ero*: simply a statement 'you shall secure your health.' Note that *σωτηρίας* in both verses 178, 179, probably translated the same word. I read;

Et tu continuo certa salutis eris.

The apodosis begins at *nec quem*..... 'If you reject him, you will not have loved one whom the goddess disapproves, and you will immediately be sure of a return to health.' Cf. Cydippe's reply, v. 31;

Ergo te propter totiens incerta salutis

Commentis poenas doque dedique tuis.

I am not without hopes of being able to publish in the course of 1893 a complete edition of the *Heroides* with this Greek version, which has not yet been printed.

MARTIAL, 2. 66. 1—5.

Unus de toto peccaverat orbe comarum

Anulus, incerta non bene fixus acu.

Hoc facinus Lalage speculo, quo viderat,  
ulta est,

Et cecidit saevius icta Plecusa comis.

Desine iam, Lalage, tristes ornare capillos,  
Tangat et insanum nulla puella caput.

Friedländer in his admirable edition says that *comis* in v. 4 is 'ablative instead of accusative with *propter*'; an extraordinary view. By others *comis* is taken for the flagellum, but I know of no support for such an interpretation. Nor was there any scourge used in this case. Lalage felled

her maid to the ground with a blow of her brazen mirror. Read :

Et cecidit saevis icta Plecusa modis.

It is sufficiently obvious how the scribe came to write *comis*. This use of *modis* abounds in Plautus and Terence, e.g. *Aul.* 4. 4. 3 *miseris iam accipiam modis*, *Adelph.* 3. 2. 17 *quibus illum lacerarem modis*. So *miris modis* etc. in Virgil.

A. PALMER.

#### ON THE WORDS *πώμαλα* AND *βάναντος*.

THE traditional explanation of *πώμαλα* — accepted by Blaydes on Aristophanes *Plutus* 66 and in principle by Shilleto on Demosthenes *de Falsa Legatione* 56—is given by Suidas s.v. : *πώμαλα ἀντὶ τοῦ πόθεν, οἷον οὐδαμῶς ἔστι δὲ τὸ μὲν πῶ Δώριον, τιθέμενον ἀντὶ τοῦ πόθεν τὸ δὲ μάλα ἢ παρέλκει ἢ ἐν συνηθείᾳ λεγόμενον ἐν τῷ πώμαλα, οἷον οὐ μάλα ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐ, ἢ ἀντὶ τοῦ οὐδόλως ἔστι δὲ Ἀττικόν*. Shilleto however points out that *πῶ* could only stand for *ποῦ*, not for *πόθεν*, and takes the word as equivalent to *ποῦ μάλα*.

This explanation seems extremely doubtful. In the first place, it fails to explain why the Doric form *πῶ* is retained in what is confessedly an Attic word; secondly, no parallel is quoted for the change of accent in *πῶ* and the use of *μάλα* as an enclitic; thirdly, *μάλα* after interrogatives seems a doubtful idiom, which τί μάλιστα; πηνίκα μάλιστα; and the like in no way justify.

The word occurs in the following places: (1) *Ar. Plut.* 66 ὦ τῶν, ἀπαλλάχθητον ἀπ' ἐμοῦ; *πώμαλα*; (2) *Ar. Frag.* 126 λοιδορία τις ἐγένεθ' ἡμῖν; *πώμαλα*; οὐδ' εἶπον οὐδέν; (3) *Pherecr.* Ἀγριοὶ *Fr.* 9 (Mein.) οὐδ' ἀποπροσωπίζεσθε κνᾶμοις; *πώμαλα* (where Meineke says '*πώμαλα* addidi e Grammat. Bekkeri p. 433, 18 ubi Φ. Ἀγρίους'); (4) *Lys. ap. Suid.* l.c. γενναίως γὰρ αἱ γυναῖκες *πώμαλα* ἔφασαν ὀρχησθαι αὐτάς, δέον οὐδὲ πιονύσας ἀπηλλάχθαι τοῦ συμποσίου; (5) *Demosth. de Cor.* 56 καίτοι καὶ ἐπιστολὰς ἔπεμψεν ὁ Φίλιππος δύο καλούσας ἡμᾶς οὐχ ἵν' ἐξέλθῃτε *πώμαλα*; οὐ γὰρ ἂν ποτε —ἐκάλεε. Harpocration (s.v.) remarks that the word was frequent in Old Comedy.

The word is evidently a very emphatic negative (whence Suidas's οὐδόλως), of the kind frequent in ordinary speech, to which it probably belongs.

The passage from Lysias seems to mean 'The women boldly declared that they had not yet danced, when they were required to

be off from the banquet without so much as a drink.' Probably the γυναῖκες were ὀρχηστρίδες, who had been invited to amuse the guests, and resented their rude dismissal by some one who preferred hearing himself talk metaphysics to seeing them dance (cf. Plato's *Protagoras*, 347 C). The translation 'not yet,' or 'not yet indeed' would (I think) suit the other passages equally well; in (1) and (5) it seems particularly appropriate, if only we bear in mind the idiomatic use in Attic of οὐπῶ for οὐποτε, commented on (as a friend has pointed out to me) by Porson on *Eur. Hec.* 1260. I think therefore that *πώμαλα* is an expressive vulgarism for οὐπῶ μάλα, like δένος for οὐδένος in the well-known line of Alcaeus καὶ κ' οὐδὲν ἐκ δένος ἂν γένοιτο (*Frag.* 76), and possibly δαμά for μηδαμί in Parmenides 52 (see Dr. Jackson in the *Journal of Philology*, No. 41, p. 75).

The word βάναντος is explained by Suidas thus: πᾶς τεχνίτης διὰ πυρὸς ἐργαζόμενος βάννος γὰρ ἢ κάμινος. This explanation is accepted by L. and S., the latter part of the word being connected with αἶω (as if βάναντος), but it is difficult to believe it right.

The word irresistibly reminds one of the Boeotian βανά for γυνή: it certainly has not the look of an Attic word. Is it permissible to conjecture that the Athenians borrowed the word from the Boeotians to express the contempt which they felt for servile mechanical drudgery such as a veritable ἱς Βοιωτία might perhaps perform for her lord and master? Hesychius gives us βανήκας, γυναικας Βοιωτοί; if we might postulate a stem βανανκ-, \*βάνανσος (βανανκ-ιος), an adjective formed from it, would in Attic become βάναντος as μέσσος becomes μέσος. Perhaps some Σικελός τις ἀνὴρ, if possible a comparative philologist, may know of some instance of the stem βανανκ- in Greek or other Indo-European languages.

J. ADAM.

## AESCH. CHOEPH. 623—630.

In reading the three orations of Choricus, a sophist contemporary with Justinian, which have been edited within the last two years by Prof. Richard Förster of Breslau—the *Miltiades* and the two *Orationes Nuptiales*—I came on a formula which he seems to have affected, occurring as it does twice.

*Milt.* 81 (p. 14 F.), ἐπειδὴ δὲ τοῦ Ἀπόλλωνος ἐμνήσθην, εἰς ἑτέρου χρησμοῦ μνήμην ἀφῆμαι. *Orat. Nupt.* ii. 33 (p. 23 F.), ἐπεὶ δὲ Ἀχιλλέως ἐμνήσθην, εἰσῆλθέ μοι μνήμη καὶ τῆς ἀσπίδος ἐκείνου ἣν ἐποίησεν Ἥφαιστος. In both cases the rhetorician passes from one legend to another which it helps to recall.

The similarity of this formula to the well-known difficulty in *Choeph.* 623 ἐπεὶ δ' ἐπεμυσάμην ἀμειλίχων πόνων κ.τ.λ. is striking. It suggests that the outline of construction in both cases was the same. As Choricus makes his apodosis begin, now with ἀφῆμαι, now with εἰσῆλθέ μοι μνήμη, so Aeschylus must have done if we had his words as he wrote them. But the metre of 628 ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ δῆϊός ἐπικότως ἔβας (so *M*) is wrong, and proves that the text of the MSS. is corrupt. An anonymous critic quoted by Scholefield proposed to alter ἐπικότως ἔβας into ἐπικότως ἔβαν. This would agree very nearly with Choricus' εἰς ἑτέραν μνήμην ἀφῆμαι, and

restore the metre of the verse adequately and satisfactorily. We still lack however a construction for the accusatives γαμήλευμα, μῆτιδας. This I propose to find in δῆϊός, which with a very slight change I would write δηλοῖς = δηλοῦσα—

ἐπ' ἀνδρὶ δηλοῖς ἐπικότως ἔβαν,

'I pass, in natural order, to tell of a nuptial rite that ended in the wife plotting to kill her husband,' *sc.* the marriage of Clytemnestra with Agamemnon.

*Agam.* 1537, 8.

δίκα δ' ἐπ' ἄλλο πρᾶγμα θήγει βλάβης  
πρὸς ἄλλαις θηγάνας † μοῖρα.

Musgrave conj. μάχαιρον for μοῖρα, Housman would read θηγάνας αἶον. I fancy the word may be αἶρα, an axe. Callimachus used this rare word in the sense of 'hammer,' *fr.* 129 Schneider. One of the authorities there cited will show this. Eustath. on *Od.* x. 75, p. 1648, 10 αἱ σφῦραι ὅτε μὲν βαιοτήρες κοινότερον, ὅτε δὲ αἶραι, ὡς καὶ ἄλλαχού ἐδηλώθη, οὐ χρήσεις (? χρήσις) ἐν τῷ αἰράων ἔργα διδασκόμενοι. But it had another meaning, 'axe,' Hesych. αἶρα· σφῦρα, ἀξίνη. 'Justice is sharpening on other whetstones for another deed of wrong its axe.'

ROBINSON ELLIS.

## TWO PELIGNIAN INSCRIPTIONS IN SATURNIAN METRE.

The thirteenth inscription in Zvetaieff, *Inscr. Ital. Inf. Dialecticae*, is one from the neighbourhood of Corfinium, written in alliterative language which reminds one of the Saturnian epitaphs of the Scipios<sup>1</sup>—

pracom x  
usur pristafalacirix prismu petiedu ip uidadu  
qibdu omnitu uranias ecuc empratois  
x lisaust cerfum sacaracirix semunu suad

<sup>1</sup> Prof. Thurneysen objects that the carrying on of the final word of a clause to the beginning of the next line, praiceime Perseponas | Afedd, (*in regnum* (?) *Proserpinae* | *Abiit*), is not in the Saturnian style. But we have exactly the same thing in one of the Scipio epitaphs (*C.I.L.* i. 33: Quare lubens te in gremio, Scipio, recipit | Terra).

In the Pelignian inscription I indicate by dots under the letters that the first letters of vv. 1, 2, 3, 5, and the last of v. 2, are not quite certain, and by crosses that the first of v. 4 and the last of v. 1 are completely illegible. The letters v and u are not distinguished on the stone.

aetatu firata fertlid praiceime perseponas  
afedd. eite uus pritrome pacris puus ecic  
lexe. lifar dida uus deti hanustu herentas

(See Zvetaieff *l.c.*, and the corrections by Pauli *Altital. Stud.* v.) Each word is separated by a triangular mark, but after afedd v. 6, and lexe v. 7 is a round dot. In the Pelignian dialect of Corfinium, which seems closely related to the Oscan, are a few other inscriptions (*Zv.* 14 *sqq.*), the largest of which (no. 14) is, like no. 13, alliterative, and probably metrical:

pes pros ecuf incubat  
casnar oisa aetate  
c anaes solois des forte  
faber

One of the peculiarities of the dialect is the use of a crossed D, which I have

indicated by *d* (italic) in the words *petiedu*, *uidadu*, *uibdu*, *afded*. This cannot be the Umbrian modification of intervocalic *d*, written *rs* in Latin characters; for the 3rd sing. subj. of the verb 'to give,' in Umbrian *dirsa*, is in our inscription *dida* with no difference between intervocalic and initial *d*. Prof. Thurneysen's suggestion (*Rhein. Mus.* 43, p. 348) that the Pelignian letter expressed some modification of the consonantal *i* (*y*) sound, like Gothic *iddja*, 'I went,' from the root *ei*, 'to go,' or Welsh *cledd*, 'the left,' from the root *clei*, and so was an anticipation of the modern Italian palato-dental sound, written *-ggi-*, of *maggio* (Lat. *maior*), *peggio* (Lat. *peior*), *oggi* (Lat. *hodie*), etc., would make the Latin equivalents of these words: *Pet(t)ieia* (or *Pettiedia*), *uiiad-*, *Vibia* (or *Vibidia*), *abiiit*, and is probably right; for *Vibius*, *Pettius*, and their cognates *Vibidius*, *Pettiedius*, etc., are names of common occurrence on inscriptions of this district and of the surrounding country, (e.g. *C.I.L.* ix. 6330 *Pettius* (Corfinium); 6335 *Vibia Sullia* (Corf.); 2032 *Vibia Prima*; 1403 *Vibia Tertia*; 3270 *Petiedius Secundus* (Corf.); and the proximity of *afded*, *eite uus* (*abiiit. Ite vos*) is quite in the early epitaph style. The condition of the stone leaves it uncertain how much of the left side of the inscription has been lost. The lines would however be of unusual length if they were longer than those visible on the stone; and the natural sequence of *afded* (*abiiit*) on *praicime* *Perseponas* (*in regnum*?) *Proserpinae* inclines me to suppose that the inscription, as we have it, is complete on both sides, though defective at the top.

The disposition of alliterative words in Latin Saturnian lines gives us a clue for the arrangement of the verses of the epitaph in some fashion like this:

- v. 1. ———— *pracom* ————
- v. 2. *Uſur priſtafalacirix* || *Prismu Petiedu*
- v. 3. *Ip uidadu Vibdu* || *Omnitu Uranias*
- v. 4. *Ecuc empratois x lisuist Cerfum* || *sacacirix Semunu*
- v. 5. *Suad aetatu firata fertlid* || *praicime Perseponas*
- v. 6. *Afded. Eite vus pritrome* || *pacris puus ecic*
- v. 7. *Lexe. Lifar dida vus* || *deti hanustu Herentas.*

With the exception of the second hemistich of the last line, which seems, like the last line of the Saturnian epitaph on *Naevius*, to have three accents, these lines will suit the requirements of the accentual scansion of Latin Saturnians, viz. 3 accents

in the first hemistich, 2 in the second, a polysyllable displaying a secondary as well as a main accent, e.g.

*dabunt malum Metelli* || *Naevio poetae,*  
and  
*onerarias onustae* || *stabant in flustris.*

For *suad-aetate* (Lat. *sua-aetate*), *eite-vus* (Lat. *ite-vos*), *dida-vus* (Lat. *det-vobis*) (alliterating with the neighbouring word *deti*) will, like *x lisuist* (a 3 Sg. Perf. Ind. Pass., Lat. *-sa est, -sast*), be each joined under one accent, and the relative *puus* (Lat. *qui* Nom. Pl. Masc.) with possibly the adverb *ecuc* (Lat. *huc*) will be unaccented. They will also, without much manipulation, exhibit the number of syllables which is normal in the Latin Saturnians, viz. 7 in the first hemistich, 6 in the second, two neighbouring short syllables in the same word being allowed to stand for one syllable, if we may pronounce *eit(e)-vus* as two syllables, (like *mitt(e)-me* of Plaut. *Pseud.* 239), and elide the vowels in *det(i)* *hanust(u)* *Herentas* (*dite honesta Herentas*). The second hemistich of v. 6 seems to have only five syllables, as second hemistichs of Latin Saturnians occasionally have, e.g. *fuisse uirum* or *stabant in flustris*; and the extra-long<sup>1</sup> first hemistichs of vv. 4 and 5, with eight(?) syllables each, echo each others' rhythm (cf. vv. 6—7 *Afded. Eite and Lexe. Lifar*), like the irregular first hemistichs of a couplet of *Livius Andronicus*:

*Namque nullum prius* || *macerat humanum*  
*Quamde mare saeuom,* || *vis-et-cui sunt-magnae.*

Rhyme, of the final syllable of each hemistich, an occasional ornament of Latin Saturnians, occurs only in v. 4, *Cerfum... Semunu(m)*. The other inscription satisfies

<sup>1</sup> Irregularly long lines on metrical epitaphs, are often caused by the insertion of 'tags,' like those bracketed in this Latin 'Iambic' epitaph (*C.I.L.* i. 1027):

*Hospes, resiste, et hoc ad grunum [ad laeuam] aspice,*  
*Ubi continentur ossa hominis boni [misericordis,*  
*amantis, pauperis.]*

*Rogo te, viator, monumento huic nil [male feceris],*  
where the metre has been woefully deformed by the substitution of *ad laeuam aspice* for the *respiece* of the model, and *male feceris* for *laeseris*. Justice is done to the good qualities of the deceased, at the expense of the verse, in line 2. An example of the same thing in Saturnian verse is perhaps v. 2 of the Falisco-Latin inscription (*Zv. I.I.I. 72 a*), in the first hemistich:

*Opiparum ad neitam quolundam* || *festosque dies.*  
But in the Pelignian epitaph the parallel rhythm of the two half-lines of vv. 4—5 saves the credit of the versifier. With *ecuc* and *suad* they have only one syllable too many, if *firata* (*firata* or *f(i)rata*?) be the equivalent of two syllables.



the syllable-test better, in the first hemistichs at least :

pes pros ecuf incubat || casnar, oisa aetate,  
C(aeso) Anaes, solois || des, forte faber,

but it has three accents in each hemistich, if we include under one accent ecuf-incubat or pes-pros. Its meaning too can be made out with more certainty. Pes is perhaps Lat. *pedes*, Acc. Pl. (or else = *viator*, Voc. Sg.); pros Lat. *\*paros* (cf. *parum*) (or Lat. *probus*); ecuf is Lat. *hic*, as if *\*ec(c)ubi* (cf. Oscan *puf*, Lat. *ubi*); incubat, Lat. *incubat*; casnar is the ordinary Oscan word for an old man (Paul. Fest. 33, 18 Th.: 'casnar' senex Oscorum lingua), connected with Lat. *cānus*, for *\*casnus*, *cascus*, here perhaps alliterating with in-cubat, like Naevius' Saturnian: *prima in-cedit Cereris Proserpina puer*; oisa, for *\*oiss-*, is Lat. *usū*, in passive sense, like *abusa*, *abussa* in Plaut. *Astn.* 196 (cf. Gell. 15, 13: 'utor te' et 'utor abs te'); aetate is Lat. *aetate*, for *\*aevetate* with syncope of -vū-, apparently 'Abl.' Absolute or 'Abl.' of description, though we should expect aetatu(d), as in no. 13, for the ablative (cf. Osc. *ligud*, Lat. *lege*, *tanginud* etc.); C. may be expanded to Caeso, Lat. *Kaeso*, or, with C for G, as perhaps Zv. 28 Anceta for *Angitia*, to Gāvies, Gāvis, Lat. *Gaius* symbolized by C. not G.; if *Kaeso*, I would read the same name as here, *Kaeso Annaeus*, on that very ancient bucchero vase found at Ardea, *ego K. Anaio(s?)*, not *Fanaio* (Not. Scav. 1882, p. 273): solois for *\*sollois* is Abl. Pl. of Osc. *sollo*, Lat. *totus* (Fest. 426, 6 Th.: 'Sollo' Osce dicitur id quod nos totum vocamus); des is Lat. *dives*, with the same syncope of -vū- as in aetate (cf. Ter. *Adelph.* 770: *dis quidem esses, Demea*); forte faber at once suggests the Latin proverb: *faber est suae quisque fortunae*; forte however could hardly be a Gen. but might be an 'Abl.' like aetate above, or an Acc., forte(m) losing its -m, like *Semunu(m)* in no. 13, before an initial consonant. The Acc. might be governed by the noun or adj. faber: like *quid tibi hanc tactiost?* of Plautus. But Lat. *faber*, I. Eur. *\*dhabhro-*, ought to be in Pel. *\*fafer* (cf. *Rufrius* for Lat. *Rubrius* on an inscr. of Corfinium, *C.I.L.* ix. 3260), and neither incubat (for *\*encubat*) nor aetate (for aetatud) justify us in supposing that the language of this inscription is Latinized Pelignian, so that the rendering of forte faber as *fortunae* (sc. *suae ipse*) faber is very doubtful. If Lat. *faveo* stands for *\*fagveo*, (but cf. Umbr. *fons*) Forte faber might be 'favoured by Fortune,' like *ferro lacer* 'lacerated by the

sword.' The whole inscription will then be in Pelignian Latin: *pedes paros*, (1 *viator*, *probus*) *hic incubat casnar* (i.e. *senex*), *usū* (*confecta*) *aetate*, *Kaeso Annaeus*, *sollis* (i.e. *omnibus rebus*) *dives*, *Fortunā(?) adjutus*.

In the first inscription, v. 2 *usur pristaf-alacirix* might be Nom. Sg. as well as Nom. Pl. for *\*uxōr(ē)s pristafātrix(ē)s*, with *pri-* corresponding to Lat. *prae* (cf. Paul. Fest. 282, 27 Th.), in Latin *uxorēs praestabulatricēs*, but the Plur. seems to be required here, for two 'temple priestesses' (?) appear to be mentioned (1) *Pettiedia Prima* (the name *Pettiedia* is not found on Inscr. of this part of Italy. *Prima*, like *Primilla*, *Secunda*, *Tertia* etc. is a common cognomen); (2) *Vibidia Omnita* (-*hī*- is not palatalized in modern Italian, e.g. *rabbia*, Lat. *rabies*, Fr. *rage*). Women have a double name on Pel. Inscr., e.g. Zv. 21 (Peligno-Latin) *Saluta Obellia*, 28 *Saluta Scafia* etc. I take *Omnita* (like *Copiosa* in *C.I.L.* ix. 501 *Cominia Copiosa*) for *\*Op-nita*, lit. 'blest with wealth,' as *Saluta* is 'blest with health,' or it may correspond to the common cognomen *Optata*; ip is *ibi* (cf. Osc. *ip*, Zv. 136, 34 *pai ip ist*, Lat. *quae ibi est*); v. 3 *Uranias* is Gen. Sg. of Greek *Οὐρανία* (1 alliterating with *Omnita*). v. 4 *ecue* is probably Lat. *huc*, as if *\*ec(c)uc(e)* 'hither'; *empratois* is *imperatis*, Abl. Pl. (cf. Osc. *embratur*, Lat. *imperator*); *Cerfum* is Gen. Pl., of the name or epithet of a deity (cf. Umbr. *Prestate Cerfie Cerfe Marties*, Lat. *praestituae Cerfuae Cerfi Martii*); *sacaracirix* is Lat. *sacrātrix*; *Semunu(m)* is Gen. Pl., agreeing with *Cerfum*, rather of Lat. *Semo*, *Sēmūnum*, than of Greek *Σεμῦν*, *Sēmūnum*, which would require *Cerfāsum*; v. 5 *suad* (Zv. reads *sua*) is *suā*, Abl. (cf. Zv. 35 *suois*, Osc. *σῶα[2]*); aetatu(d) is *aetate*, Abl. Sg. of Cons. Stem., whether Abl. Abs. or governed by *af-* of *afded*, *abiit*; *firata(d)* may then be Abl. Sg. Fem. of some Perf. Part. Pass. with the sense of Lat. *fī-nī-ta*; *fertlid* is *fertili*, Abl. Sg. of I-Stem (cf. Osc. *prae-sentid*, *slaagid*), *praicim-e(n)* *Perseponas* is in *regnum* (?) *domum* *Proserpinae*, *praicim* (probably an IO-Stem, *praicim-e* having a long middle syllable, and so corresponding to *sacarācirix* v. 4, *Omnita* v. 3) being possibly some poetical word brought into requisition here to alliterate with *Perseponas* (*Περσεφόνης*); v. 6 *afded* is *abiit*, 3 Sg. Pft. (3 Pl. would be *\*afdens*); *eite vus* is *ite vōs*; *pritrom-e(n)* is Lat. *\*praeterum-in*, 'forward,' 'continuing your journey'; *pacris* is Nom. Pl. of stem *pācri-*, Lat. *pacati*, *propitii*, *benevolentes*; *puus* is Nom. Pl. Masc. Lat. *quī*, with the Nom. Pl. termination of

O-Stems (cf. Osc. *bivos*, Lat. *vivi*); ecic is Lat. *hoc*, as if \**ec(c)id-c(e)*, Acc. Sg. Neut. (cf. Osc. *ek(k) sakaraklom*); v. 7 *lexe* is *legistis*, \**lextis*, as if \**lexte*, 'have read'; *dida(d)* is Lat. *det*, Umbr. *dida*; *vus* for \**vōfs*, Lat. *vōbis*, as if \**vōbus*, \**vōbis* (cf. pros perhaps for \**prōfs*, Lat. *prōbus* on no. 14); *deti* is, I think, Acc. Sg. Neut. of *des* (no. 14), Lat. *dices*, like the (suppositious?) *hoc dite* of Priscian (i. 248, 18; 338, 3 H) with Plur. *ditia*, rather than Gen. Pl. *deti(m)*, (Lat. *ditium*, beside *ditum*), which would retain -m before initial *k*; *hanustu* will then rather be Lat. *honesta*, with the same relation of *a* to *o* as in Latin *atrox* and *odium* etc. (see von Planta's new *Grammar of the Osco-Umbrian Dialects*, vol. i. p. 115), than Lat. *onusta*, *honusta*; *Herentas* is the Oscan *Venus* (cf. Osc. *Herentatef* *Herukinaf*, *Veneri Erycinae*).

The words least satisfactorily explained as yet are *uidadu* v. 2, × *lisuist* v. 4, *lifar* v. 7. Zvetaieff's reading *uidad*, which Prof. Thurneysen explains as Abl. Sg. of A-Stem, is unlikely; for -*d* seems to be dropped before initial *v* (*dida vus*) and *f* (*aetatu firata* fertlid). The word *ecuc*, 'hither,' suggests some verb of bringing, conveying, or the like. In Oscan and Umbrian there seems to have been a verb *vehā*, which would correspond to a Latin \**viāre*. The Oscan noun for *vectura* was *veitura* (Paul. Fest. 560, 17 Th.: 'veia' apud Oscos dicebatur *plaustrum*: inde 'veiri' stipites in *plaustro*, et *vectura* 'veitura'); and both Oscan *eehiianasom* (*Rhein. Mus.* 1888, p. 9), Lat. \**ēvehīandarum*, and Umbrian *ehiato* (*Tub. Ig.* vii. B 2), Lat. \**ēvehīatos*, are compounds of this verb with the preposition *ex*, *ē*, showing the same absorption of the syllable -*vē*- as is seen in Latin *trāho* for \**trā(s)-veho*, from *trans* and *veho*. But the Perf. Part. Pass. Fem. of this verb would be *vidatu* not *vidadu*; and we have no reason to believe that a 3 Sg. Preterite Ind. Pass. was formed in the Italic languages in any other way (such as by adding -*u(r)*, -*er*, -*ir* to a 3 Sg. Pret. Ind. Act., *vidad* like Lat. *amat* (t) for *amavit*, becoming Pass. *vidadur*, *vidader*) than by the combination of the Participle with the Subst. Verb. A better solution of the difficulty would be to connect the word with the Latin *viator*, *viatores*, Voc. Sg. or Plur., and suppose the Dental Media to be substituted for the Dental Tenuis by influence of the *r* (cf. *Sadries*, Zv. 33, Lat. *Satrius*, Osc. *Sadiriis*, but Osc. *embratur*, Lat. *imperator*, Pel. *empratois*). But it seems to me that *ibi*, requires some further indication of place—of the

place, I take it, where the former of the two priestesses, whose simultaneous deaths are recorded, was buried, and that *ip* 'in that place' does not go well with *ecuc* 'to this place.' So I prefer to regard -*du* as the preposition, or rather 'postposition,' \**do*, appended,<sup>1</sup> in the fashion of *e(n)* in *praicim-e*, *prित्रom-e*, to the noun, and make *vida(m)-du ad viam*, *viam versus*, understanding *uida(m)-du* to supply the needed antithesis to *ecuc*. The *ip*, *ibi*, will then refer to some place mentioned in the lost first line, and the verb of motion required for *ecuc*, 'hither,' 'into this tomb,' will be × *lisuist*. For the missing initial letter or letters of this word the alliterative character of the inscription suggests *c* (cf. *Cerfum*) or *ē* (cf. *ecuc empratois*). *Clisuist* has been compared to Lat. *clūsa est*, a by-form of *clausa est*, 'has been entombed'; but even granting that the *ū* of *clūdo* is original *ū*, and not the reduction of *au* in the unaccented syllable, *inclūsa*, *exclūsa*, etc., the name *Salūta*, Zv. 16, 21 should be on this theory \**Salita*. It might better be connected with Umbr. *kletra*, 'a litter.' But *clisuist* for *en-lisuist* (*en-clisuist*, *e(n)clisuist* is unlikely, for *enc-* in *incubat* no. 14 becomes *inc-*) is possible as giving the same number of syllables to this hemistich as *hem. i* (with *firāta*) of v. 5, and because alliteration is frequently produced by the juxtaposition of two compounds with the same preposition (e.g. *contemptim conterit*, *Naev. Plaut.*). In the last line, *lifar* is most naturally construed as Acc. Sg. of some neuter noun, indicating the boon to be granted by the goddess *Herentas*, and qualified by the Adj. *deti*, 'rich.' The whole inscription will then be in Pelignian Latin:—*...uxores praestabulatrices, Prima Pettidia ibi viam versus, Vibidia Omnita*

<sup>1</sup> The Prepositions in early Latin were probably, as in the Italic dialects, more often appended than in classical Latin, or placed between the noun and a qualifying word, e.g. *praicim-e Perseponas*. I would so explain the beginning of the Dvenos Inscription: *Ioueis* (t-es) *at deiuos, Jovios ad deos*, the *di Jovii* in contrast to the *di Mānes* (on the Dvenos Inscr. stem *Māno-* lit. 'good,' Varro *L.L.* 6, 4). Cf. *Eph. Epigr. VIII.* 460 (Capua) *Venerus Joviae*; *Not. Scav.* 1880, p. 479 (Rome) *Herculi Jovio*. The Dvenos Inscription prescribes that the sacrificial vessel, on which it is written, shall be used in the worship only of *Mānus* (cf. *Summānus* and in *Carm. Sal.* ap. Paul. Fest. 87, 29, Th. *Cerus Mānus*), or of *Ops Titēriae* (cf. the name *Tutisulanus*, *Not. Scav.* 1890, p. 47; and for the form of the title, *Gell.* 13, 22, 2.)

Prof. Brugmann now explains the Latin Gerundive by this appended \**do*, which he makes *dō* or *dē*, e.g. Lat. *en-dō*, *en-du*, *dō-ni-cum*, Av. *vasman-da*, Gk. *ἡμέτερον-δε*, *ἡμέτερον-δω*. *Laudandus* is \**laudam-do* 'one to praise' (*Grundr.* II. p. 1425). I would rather make *dus*-a Verbal Adjective 'giving praise.' Cf. *ruborem dō*, *venum-dō*.

*Uranias huc imperatris invecta (?) est, Cerforum  
sacratriz Semonum; suā aetate finitā fertili  
in regnum (?) Proserpinae abiit. Ite vos*

*praeter (porro) pacati (benevolentes) qui hoc  
legistis. Copiam (?) det vobis divitem honesta  
Herentas.* W. M. LINDSAY.

## T. S. BRANDRETH.

T. S. BRANDRETH, fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge, is, so far as I know, the only editor who attempted to follow up the work of Knight by another edition of the *Iliad*. The date of his book is 1841. Concerning Brandreth himself I know no more than this, and that he also published a Dissertation on Homeric metre which has some valuable observations in it; let the curious look up the *Dictionary of National Biography*. I have never seen his *Iliad* alluded to in even the most distant manner, but I hope to show that he must not be entirely neglected in the future.

We reconstructors of Homer remind me (or should I be more grammatical in saying 'myself'?) of the famous criticism of Byron by Goethe. 'Kühnheit' and 'Keckheit' we have, most of us at any rate, but alas! there is that opposite depressed scale: 'sobald er reflectirt ist er ein Kind.'<sup>1</sup> True enough is this of Brandreth anyhow. Take for example his *δρα* for *δφρα*, for *δφρα* if you please is nought but a corruption of *δρα* (i.e. *δρα*), his *υῖν* (Δ 473) for *νιόν*, his *δφω* = *δov*, where Knight had already seen the truth, his *δovρω* as dative of *δδov*. O Kühnheit und Keckheit! Accents he eschews, a matter wherein I confess to sympathizing deeply with him, though the argument that Homer certainly did not use them might perhaps enable us to dispense with the necessity of using any alphabet at all, and should at least restrict us to a pre-Euclidean one. But it is not much avail to rake up such details; let us rather look at the bright side of the shield, and do what honour we may at this late date to a man who deserved more than he ever got.

I will give some illustrations of Brandreth's work without further preface.

A 90. 'ει κ'. Vulgo *ην*, sed Homerus tales contractiones raro admittit, et *αν* meo iudicio vox ei ignota erat. Ita *επην* et *επειδαν* recentiorum inventa sunt.

B 672. *Χαροπος* for *Χαρופן*, coll. A 426. Very doubtful.

<sup>1</sup> See Arnold's Preface to *Poetry of Byron*; Goethe's *Conversations with Eckermann*, Dec. 16, 1828, Jan. 18, 1825.

Γ 140. *και Αργεος*, 'patria semper Αργος et non *φαστυ*.' Ingenious but improbable.

373. *ημετο* for *ηματο*. See also Ξ 510, X 393. Cobet at present enjoys the credit of this.

Δ 384. *επι Τυδεί τελευαν*. So Menrad, followed by van Leeuwen and Da Costa, an admirable and I think certain correction.

E 293. *εξελευθεν* with astonishment that no one had seen it before him. So Ahrens.

349. *οιχ αλς* for *η οιχ αλς*. 'Homerus huiusmodi elisiones non admittit.' So elsewhere.

396. *αυτος* for *ωυτος*.

782. *φλισσι* for *λειουσι*, and elsewhere.

Z 508. *λοεσθαι* for *λουεσθαι*. 'ευρειος vox nihili' but one can hardly commend *εωφροφω*.

I 533. *η λαβετ' η ενοσηεν* for *η οικ ενοσηεν*, with remark that crasis of *η οικ* is un-Homeric and that the negative ruins the sense.

Λ 696. *Κριναμενος τε τριηκοσι*, coll. A 307, 329.

N 707. *ταμεσθαι* for *τεμει δε τε*, coll. I 576. See Leaf.

O 290. *και F' εσαωσεν*, arguing that *και* 'ante vocalem producitur' only in Ω 60, 570, 641. But qu?

339. *Μηκιστη δε Πουλυδαμας*. So Nauck.

Π 779. *βουλυτονδε*, ad horam secundam post meridiem; tunc enim boves ab aratro solvuntur.' This in the main correct explanation was proposed by Mr. Frazer in the *Classical Review* for Oct. 1888; add to his illustrations the following from *La Petite Fadette*, chap. xxi.: 'C'était l'heure de délier les bœufs, parce qu'ils avaient fait leur demi-journée.' But why should Brandreth be so positive about the exact hour?

Ω 154. *ος F' αξει*. 'This brilliant discovery,' says Leaf, was made by Bekker and afterwards by Cobet, and has suggested the same restoration in other passages. The correctness of this conjecture when once made is quite obvious.' Whether Brandreth was led by this passage to introduce the pronoun elsewhere I do not know; anyhow he does introduce it very freely indeed. In B 102—7, six lines, he has inserted it six

times. But like the rest of us he has often introduced it when the order of the words makes it impossible—e.g. Y 340: *ὡς φειδὼν λίπε F' αὐτόθ'.* (See *Monro H.G.* § 365 2nd ed.)

These instances will be enough to show

that it will be as impossible to neglect Brandreth as Knight. It is no small satisfaction to me to be the means of rescuing from undeserved oblivion a Fellow of my own College, *ad maiorem Trinitatis gloriam.*

ARTHUR PLATT.

#### BUSTS OF JULIUS CAESAR.

I NEED hardly say that I entirely agree with Mr. Tilley in his remarks on the portraits in my *Life of Caesar*. In justice however to my good friend Mr. Putman,—the most obliging of publishers, save in this one matter of illustrations,—I must take blame to myself for not having alluded in the preface or elsewhere to the very doubtful evidence in favour of other portraits besides that on page 78. I would myself have preferred to limit the illustrations to two or three portraits of Caesar himself, and as a consequence failed to take sufficient trouble about the others that were pressed upon me.

Mr. Tilley's note however gives me an opportunity of drawing attention to an omission which neither he nor any of my reviewers seems to have noticed. The Berlin basalt bust of Caesar, to which I made allusion in the preface, does not appear in the volume; it was unaccountably omitted after the sheets had gone out to New York, and the bad representation of the Vatican bust seems to have been substituted for it. Of all the so-called busts of Caesar this is the most singular and in some ways the most interesting. Bernoulli is very sceptical about it, and no doubt justly so, but it appears to me to have at least one or two points in common with the coins, and the exceeding hardness of the basalt may, I suppose, possibly account for some of the points of difference. I have not seen the

original, but I was greatly attracted by a fine cast of it shown me by Professor Michaelis in his gallery at Strassburg, and a letter which he afterwards very kindly wrote to me on the subject, quoting Conze's somewhat doubtful opinion and at the same time giving me his own, made me wish to include it in my book, with the word of warning which does actually appear in my preface.

If this strange and realistic bust is not a portrait of Caesar, it must at least be a portrait of some remarkable man. It is in fact so striking that it would be a great boon to all who are interested in Caesar's personality if the question as to its genuineness could be even approximately settled by experts. What Bernoulli says of it is certainly not the last word that can be said. And I take advantage of Mr. Tilley's remarks to invite specialists to concentrate their attention on a question of such real and lasting interest; for if it be Caesar at all, it must, I think, be the one real and unidealized portrait of him; while if it must be reckoned altogether doubtful, we should at any rate be able to rid our minds of an impression which it is not easy to shake off, so long as the strange features of this bust are even dimly associated in our minds with the Dictator.

W. WARDE FOWLER.

#### THE BERLIN PAPYRI.

*Aegyptische Urkunden aus den königlichen Museen zu Berlin, herausgegeben von der Generalverwaltung. Griechische Urkunden, Hefte 1—3* (Berlin, Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1892). Each Mk. 2.40.

Of the four great collections of papyri, in London, Paris, Berlin, and Vienna (Leyden

does not seem to have maintained its position of late years), that at Berlin has hitherto been the least generally available. It is true that no official publication of this class of manuscript (with the exception of those containing texts of classical authors) has been made by the British Museum since 1839, or by Paris since 1865, and that the



Rainer collection at Vienna is only represented by a catalogue containing brief descriptions of a small selection from its possessions; but these volumes have been supplemented by the publication of a considerable number of texts in various ephemeral journals, chiefly through the industry of Dr. Wessely of Vienna. The Berlin papyri, on the other hand, have remained unknown, with the exception of a few texts published or referred to by Wilcken, and students of the papyrus literature have laboured under the unpleasant sense that their conclusions might be refuted out of this extant but unpublished material. Now, however, the want is being made good by the gradual issue of what promises to be a complete *corpus* of the papyri contained in the Berlin museums. The first three parts have just appeared simultaneously, and subsequent parts are promised at the rate of about ten a year; but no indication is given of the number of years over which the publication is likely to extend. The editors of the three published parts are Wilcken, Krebs, and Viereck, one part being undertaken by each. Dr. Wilcken's work has for several years been known to those engaged in the same field for its soundness and carefulness, and the only complaint that could have been made was that there was too little of it. His colleagues have not hitherto made their mark in this department of research; but if this is their first appearance it is an eminently creditable one.

The mode of publication adopted by the Berlin authorities is open to some criticism. The editors' transcripts of the texts are reproduced in autograph, with no introductions except an official advertisement of the whole series and brief statements of the dimensions and place of discovery of each document. No notes are given except explanations of the symbols employed in the MSS. Dates are interpreted in the margin; but in many instances in the second part and a few in the third, where precise dates are not stated in the documents themselves, no indication is given of the probable age of the writing. This is a serious omission, since the inferences which can be drawn from the documents naturally depend largely on a knowledge of the period to which they belong. No order is observed, either of date or subject or official numeration; the latter at least one would have thought possible, and it would have facilitated references. Finally, no facsimiles are given, so that the interests of palaeography

are in no way furthered by this publication. This is the more to be regretted, since the published materials for fixing the palaeography of the early centuries of our era are still very scanty. On the other hand, this mode of publication has the great advantage of cheapness. Each part (containing thirty-two large pages and, on an average, twenty-seven separate documents) costs little more than two shillings, so that the texts are easily accessible to all who may require them. The absence of system and classification permits of greater rapidity of production, and enables the more important documents to be brought forward at once, if so desired. And the advantage of the actual publication of the texts, in whatever form, is sufficient to counterbalance the fact that the method of publication is not ideally perfect.

Of the accuracy of the transcripts it is of course impossible to speak positively in the absence of facsimiles; but a study of the texts leaves little room for doubt that the work has been most carefully and faithfully executed. The errors which one can be fairly certain are such are few. In no. 14, l. 15, ἐγλόγου should perhaps be printed *divisim*, the same phrase ἐγ (for ἐκ) λόγου τοῦ δαίμονος μνηός occurring more than once in Brit. Mus. Pap. cxxxi. In 36, l. 9 for ὕβριν οὐτήν (where Krels conjectures ταύτην) τυχοῦσαν, read ὕβριν οὐ τὴν τυχοῦσαν. In 38, ll. 17—19, where Krels reads ἰπάγω παρὰ | Σερατιάδα τὴν ζῆτω | πολεῖν, explaining πολεῖν as = πωλεῖν and leaving ζῆτω unaccented, apparently as uncertain, probably the word really intended is τὴν ζυτόπωλιν. In 55, l. 16 the 14th year of Aurelius should be interpreted as A.D. 173/4, not as 174/5. In 71, l. 9 for οὐ[σ]ι τὸν ἐς νότον read οὐ γ(ε)ίτονες νότον (or <ἐς> νότον), according to the phrase common in describing the situation of a house. In 72, l. 12 συχολικην βλάβην presumably stands for οὐκ ὀλίγη βλάβη rather than οὐ χολικὴ βλάβη. Lastly in 73, ll. 9—11, where Viereck gives ἐὰν οὖν τὰ δι' αὐτοῦ δεδηλωμένα ἀχρηθῇ ἢ καὶ μηδὲν ἐμποδίζῃ, explaining ἀχρηθῇ as = ἀχθῇ, the real reading intended must be ἀληθῇ ἢ καὶ κ.τ.λ. This is not a very large catalogue of lapses in a work of this nature, and as a whole the work of all three editors inspires confidence. The danger is lest the absence of facsimiles, which would show where the work of transcription is easy and where difficult, should deprive them of the credit due for their careful and conscientious work.

Of the contents of the documents now published it is not possible to speak at

length within the limits of a review. A few of them have been published previously, but the majority are new. There is nothing in them sensational or of first-class importance, but they contain the material out of which the history of the administration of Egypt under the Roman Empire can be reconstructed. A few of them belong to the Byzantine period, but by far the greater number are dated in the second and third centuries of our era. Only one is as early as the first century (A.D. 51). The official hierarchy of Egypt is largely revealed in these and similar documents. The present publication includes the following officers: the *ἐπιστράτηγος* (of the Heptanomis), the *στρατηγός*, the *ἡγεμών*, the *βασιλικὸς γραμματεὺς* and the *νομογραμματεὺς* of the nome (or, in the case of the Arsinoite nome, of one of the districts into which it was divided), the *ἐπιτηρηταὶ τελωνικῶν*, *ἐπιτηρηταὶ γενημάτων*, *πράκτορες ἀργυρικῶν*, *κωμογραμματεῖς*, *πρεσβύτεροι*, *ἀρχέφοδοι*, *βιβλιοφύλακες*, *χωματεπιμεληταί*, *ὕδροπάροχοι*, *δεκάδαρχος*, *λαογράφοι* (such is probably the proper expansion of *λαογρ.* in 53, l. 4 and elsewhere, rather than *λαογραφοῦμενοι*, which, when written at full length, is always passive), *γραμματεῖς σιτολόγοι*, *κριτής*, *ἀρχιδικαστής*, *λογοθέτης*, and (in a fourth century document) the *πραιπόσιτος πάγου*, *πραιπόσιτος τοῦ λεγεῶνος*, *κώμαρχος*, *κοναδράριος*, *ἐξάκτωρ*, *ἐκατόνταρχος*, and *τρίβουνος*. To classify and arrange these functionaries would require a treatise, and is not to be attempted here; but Dr. Wilcken would do good service if he would expand and continue the dissertation on Egypt as a Roman province in which he has already touched upon part of this subject.

The matters dealt with in these documents are very various, and include census returns, appeals against false registration, certificates of deaths since the last register, official correspondence on points of law and administration, an *ἀργυρικὸς λόγος* or bailiff's account, similar in nature to the British Museum MS. on the back of which the *Ἀθηναίων πολιτεία* is written but very much shorter, an official wiggling from the *ἐπιστράτηγος* to all the *στρατηγοί* of the Heptanomis with one exception, a report by five *πρεσβύτεροι ἱερεῖς πενταφυλίας θεοῦ Σοκνοπαίου* on an information laid against one of their colleagues for letting his hair grow long and wearing woollen garments, private letters, leases, sales, accounts of expenditure, petitions for redress of injuries, and so on. The mention of the month *Νεὸς Σεβαστός* (pap. 1) is interesting in connection with the appearance of the same

unusual name in the British Museum bailiff's account, just referred to. The reference to a *παράδεισος* and a *φονικῶν* in a deed of sale (pap. 50) may also be paralleled among the Museum papyri. On the vexed question of the existence of a fifteen-year cycle of taxation in Egypt under the Romans, before the adoption of the indiction in A.D. 312 as the official method of reckoning dates, some light of a valuable nature is thrown. So far as it goes, the evidence contained in these papyri tends to show that there was some such cycle, but that its duration was for fourteen, not fifteen, years. In nos. 53—59 mention is made of a *κατ' οὐκίαν ἀπογραφή*, in which details are given of the members of the household and all real property held by them, in the 16th year of Hadrian, the 9th, 23rd, and 25th of Antoninus Pius, and the 14th and 28th of Marcus Aurelius (the latter year really falls in the reign of Commodus, but his regnal years were reckoned from the accession of Marcus). But the references to the 25th year of Antoninus must be mistaken, since that emperor did not live to complete his 24th year; and it is therefore probable that in the two passages where this figure occurs (54, l. 5, 55, l. 16) the letters *κε* have been either mis-written or mis-read (in the absence of facsimiles it is impossible to say which is most probable) in place of *κυ*. If this is so, we then have references to *ἀπογραφαί* in the years 131/2, 145/6, 159/60, 173/4, and 187/8. This would be very cogent evidence for a fourteen-year cycle if it stood alone; but it is reinforced by the fact that in two instances, (both in no. 55) the individual making the return refers back to a previous census, and in the one case the reference is from the census of the 23rd year of Antoninus<sup>1</sup> to that of the 9th, in the other from the 14th of Aurelius to the 23rd (written 25th) of Antoninus. If returns were made yearly, such references would be senseless; and we consequently have strong reason to suppose that in the Roman period a revision of the census-lists took place every fourteen years. Why this cycle was replaced by one of fifteen years in the Byzantine period it is impossible to tell; and the view here taken may of course have to be modified by the publication of new material. It should be added that the

<sup>1</sup> The year is not so described in the text, the papyrus being mutilated; but it is evidently the year preceding the 1st of Aurelius (which consists of the latter part of the twelvemonth which began as the 24th of Antoninus).

existence of an *annual* register of the live stock in the possession of private individuals seems clearly to be established by nos. 51 and 52; but, so far as appears from the Berlin papyri already published, there is no indication of an annual revision of the general census-lists.

It is one of the drawbacks of the method of publication adopted by the Berlin authorities that the editors have no oppor-

tunity allowed to them of expressing their opinions on these and other points raised by the texts which they have transcribed. It is to be hoped that this want may be made good, either in the form of excursus attached to the volumes themselves, or, if that is impossible, at least in the multitudinous columns of the academic press in Germany.

F. G. KENYON.

#### RICHTER'S DRAMA OF AESCHYLUS.

*Zur Dramaturgie des Aeschylus*, von P. Richter. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. 1892. Mk. 6.50.

THIS is a book which well repays the easy task of reading it. The author is indeed curiously German in the limits of his horizon. He discusses for instance the views of blood-guilt propounded in the *Eumenides*, without so much as mentioning McLennan, and in a manner which shows that the light thrown on the subject by McLennan's enquiries is wholly unknown to him. Paley and Conington, Patin and Leconte de Lisle, all and every who do not write in the privileged tongue, appear to be ignored: while on the other hand there is much polemic against some German critics who have not at present excited much interest in the world at large and, if we were to judge by Mr. Richter's citations, have not done much to deserve it. Nevertheless Mr. Richter himself is far from repellent to a foreigner. He writes in a clear, simple style: and above all there is in him a straightforward candour, a desire to state the facts and his opinion on the facts, rather than merely to 'score,' which are qualities everywhere rated highly, and will make his discussions as useful to those who may not accept this or that conclusion, as to those who may. Within his circle he appears to be well read; and we have always at any rate the satisfaction of feeling that what lies before us is a real *bona fide* impression, and not a device wrought out to serve some ulterior purpose.

Nothing for example can be more instructive in its way than Richter's account of the *Agamemnon*, which (much as I think it wants, to be even approximately complete) I should, for my own part, like to commend to as many readers as possible. It is needless to say that he, like every one, admires

the play profoundly. His conception of the plot is the traditional conception: and so far is he from any suspicion with regard to it, or any desire to impugn it, that, alone perhaps among those who have handled the subject, he passes without remark the familiar difficulty as to the time of the action. And yet, from his notable candour, from his habit of stating, without reserve and without calculation, his actual feeling and opinion in relation to the particular thing then and there before him, he shows what the traditional theory cannot do, as well as what it can, better and more impressively than any defender of a thesis.

In a final review of the *Agamemnon* Mr. Richter says, that 'it exhibits almost throughout a lively and exciting movement' and that 'the interest of the spectator nowhere flags.' But if we turn back to the details, we find that in this 'almost' are comprised reservations so large as practically to change the main sense of the proposition. First, with regard to the description of the beacons, 'it is,' says the author, 'tedious for us, though it might be not without charm for the Athenian public.' That this as a psychological fact is true, that the unprepared reader does in truth begin to feel impatience in this part of the play, may be ascertained by any one who will experiment upon such readers. And why is this so? Assuredly not for any want of skill in the composition. On the contrary there are few passages of Aeschylus which, detached from the context, would more impress a reader with admiration for the vigour and grandeur of the style. Mr. Richter, without insisting on the point, reveals the cause sufficiently. The only visible or ostensible purpose of Clytaemnestra, in her description of the beacons, is to convince her sceptical hearers 'that her information respecting the fall of

Troy is in all respects true,' and has been transmitted in the manner before alleged. Quite so. But we cannot help seeing, first, that, according to the poet himself, the description does not produce in the hearers any serious and permanent conviction; secondly, that it does not deserve to do so, and does in fact rather aggravate than remove the grounds for astonishment; and thirdly (what is most important of all), that whether the information is believed or not believed, whether the alleged means of communication is or is not trustworthy, are questions in which, upon the common assumption with regard to the subject of the play, we the audience have not the smallest interest. In short, the whole invention of the beacons, in its mechanical aspect as part of the plot, appears *ex hypothesi* to be an ineffectual instrument for doing what nobody wants done. No eloquence, no ingenuity will save such an episode from appearing 'tedious to us'; nor have we, as Mr. Richter well observes in relation to another matter, any reason to suppose that, in these fundamental laws of the intelligence, the ancients were different from ourselves.

We pass to the second *stasimon*; and here we find that, as soon as the reflexions cease to be general, as soon as the chorus begins to deal directly with the facts of the present situation, the spectator, as Mr. Richter honestly says, 'can only shake his head in astonishment' and observe that 'Aeschylus is here guilty of a grave error.' A long and elaborate passage (*vv.* 435-480) describes to us the indignation excited in Argos by the loss of life in the war. What bearing has this upon the matters supposed to be solely in question, the pitiableness of Agamemnon's fall, and the cruelty of Clytemnestra? Is it intended, as it is certainly adapted, to qualify and abate our sympathy for the king? But, says Mr. Richter, enough and too much, if the king is to be our hero, has already been done in this direction by the powerful exposure of his guilt in consenting to the sacrifice of Iphigenia. We shall mourn the less, not the more, for his fate, because his best friends are compelled to acknowledge that many regard him as a tyrant, who has sacrificed to his ambition not only his family but his people too.

Next the herald enters, and for some minutes we are at our ease; so long as he dilates upon the triumph of Agamemnon and his army, we see where we are, and how we are going towards the mark. But 'the words, in which the herald proceeds to describe the sufferings of the army before Troy,

are for the progress of the story irrelevant,' that is to say, we here drift off again from the purpose for some fifty lines more. And when Clytemnestra re-enters, we go back once more to the beacons, which we have already found to be 'tedious.' But worse is to come. 'The rest of the act,' says the critic boldly, 'has no foundation in the progress of the story, and would be better away.' And *ex hypothesi* this is indisputable. The narrative of the storm has no relation at all to the future incident on which our prospective attention is supposed to be fixed, nor can it matter *ex hypothesi* whether the herald departs at once or is further detained, or what passes between him and the elders before his departure. Sixty lines more, in a dramatic aspect, of pure waste. Nor does the following *stasimon*, whatever its merits as an independent piece of poetry, bring us any nearer to the road out of which we have wandered. It is linked to the preceding passage already condemned, and, so far as dramatic interest is concerned, all of it except the conclusion must go along with that passage as 'requiring no special remark.'

And now 'at last,' says the relieved expositor, frankly expressing the feelings which inevitably await the reader who takes up the *Agamemnon* with the traditional preface, 'at last appears the hero of the piece.' With the manner in which he is greeted by the elders Mr. Richter does not appear to be perfectly satisfied, nor is this surprising. 'The poet,' he says, 'does not deserve reproach' for making the salutation turn entirely on the topic of sincerity and insincerity, nor (we may presumably add) for enlarging further upon the same subject in the reply of the king. Perhaps not; but since this topic is irrelevant to the situation, as it has been commonly understood, it is felt, and we must agree, that the poet, if he does not deserve reproach, does at least require a defence.

But now the embarrassments of the traditional exposition really are for a time suspended; and Mr. Richter, like others, sails along with comfort and enjoyment till the entrance of Aegisthus. The episode of Cassandra, being regarded as a 'mere' episode, does indeed appear to him 'somewhat largely extended' by the second part and its 'repetitions'; but this judgment is connected, partly at least, with a doctrine which is not inherent in the traditional view, and will be best considered separately.

However 'with the entrance of Aegisthus the difficulty begins again,' as I should put



it and have put it elsewhere from my own point of view. Mr. Richter does not say this; but he exhibits the fact with an openness which was little to be expected and cannot be praised too much.

Aegisthus openly acknowledges that the whole plan of the murder was constructed by him, and represents it as an act of just revenge. Yet once again the feast of Thyestes with its horrible details is exposed for our contemplation. The retrospect of the play, as a work of art, would not have required this additional repetition. For however true it may be that the recollection of that crime impelled Aegisthus to revenge, he is a personage of so little importance, that we cannot take any lively interest in him, or desire to be confronted again with the question, how far it may have been his right, or even his duty, to act as he did.

Nothing could be truer or more to the point. But surely these are reflexions to make an expository pause and review the road by which he has come. Surely it is somewhat surprising to find that the poet's 'retrospect of the play as a work of art' is so little in accordance with what we have assumed to be his intention, that he insists on presenting us in the conclusion with a person in whom we are not prepared to take interest, with a harangue and a debate upon questions with which we 'have no desire to be confronted.' And all the more so, if we ourselves, in the course of our exposition, have again and again been led by our principles to set aside large portions of the play as 'irrelevant,' 'mistaken,' 'tedious,' 'superfluous,' and 'disproportionate.' It is no object with Mr. Richter to condemn or impeach the structure of the *Agamemnon*: on the contrary he sums up, as we have seen, strongly in its favour, correcting with a bare *almost* his praise of the whole. But if we add together the various passages comprised, on the critic's own showing, in this deduction, they amount upon any reckoning to near a third of the drama; and by reckoning something, as we should do, for those portions, such as the episode of the tapestry, which are but imperfectly explained on the principle assumed, the amount will be raised more near to half of it.

This is the simple truth. So long as we assume that the sole interest of the *Agamemnon* lies in the moral quality of Clytemnestra's act, and that the only incident of importance is the actual death-stroke, so long we must say that the drama is full of extraneous matter, that the poet, admirably as he words everything, is perpetually telling what, with the object proposed, he cannot expect us to hear with interest. We should suppose him to be thinking of something

else. And in fact he is. The parts of the play which Mr. Richter sets aside are precisely those parts which deal, not with the murder itself, but with a matter which no audience, and no competent story-teller, could regard as insignificant or even secondary, the circumstances, that is to say, in which an achievement so extraordinary as that of Aegisthus and Clytemnestra became possible, and the means by which it was effected. The story has necessarily both a domestic aspect and a political. If the politics are neglected, the play inevitably goes to pieces. In the first half there are but two passages, the 'Iphigenia' chorus and the first speech of the herald, which upon the traditional principles are what they should be, which do not detain us needlessly and unwarrantably from the 'entrance of the hero' and real commencement of the action.

If indeed we accepted altogether the view of 'the hero' taken by Mr. Richter, we should have to make our reservations still larger. We must then see, as Mr. Richter does, something not quite harmonious in the narrative relating to Iphigenia. The fate of Agamemnon is tragic partly at least because it is a sudden fall from glory to ruin. But Mr. Richter will have more than this. He thinks that, to make the effect complete, Agamemnon should have an amiable character; he thinks that Aeschylus has represented him so, when he actually appears upon the stage, and that the strong reprobation previously directed upon his conduct in the sacrifice of his daughter, however morally justifiable, is dramatically a drawback and a mistake. I should not myself quite agree with the critic as to the effect produced by Agamemnon when we see him. I think that Mr. Richter overestimates the better points in 'the hero's' behaviour, and overlooks the worse. But this I think is true, that if the intended interest of the play were really so circumscribed as has been commonly thought, then Agamemnon ought to have been more like what Mr. Richter would make him, he ought to have been a better 'hero,' more fully commended to our sympathy. But in fact we are meant, I conceive, to be interested in his fortunes indeed deeply, but not very strongly in him. Certainly nothing detestable is attributed to him; even the sacrifice of Iphigenia may be forgiven, at any rate after his fall, in view of the enormous temptation. In himself, apart from his fortunes, he appears to be just what an average man in his situation would be, neither better nor worse;

gallant and patriotic, but selfish, strongly disposed to regard the rest of the world as his instruments, and little accustomed to consider the feelings of those whom he employs, or the opinion which they may entertain of himself. His part in the piece is not extensive; and the episode of Cassandra, by offering to our sentiments a much more pathetic object (a motive for the episode expressly declared, as we may say, in her final words), effectively prevents us from concentrating them upon Agamemnon, and supports the belief that we were not intended to do so. When the whole scope of the plot is correctly understood, we have no need to make Agamemnon a martyr; and indeed we see that he could not have been so drawn with consistency or likelihood.

The case of Iphigenia introduces us to a matter much discussed in this volume, the attitude of Aeschylus towards the moral problem of fate and the freedom of the will. An English reader will probably think that too much refutation is given to certain critics, whose views, as they here appear, are certainly somewhat perverse. However, if there is really danger in Germany lest readers of Aeschylus should suppose him to lay special stress on the 'freedom' of those who suffer for sin, it is no doubt well that they should be disabused. The contrary is patent: it is patent that Aeschylus, as we know him, though he does not omit to point out that men are not absolutely compelled to sin, is deeply and specially impressed with the undeniable fact, that the pressure of temptation and circumstance is sometimes so strong as to be with difficulty distinguished from compulsion, even by a cool and disinterested mind. He founds on this fact some of his most tragic effects. Both Eteocles and Agamemnon are conspicuous examples. Eteocles when he goes to fight his brother, Agamemnon when he offers up his daughter, do wrong acts which they are, in one sense, quite free not to do; that is to say, there is no physical constraint upon them, and if they had been masters of their passions they might and would have abstained. This the poet shows clearly enough; but he shows at least as clearly the overwhelming strength of the temptation, and the uncontrollable, divinely appointed chain of circumstance by which the temptation is prepared and presented. And as soon as we pass from what is not really disputable, we land in what is really not determinable, in questions upon which each spectator, in a fictitious case as in an actual

case, will decide or incline according to his own character, knowledge, and experience. When Calchas told Agamemnon that if he wished to sail from Aulis he must give up his daughter, he *could* no doubt and he *should* no doubt have let his army break up; he should have deferred his just expedition until, if ever, Artemis should be overruled or better disposed. But how much blame did he deserve for not doing this? How much blame did Cromwell deserve, when he consented to the death of Charles I.? There is no mortal tribunal for such judgments: nor does Aeschylus give, nor was he as an artist required or concerned to give, his personal opinion on the cases which he presents. On the contrary the tremendous interest of them lies just in the fact, that not he nor any unprejudiced person dares to decide with confidence. Interested persons will decide according to their interests, and all will have some reason. In the case of Agamemnon there is room, and room is left by Aeschylus, for infinite shades of opinion, from the elders on the one hand to Clytaemnestra herself on the other, and even beyond these extremes.

There is more, which I would gladly notice, in Mr. Richter's discussion of the *Agamemnon*; but we must pass on, and indeed pass over most of the rest, if we are to keep within reasonable limits. In the *Choephori* Mr. Richter is right in the essential point of laying stress on the divine command and Orestes' fixed resolve to obey it, and right in rejecting all attempts to read into the text any conflict between this and other impulses. We might indeed rightly go further in this direction than he does; for it seems very doubtful whether even after the deed Orestes is supposed to feel what is properly called remorse of conscience. He has certainly ceased to feel it in the *Eumenides*, as Mr. Richter correctly maintains, and even in the closing scene of the *Choephori* we must not fail to observe that it is rather his reason which gives way, than his opinions which change, under the mere physical horror of his position, symbolized and represented by the approach of the Furies. His doubt is not whether he was right in punishing his mother, but whether his mother committed her crime at all. This is madness, but scarcely remorse. However the point cannot be discussed properly without a close investigation of the text. It may be said in passing that some of the chief questions raised upon this scene have been excellently, as I think, and finally answered by Conington. On the scene of

the recognition Mr. Richter takes the middle and commonest view, that the details of it are indefensible but not a serious blemish. He seems indeed to maintain that the mischief could have been cured by simply leaving the details out. But this is scarcely admissible. So far as I see, Electra has just so much reason and no more for entertaining the supposition that the stranger is her brother, as she derives from these 'details' themselves. How much reason this is, and what the data precisely are, is a most important question, which must be reserved for another place.

On the *Eumenides* Mr. Richter has many good observations, notably, for example, upon the arrangements of the opening scene, where he shows, I think, that the natural requirements of the text are not really difficult to accommodate with the disposition which (controverted questions apart) we should assign to the Aeschylean stage. Throughout the book indeed the remarks on the manner of performance are not the least interesting and suggestive. More than once the author calls attention to a point too much neglected, the fondness of Aeschylus for bringing on large numbers of persons, in short, for 'supers.' It is the more necessary to insist on this, because, by the necessity of the case, the indications, in a text denuded of stage-directions, though

sometimes superficially patent, are sometimes such as to escape notice, unless special attention is called to them. On the vexed question of the 'logeion' Mr. Richter apparently inclines to a *non liquet*; and indeed the evidence of the text cannot in strictness compel to a positive conclusion. However inconvenient for a particular scene a particular stage-arrangement may appear to be, it is always possible for the defender of such an arrangement to say that it was 'tolerated by convention'; and to such toleration no limit can be fixed *a priori*. But if we are asked which way the balance inclines, we need not perhaps be so reserved. More and more strongly it appears to me that in the text of Aeschylus there is really no sign of any noticeable and permanent division whatever in the acting-space, and that on the other hand the inconvenience of anything like the 'logeion,' as it was figured till lately, would be so great as we ought not to suppose tolerable, without better external evidence than can in fact be produced.

To sum up—Mr. Richter's book is well worth study, valuable in many of its conclusions, and not less valuable from the way in which, by his clearness and honesty, the author suggests those questions which he may be held not to have answered.

A. W. VERRALL.

#### SANDYS' EDITION OF THE *LEPTINES*.

ΔΗΜΟΣΘΕΝΟΥΣ ΠΡΟΣ ΑΕΙΤΙΝΗΝ. *A Revised Text with an Introduction, Critical and Explanatory Notes and an Autotype Facsimile from the Paris MS.*, by J. E. SANDYS, Litt. D. Cambridge. 1890.<sup>1</sup> 9s.

THIS is a book which in point of general finish, style, thoroughness and accuracy, might well serve as a model for all younger editors. Dr. Sandys seems to have studied everything that has been written on the subject of which he treats, and he has weighed what he has read in the balance of a thoroughly sound judgment and an unerring scholarship. In the case of most volumes submitted to the classical reviewer, as for instance in the endless series of superfluous school-books put out by com-

peting publishers, little more is needed than a brief appreciation, to say whether they should be classed as good, bad, or indifferent; but where a master of the subject puts his heart and soul into a work which makes a real advance on all that has been done before, a work which worthily represents the highest level of English scholarship to the outside world, there the duty of the reviewer becomes more honourable and arduous. Even in our best achievements *aliquid humani superest*, and the prolonged straining of the eye, the anxious balancing of opposite probabilities, sometimes tend to dull and harden the delicate instinct of language, which is after all our best guide to the real force of the words we are examining. It is therefore no presumption when a scholar ventures to criticize the works of those whom he recognizes as authorities in their own department, any more than it is mock

<sup>1</sup> [We greatly regret that owing to a series of unfortunate accidents the review of this excellent edition has been so long deferred. Ed.]

modesty in the author to invite such criticism. They are partners in the same work, the critic having the secondary office, that of the Glaucôn or Adeimantus of the Platonic dialogue, to clear the thought of the protagonist from all inconsistencies and extravagances and bring it as near to the truth as possible, whether it be in the expounding of a novel philosophy, or merely in the interpretation of an ancient writing. To this duty therefore of purging away blemishes I shall now apply myself with such microscopic power as I possess.

The Introduction occupying xlviii. pages is made up of twelve sections dealing with the subject-matter of the speech, the circumstances under which it was written, the result of the prosecution, criticisms ancient and modern, the MSS. and editions. On this part of the work the only suggestion I have to make is that it might have been well to mention that F. A. Wolf's *Prolegomena* and *Commentary* are included in Schaefer's *Apparatus Criticus*, and to state in what editions the ancient Scholia may be found. The text which follows is mainly that of Blass, but Dr. Sandys has 'frequently refrained from following that eminent authority in the changes which he has introduced into the traditional text as preserved in our manuscripts.' Taking Bekker's text (Oxf. 1823) as a standard of comparison, the changes observable are partly in the adaptation of the spelling of certain words to suit contemporaneous inscriptions; e.g. Dr. Sandys reads ἀπορείσαι, δωρεά, λητουργία 'in preference to the forms which have been made familiar to us by the copyists of a later age.' In some instances new readings are due to quotations from Demosthenes in the rhetoricians. The greater number however are due to considerations of rhythm, to the laws respecting hiatus and the accumulation of short syllables to which attention has been called of late years, especially by Benseler and Blass. It is in regard to these last changes that I venture to think that Dr. Sandys might well have gone further in resisting the authority of the German professors. Of course none can doubt that the difficulty of pronunciation which makes such words as 'laboratory' (with the accent on the first syllable) uncomfortable to English lips, and which we sometimes hear foisting in an *r* in the phrase

Victoria(*r*) our Queen,' would be at least as perceptible to Greeks. And a comparison between the ὑπόθεσις and the speech itself is quite sufficient to show that Demosthenes was far more careful than later rhetoricians

to avoid such difficulties. But even after Blass's emending energy has done its best or its worst, there still remain a very large number of instances of hiatus and of accumulated short syllables, which he has either not noticed or not cared to attack; and in several instances his amended readings, so far as I am able to judge, are less satisfactory than the old; in some instances, I should even be inclined to call them impossible.

Taking first the case of hiatus, excluding prepositions and conjunctions which are universally elided, I am unable to discover any principle which explains why a vowel is elided, or protected by *ν* ἐφελκυστικόν in Blass's text. Elision is, to begin with, far more common and the final *ν* less common before a vowel than in Bekker. Thus we have § 68 εἶθω' ἀκούειν for B.'s εἶθωσιν, § 77 λαβ' αἰχμαλώτους for B.'s λαβεν, § 129 εἰς' ἀτελείς—εἰς' ἱερῶν for B.'s εἰσίν, § 157 προσέειχ' ὁ γράφων for B.'s προσέεικεν, § 130 ἐτόλμησ' οἰδεμὶ' οὐδ' αἶν' for B.'s ἐτόλμησεν οὐδεμία, § 149 ἔστησ' ἐν for B.'s ἔστησεν ἐν, § 138 δύ' ἡ πλείους for B.'s δύο, § 58 ἐχειρήσαιμι ἐξετάζειν, § 65 ἐχρήσανθ' οἱ ἄνδρες, § 157 γενήσονται οἱ for B.'s γενήσονται οἱ, *ib.* ἡ' *ν* for B.'s ἡ ἐν, § 141 τοῦτιπτήδευμα for B.'s τὸ ἐπιτήδευμα; and this even where the elided word is followed by a pause, e.g. § 61 Φιλίππῳ μὲν ἐστὶν ἱπῆκο', ὑμῖν δ' ἐχθρά, *ib.* Λακεδαιμονίοις μὲν οἰκεί', ὑμῖν δ' ἀλλότρια, *ib.* εἰ τινες...ἐπαγγέλλαντ', ἂν αὐτοῖς τὰς αὐτὰς δῶτε δωρεάς, § 125 τὸ μὲν τινας, οἷς ὁ δῆμος ἔδωκ', ἀτελείς εἶναι where B. has ἔδωκεν, § 84 οὐ μόνον αὐτὸν ἐτιμήσατ', ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἐκείνον Στράβηκα, § 85 εἰ δὲ τὸθ', ὅθ' εἰρίσκετο τὴν δωρεάν, δι' ἐκείνον ἔδωκατε. But while elision seems to be the general rule, we find (by the side of § 7 ἐκείν' εὐλογον, § 57 ἐκείν' ὀκνήσω, § 25 ἐκείν' ὑμᾶς, § 2, § 3 and § 111 ἐκείν' ἄν, and just as frequent) the hiatus in § 23, § 63 ἐκείνο οἶμαι, § 56 and § 119 ἐκείνο ἀγροεῖν, § 6 ἐκείνο ὅτι, § 160 ἐκείνο ἐτι, § 118 κακείνο ἐνθυμείσθαι (by the side of § 8 κακείν' ἐνθυμείσθαι), § 87 ἀδικήσετε εἰ (by the side of § 59 ἀδικήσετ' ἑάν), § 88 ἡμῶν εἵνεκα, ἀναγνώσεται, § 110 τῆς γε τύχης εἵνεκα ἢ παρὰ ταῦτ' ἀγαθῇ κέχρησθ' (by the side of § 41 φῖ φιλοτιμίας εἵνεχ' ἡ σπονδὴ γένοιτ' ἂν).

Of course one can understand that the presence or absence of hiatus may be utilized for rhetorical and rhythmical purposes; but I should be surprised if any one were prepared to defend all the above variations on this ground. Or again, the responsibility might be thrown off from the editor upon the MSS. Judging however from the few cases in which the evidence of MSS. on



these minute points is given, it is frequently against the reading of Blass. For instance the  $\nu$  *ἐφελευστικόν* is often found in the MSS. before a consonant and is sometimes adopted by Blass; but in § 11 where the best MS. has *ἦλθεν*, the printed text has *ἦλθε*; in § 126 where MSS. have *ζητήσουσιν* and *πράξουσιν* before a pause, Blass omits the final  $\nu$ ; and so in § 149 where MSS. have *συνίστασιν*, and in § 147 where MSS. have *ἴσχυεν*.

I will now consider cases in which more considerable changes have been made in the traditional reading *hiatus vitandū causa*. Such are § 30 *ἔστι γὰρ γένει μὲν δήπου ὁ Λεύκων ξένος*, where Blass reads with one MS. *ὁ Λεύκων δήπου* to avoid the concurrence of *που ὁ*: here Dr. Sandys (after Voemel) defends the more natural order on the ground that a pause intervenes, '*γένει δήπου explicandi causa insertum est, quia ratione pausa existit.*' This however is a consideration which, as we have seen, will apply to many other of the changes advocated by Blass. Another case in which Dr. Sandys keeps the old reading is § 142 *μηδ' ἵνα Λεπτίνης ἰδίᾳ τισίν, οἷς ἀγῶς ἔχει, ἐπηρέασθ*, where Blass *propter hiatus* proposes to read *ἔσχεν*, but it is not a past, but a present feeling of ill will which Demosthenes imputes to Leptines both here and in § 137. Similarly in § 44 *θεωρεῖτ' ὃ ἄνθρωπος Ἀθηναῖοι ὅσα ψηφίσματα ἄκυρα ποιεῖ ὁ νόμος*, and in § 92 *ψηφισμάτων . . . νεώτεροι οἱ νόμοι*, Blass proposes to avoid the hiatus after *ποιεῖ* and after *νεώτεροι* by omitting *ὁ νόμος* in the first case and *οἱ νόμοι* in the second. In both cases I am glad to say Dr. Sandys refuses to listen to the voice of the tempter. In § 113 however, where Dr. Sandys reads *ἔστι δ' οὐχ οὕτω ταῦτ' ἔχοντα, οὐδ' ὀλίγον δεῖ, ἀλλ' ἐπειδὴν κ.τ.λ.*, I think Bl. is right in reading *δεῖν*, not because of the hiatus, which did not prevent him from reading *ἔχοντα* just before, but because *δεῖν* is the reading of MSS. and more idiomatic. I speak with great diffidence in presence of such authorities as Dr. Sandys and Prof. Blass, but my own impression is that in Demosthenes, at any rate, we are in no case justified in departing from the reading of the MSS. merely in order to avoid a hiatus. Are we then justified in refusing to admit an emendation on the ground that it involves a hiatus, as is done in § 49 *περὶ νόμον μέλλει φέρειν τὴν ψήφον, ᾧ μὴ λυθέντι δεήσει χρῆσθαι* to which Cobet proposed to add *ἀεὶ* on account of the *languida et frigida ac pene inepta sententia* of the words as they

stand? The emendation gives a good sense and is perfectly easy, but in Dr. Sandys' note we read *coniectura propter hiatus sine causa admissum repudianda est*. Why may we not however suppose a pause after *χρήσθαι* to give more weight to *ἀεὶ* and justify the hiatus, if justification is needed? Hirschig has a similar emendation in § 122 *διδόναι <ἀεὶ>*. We may compare § 20, where L has *τί τοῦτο τῇ πόλει ἔσται ἐν ἅπαντες κ.τ.λ.* Here Dr. Sandys condemns the reading of L *propter hiatus*; but, even omitting *ἔσται* with S<sup>1</sup>, we have *πόλει ἐν*, which is just as bad as *ἔχει ἐπηρέασθ*, to which Bl., as we have seen, objects in § 142. Sometimes again too great influence seems to be assigned to the wish to avoid hiatus, as a determinant of the order of words in a sentence. Thus in § 33 *τοσούτου τοίνυν δεῖ ταύτην ἀποστερηθῆσαι τὴν δωρεάν τὴν πόλιν* it is said 'the separation of *ταύτην* from *τὴν δωρεάν* prevents a hiatus,' but is it not a more important consideration that it gives special emphasis to *ταύτην*? So in § 105 *οὐτ' ἔθεσιν χρώμεθα τοῖς αὐτοῖς οὔτε πολιτείᾳ*, where the note is '*τῇ αὐτῇ* implied from *τοῖς αὐτοῖς*, but not expressed possibly *propter hiatus*,' is not the omission made for the sake of the improved rhythm?

I proceed now to the consideration of an accumulation of short syllables. There is a little ambiguity here. In the Preface it is said that Demosthenes 'avoids the collocation of more than two short syllables in consecutive words,' and in p. 71 n. on § 82 *φιλόπολις*, it is said 'such a collocation is allowed when the short syllables are all contained in a single word'; but in § 57 we find Bl. omitting *εἷ* after *βουλόμενον* *propter tres breves antecedentes*, and again in § 83 changing *πότερον* into *πότερ'* before *ἔστ'* *ἐπιτήδειος propter tres breves*. It would appear therefore that on this theory Demosthenes is precluded from using any word containing a succession of three short syllables. I will confine myself however to the laxer rule of the Preface, and see how far the Blassian text is in conformity with this. Dr. Sandys himself has called attention to some cases in which Bl. has passed over exceptions to the rule without notice. Thus on § 23 *εἰς συντέλειαν ἀγαγεῖν* he says *tres breves intactas reliquit Blass*, in § 79 he says of *καὶ γὰρ ἂν ἀλογον*, and *περὶ προδοσίας* *quinque breves intactas reliquit*; and so of § 96 *ὅτι παρανομεῖ, fortasse delenda non tantum ob breves quinque continuatas sed potius propter collocationem duram*. It may be worth while to add a few more of the many exceptions I have myself noticed—§ 82

ὀρφανὸς δὲ ἐκείνον ἐγένετο, αὐτὸς δ' (just below in § 83 ἀφελώμεθα τὸν νῦν αὐτοῦ, Bl. proposes to omit the last three words *propter tres breves*), § 37 πεποιηκότες, ὁ πολὺ, § 31 ἀφικνούμενον, ὁ ἐκ τοῦ Πόντου, § 35 ἐκείνος ὑπομενέι, ἐαυτῷ (*ib.* τὰ ψηφίσματα τὰ περὶ, here Bl. inserts αὐτά with one MS. after ψηφίσματα, even so keeping four short syllables), § 41 ἐθέλοντά τινα ὧν, § 98 καταμανθάνετε ὅτι, *ib.* ἐξαπάτης εἵνεκα παραγεγράφθαι, § 119 ποτηροὺς μὲν διότι καταψεύδονται...ἀμαθείς δὲ διότι ἐκείνο ἀγνοοῦσι, § 6 δὲ ἐκείνο ὅτι, § 5 διὰ τί; ὅτι (but in § 108 where the same phrase recurs, Bl. omits ὅτι with a single late MS.). It is curious that in two passages, noticed by Dr. Sandys, Blass himself introduces readings from Aristides which sin against his own law, § 10 ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας for ὑπὲρ φ. and § 57 κρινόμενον ἴδοι for the simple ἴδοι found in S<sup>1</sup>.

I turn now to the emendations (contrary to all the MSS. unless otherwise stated) necessitated by the determination to get rid of a succession of short syllables. I give first those in which Dr. Sandys retains the traditional reading. § 10 οἷτος ὁ νόμος, Bl. omits οἷτος; § 3 ὅτι διὰ τό, Bl. reads with Aristides διὰ γὰρ τό; § 26 παρὰ δὲ τὰς, Bl. παρὰ τὰς δέ; § 32 παρὰ δὲ τὰς δέκα, Bl. παρὰ τὰς δέκα δ'; § 109 παρὰ δὲ τῶν, Bl. παρὰ τῶν δέ; § 40 κατὰ δὲ τὸν νόμον, Bl. κατὰ τὸν δὲ νόμον (surely the better order in all such cases would have been κ. τ. νόμον δέ); § 83 ἂ ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν στρατηγῶν ἐκείνος ἔστησε, Bl. ἂ στρατηγῶν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν; § 71 ὧν εὐεργέτηντο χάριν φοῖντο δὲν ἀποδιδόναι, Bl. δὲν φοῖντο; § 18 ἐκείνο λέγειν ἂν ἐπιχειρήσει, Bl. ἐκείν' ἂν λέγειν; § 68 κατεναυμάχησε Λακεδαιμονίους, Bl. -σεν; § 62 πῶς ποτ' ἂν ἔχοιτε, Bl. σχοίτε; § 92 πέρας ἔχειν, Bl. with one MS. σχεῖν; § 153 νόμον δ' αὐτοὺς παραβαίνειν ἕτερον ἀνάγνωθι, Bl. omits ἕτερον; § 79 ναὺς δέκα μόνας, Bl. omits μόνας; § 48 ἄξιος ἀδικηθῆναι, Bl. inserts ὧν after ἄξιος; § 125 τις ἀφεθήσεται, Bl. ἀφείσεται; § 127 τὸ τῶν λητουργῶν ὄνομα ἐπὶ τὸν ἱερῶν μεταφέροντες, Bl. omits ὄνομα. The emendations which follow are accepted by Dr. Sandys: § 39 τινὲς εἰσιν ἰσως φαῖλοι, where the majority of the better MSS. omit εἰσιν; § 128 προσέγραψ' ἀτελῇ, where MSS. have προσέγραψεν. To most of these changes there is no objection beyond the fact that they are changes unsupported by MSS., and that, if they are admitted, we ought to obelize twice as many other passages in which the same succession of short syllables is still to be found. The following however seem to be in themselves objectionable: § 94 τούτων...οὐδ' ὅτιοις ἐποίησε Λαπτινῆς· οὐδὲ γὰρ ἂν ἡμεῖς ποτ'

ἐπεισθῇ, where, in place of the second οὐδέ, the less idiomatic οὐ is read against the best MSS.; § 126 ἂ κατὰ μηδέν' ἄλλον ἔχουσι τρόπον δεῖξαι δίκαιον ἡμᾶς ἀφείσθαι, where κατὰ is bracketed against the MSS., but if we omit κατὰ, the construction becomes less clear and δίκαιον is liable to be taken with τρόπον; § 42 οἷτος γὰρ ἀνὴρ...τοῖς ἀλοῦσιν τὸτ' ἐν Σικελίᾳ...ἔδωκε μνᾶς ἑκατον καὶ τοῦ μὴ τῷ λιμῷ πάντας αὐτοὺς ἀποθανεῖν αἰτιώτατος ἐγένετο, here Bl. reads γέγονεν with 'Rh. Gr. Walz iv. 323' (is not the reference wrong?), but is it possible to use the perfect of an event which happened fifty-four years before, and of which there could be few, if any, survivors? § 7 (οὐκ εἰλογον φαίνεται) καταμεμφόμενον τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις δωρεαῖς τοῖς χρησίμοις ὄντας τῶν τιμῶν ἀποστερεῖν. This is the reading of the MSS., but in the two best MSS. the first τοὺς is corrected to τας, which Kennedy translates 'neither does it seem rational that, because he objects to some men having the privileges which have been granted them, he should deprive really deserving men of their honours.' Cobet, as Dr. Sandys informs us, thinks the original reading was καταμεμφόμενον ὀλίγους τινάς, the letters ολι being easily confused with the preceding ον and so disappearing. Those who do not mind the recurrence of five and four short syllables will see nothing to object to in this emendation; but it is difficult to see what sense is to be given to the reading of the text τοὺς ἐπὶ ταῖς ὑπαρχούσαις δωρεαῖς. Even if such a phrase were possible, it contains no opposition to the following phrase τοὺς χρησίμοις ὄντας. Surely there can be no doubt that ἐπὶ was intended to follow καταμεμφόμενον.

To pass on now to other readings which seem to me open to question, why is προσήκει preferred to προσήκει (the reading of SL) in § 5 ἐκ μὲν τοῦ πλείονος ἢ προσήκει τιμᾶν πολλοὺς εὖ ποιεῖν προκαλεῖσθ' ἡμᾶς, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ μηδενὶ μηδὲν δίδοναι πάντας ἀπείρξετε τοῦ φιλοτιμείσθαι? The alternative referred to is stated in the present tense in the preceding sentence πότερον λυσitelésteron ἐστὶ κυρίους μὲν εἶναι τῆς δωρεᾶς...ἢ μηδ' ἐξείναι τιμῆσαι, and the result contemplated is in the future (προκαλείσθε, ἀπείρξετε). § 12 τὰ χρήματ' εἰσφέρειν ἠθελήσατε, here Bl. brackets τά on the ground that it would denote the whole sum which the people 'συνεισφέρει τοῖς ἐξ ἄσπεως non εἰσφέρει.' Is not this to refine too much? 'The oligarchical party,' as we read in the note, 'borrowed 100 talents from the Spartans' which 'the Athenian people discharged by a general property tax.' I

gather from Bl.'s note that he considers that the sum borrowed by the Ten was repaid partly by them and partly by a general property tax, but this is opposed to the language of Isocrates quoted in the note on p. 15 ἔδοξε τῷ δήμῳ κοινὴν ποιῆσθαι τὴν ἀπόδοσιν, and it is not implied in the word συνεισφέρειν, which simply means 'to make a joint contribution,' as in Xen. *Hell.* ii. 1, 5 τοὺς Χίους χρήματα ἐκέλευσε συνεισφέρειν. Even if the payment had been divided between the people and the Ten, the proportion of the debt paid by the former might well have been defined as τὰ χρήματα. In § 13 and § 44 Dobree's emendations <τῷ> τὸ λυστελέστατον and οἷος for ὅσος deserved to appear in the text. So too Tournier's change of μένουσιν into μενούσιν in § 71 seems required in order to correspond with the following ἀφαιρήσεται. In § 74 μηδεὶς φθόνῳ τὸ μέλλον ἀκούσῃ I think some addition such as Cobet's ῥηθήσεσθαι (objected to *propter hiatus*) is needed after μέλλον. The meaning assigned in the note to τὸ μέλλον 'what I am about to say' does not seem to be justified by such examples as ὁ μέλλον λόγος. In § 94 τούτων τοίνυν τοσούτων ὄντων δικαίων τὸ πλῆθος, I think Dobree's insertion of τῶν before δικαίων is needed. It is evident that τοσούτων ὄντων τὸ πλῆθος is intended for predicate, and the article is required to make τούτων δικαίων the subject. § 96 τοῦτο μὲν ἔστιν ἐν τοῖς οὖν νόμοις κυρίως ὑπάρχον καλόν, Blass omits ἔστιν with Aristides (p. 368 W, a reference I have vainly endeavoured to find) giving thus a very awkward participial sentence. § 26 μικρόν read by S and L seems to me required after ἡμέρας μέρος to strengthen the antithesis to πάντα τὸν χρόνον. There are some sentences, especially those beginning with οὐκ οὐκ (as I should accent it), which I think would be improved by making them interrogative. Such are § 26 οὐκ οὐκ ὁ πολλὰ κεκτημένος, οὗτος, ὅστις ἂν ᾖ, πόλλ' εἰς ταῦτα συντελεῖ πᾶσ' ἀνάγκη, where I should omit the comma before οὗτος, considering that it refers to the ὁ εὐπορῶν implied in the preceding sentence, and make πᾶσ' ἀνάγκη the answer to the question; § 62 οὐκ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἰ μέλλοντες μὲν... ἡγοῖσθε. ἐπὶ τῷ δ' ἀφελείσθαι... ἀκούσεσθε, here the interrogative is suggested by the very form of the sentence and is much more vigorous than the categorical. The same may be said of the parallel sentence in § 71 οὐκ οὐκ αἰσχρὸν εἰ αἱ μὲν παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις δωρεαὶ βέβαιοι μενούσιν αὐτῷ, τῆς δὲ παρ' ὑμῶν μόνης τοῦτ' ἀφαιρέσεται. In § 97 and at the end of § 28 οὐκ οὐκ is already made interrogative: I should

be disposed also to make it interrogative at the beginning of § 28. Similarly I think Wolf and others were right in taking § 56 ἔπειτ' ἐκείνο... παμπληθεῖ as an interrogative sentence.

The explanatory notes are in general all that could be desired, but here and there an additional note might perhaps have been given with advantage. Thus in § 57 ἰδίῳ μὲν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν σκοπεῖ τίς ἀξίος ἔστιν ἐκαστοῦ κηδεστής... ταῦτα δὲ νόμοις τισὶν διώριστα κοινῇ δ' ἡ πόλις καὶ ὁ δῆμος ὅστις ἂν αὐτὸν εὖ ποιῇ, τοῦτο δ' οὐ γένει... κεκριμένον ἴδοι τις ἂν, ἀλλ' ἔργῳ, it might have been well to caution a careless reader against being misled by the parallelism and giving the same force to ὅστις ἂν as to the preceding τίς. § 109 παρὰ τῶν πολιτῶν λόγῳ μετὰ τῶν νόμων τὰ δίκαια λαμβάνοντες, Reiske's note is worth quoting, λόγῳ continetur ratio et oratio quibus res et causas nostras parium iudicio subiciuntur. § 117 τίνος εἵνεκα... καταδειχθῇ τοιοῦτ' ἔργον; should not attention have been called to the rare use of the deliberative subjunctive in the third person? § 122 δεῖ τοίνυν μεμερίσθαι καὶ τὰ τῶν δωρειῶν, it might have been well to explain that καί, which Bl. proposes to omit, refers to the previously mentioned classification of services. § 123 ὑπὲρ ἂν γε τοῖς εὐρημένοις τὰς τιμὰς καταλείπειν φήσῃ, Schaefer's version of this rather confusing clause might be quoted *De iis autem quae se relinquere dicet aleptis honores*. § 124 οὐκ, εἰ τῶν πάντων ἀδικησομένων τιν' ἢ μείζον' ἢ ἐλάττωνα, δεινόν ἔστιν, here too the construction is not free from ambiguity. § 127 γράφων γὰρ ἀρχὴν τοῦ νόμου, should not some notice be taken of the absence of the article? And since Cobet's proposal to change τί παθὼν into τί παθῶν is mentioned just below, would it not have been well to give examples of the former? § 24 εἰ δ' ὑφηρημένον φήσουσιν ἢ τιν' ἄλλον οὐχ ὃν προσήκει τρόπον, εἰσὶ νόμοι, two MSS. add κεκτήσθαι after τρόπον, in which case ὑφηρημένον and τιν' ἄλλον τρόπον are specified as different ways of getting possession, but omitting κεκτήσθαι, the construction of τρόπον is not quite easy. Notes might also have been added on § 130 ἐνεγκεῖν χορηγόν, § 46 ἃ δὲ πρὸς τοούτους ὑπολαμβάνονται ἂν εἰκότως. In § 151 πολλὰ γὰρ βελτίονος ἀνδρὸς ἔστιν, ἐφ' οἷς αὐτὸς εὖ πεποίηκ' ἀξιοῖν τιμᾶσθαι ἢ ἐφ' οἷς ἕτεροι ποιήσαντες ἐτιμήθησαν φθονεῖν, the note is 'ἐφ' οἷς—φθονεῖν instead of ὧν, the exceptional construction is due to that of the parallel clause, φθονεῖν being very rarely followed by ἐπὶ.' But is it not the case that the second ἐφ' οἷς depends on ἐτιμήθησαν just as the first on τιμᾶσθαι, the construction of φθονεῖν being

understood from this? And is the genitive the common construction in this sense? Rost and Palm call it rare, and add 'in diesem letzteren Sinne (neidisch, unwillig sein über etwas) setzt man sonst lieber ἐπὶ τιμῇ.'

I have noticed the following misprints: p. 34 n. on πρὸς *fin.* read 198 for 98; p. 43 first note, read instead of 'the middle sense' the passive sense; p. 87 l. 4 there should be a comma after δέ; p. 97 critical note l. 1, *cociecit*; p. 102 critical note l. 2

ποιητός; p. 115 l. 9, the construction would be clearer if a dash were put after πολλάκις and before ἀφῆρεθ': the heading of the second note should be πολλὰ—ἀναίσχυντίας. On p. 1 l. 10 it would be well to have a reference to the n. on § 64; p. 8 n. on ἀφαιρέσθαι to the n. on § 17; there might also be a cross reference to σκοπεῖν and σκοπεῖσθαι in § 54; on the order of εἰ and εἰάν there should be cross references in § 22 and § 46.

J. B. MAYOR.

#### STEWART ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS.

*Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle,*  
by J. A. STEWART. Clarendon Press,  
1892. 2 Vols. £1 12s.

IN dealing with classical books that are largely used for educational purposes, it is both difficult and unwise to form a decided opinion as to the merits and defects of a new edition, until we have been able to test it by practical educational use. When we have made use of it side by side with other books in actual teaching, and when we have seen what our pupils, for whom it is more especially intended, make of it, we know pretty well its value. But a first rapid reading of our own can give us only a general impression, which we should not like to express as though it were final. Particularly is this the case with such a book as the *Ethics*, full of difficulties and playing an enormous part in the studies of one at least of our English universities. Almost every page of Mr. Stewart's edition ought to be not only read but carefully considered, before a reviewer is in a position to give as deliberate and fair a judgment upon it as he would wish. Any one therefore writing before he has had time for this must necessarily desire his words to be taken for no more than a first impression is worth. It may be said at once that Mr. Stewart is thoroughly master of the subject. He knows not only his *Ethics* themselves, his *Nicomachean Ethics*, as only an experienced teacher can, but his *Eudemian Ethics* and his *Great Ethics* and his Aristotle in general and his Greek commentators on Aristotle. In every Aristotelian treatise there are many things that we shall misunderstand or understand imperfectly, unless we can bring the contents of other treatises to bear upon

them. Of all these Mr. Stewart has a thorough knowledge. He has also taken pains to acquaint himself with all that has been written on the subject in recent times. Editions, dissertations, and stray notes have all been read. With his Greek scholarship there is no fault to be found. A large knowledge of modern philosophy enables him to connect the theories of Aristotle with the discussions of modern times. Finally he brings a very sound understanding to the arduous task of interpreting Aristotle; and, if we cannot always quite concur in his views, they are at any rate always those of a thoroughly competent critic. In general mastery of the subject every one must see that the new edition marks a very decided advance upon that of Sir Alexander Grant. The latter has perhaps been a little underrated. It has gone through several editions and the later editions have suffered in reputation from the great inferiority of the earlier. The book was very much improved in its later form, and I am glad to see that Mr. Stewart speaks of it 'with the greatest respect, as an edition the value of which has steadily grown on me.' The essays in the first volume are indeed excellent, and the commentary contains much that is useful for students. But Mr. Stewart has perhaps a larger and sounder acquaintance with the Aristotelian philosophy as a whole, and his discussions and explanations of difficulties will be found much superior to those of Grant.

It seems to me however on a first reading that there are some drawbacks to the superiority of the new edition. Mr. Stewart's learning is almost an encumbrance to the book, at least if we look at it as a book in which men are to begin their study of the



*Ethics.* I cannot help fearing that, though many of the notes will be found extremely useful, many others will be too deep and learned for the ordinary reader. Mr. Stewart remarks somewhere that the logic of a science 'is of very little use to one beginning the science' though it may be 'an invaluable guide to the experienced enquirer.' Something of the kind may possibly prove true of portions of his own book, such for instance as the formidable note with which the commentary begins, a note (I venture to say) which will fill the beginner with despair. If Aristotle's views on 'good' cannot be conveyed in a simpler and less difficult form, they had much better be reserved for a later note. Beginners—and it must be for beginners mainly that Mr. Stewart is writing—should be introduced to things by degrees and not have great fundamental doctrines propounded to them at once, unless this can be done so simply that they hardly know it. If Mr. Stewart were writing only for college tutors, it would be different; but in that case a good deal of his matter might have been omitted altogether. Writing as he really is mainly for the men who year after year are offering the *Ethics* for an examination, he might, I think, have rendered his valuable book much more useful, and yet not have sacrificed anything of its scientific value, by adjusting it a little more skilfully to practical needs. From this practical point of view I doubt very much the wisdom of quoting in full most of the passages in Plato, Aristotle, the Greek commentators, and others, to which he has occasion to refer. Of course he proceeds on the theory that a passage quoted in the note is more likely to be read than one simply referred to and perhaps not very accessible, and for this there is something to be said. But on the other hand the notes become very lengthy and disheartening, and men cease to read them on that account. Moreover the bulk and the cost of the book are prodigiously increased. Here are two large octavo volumes, published at thirty-two shillings, containing a thousand pages between them, yet containing no Greek text at all, requiring (as Mr. Stewart himself, I think, indicates) to be supplemented by the reading of several of Grant's essays, and not unfrequently passing over small or even fairly large points that really need elucidation. Surely in many cases it would be quite enough to say that the meaning is established or illustrated by such and such a passage elsewhere and leave those to whom the passage is really useful to turn it up.

Passing from these practical questions, the reviewer must endeavour to do justice to the great knowledge and ability which Mr. Stewart brings to bear on his work. Many of the notes on Aristotelian terms and on the leading doctrines or more obscure passages of the book are excellent and full of instruction. Any one who masters this commentary will have a very sound and ample knowledge of the *Ethics*, and indeed of more than the *Ethics*. What I have said above of the almost too learned character of the notes implies that everything treated of is treated of thoroughly. There is nothing showy or superficial, nothing simply elegant or 'suggestive.' Everything is worked out conscientiously and exhaustively. An Aristotelian scholar needs very considerable mental powers of his own, if he is to make much of his knowledge, and here again Mr. Stewart stands the test. He is master of his knowledge, even if we cannot say that he wears his learning lightly, and he interprets usually with judgment as well as acuteness. Any rashness or extravagance is impossible to him. The only thing that could at all be thought to deserve such a name is the tendency, carried surely a little too far, to put Aristotle into terms of Herbert Spencer and make the Greek philosopher talk about organisms and adaptation to social environment as naturally as if he had called himself a Synthetic Philosopher. Of course there is no harm in pointing out any correspondence there may be between the ideas of the two philosophers, or rather it is a very proper and reasonable thing to do. But affinity should not be turned into identity, nor Aristotle explained as though he really meant just what Mr. Spencer says. But it is hardly an exaggeration to say that Mr. Stewart now and then does this. Witness the following extracts from pages 4 and 5 of the first volume: 'the εἰδαιμων lives and there is nothing better than his life. His nature is a λόγος, or organism, ὁρθός, balanced in all its parts': and again 'the morally excellent man, however, acts in a manner which would be inexplicable unless the εἶδος of Human Nature were such as the "thinker" is conscious of it (sic). The morally excellent man may be said to have a practical, as distinguished from a speculative knowledge of it. He knows it as an ὁρθός λόγος, or organism maintaining itself with difficulty in an environment liable to be disturbed by sensations and passions.' To compare ὁρθός λόγος with such an organism or the idea of it would be all very well, but it is surely going too far to identify

them. Aristotle himself had a way of making earlier philosophers talk his own language and use his own technical terms. Perhaps it is a just retribution for his offence that he is in turn made to talk the language of a modern school. In the same way I cannot think it very helpful with regard to the Platonic Ideas to say that they 'answer, in part, to our Laws of Nature'—certainly Mr. Stewart adds in a note that in part they answer to the 'Categories of the Understanding'—without some explanation of how much or how little is meant by 'answer.'

I go on to mention a few matters of interpretation in which it seems possible to dissent from Mr. Stewart's judgment, though I do so with all respect to his carefully formed opinion. I do not myself think it possible to reconcile what we read about ἀρετὴ φυσικὴ in vi. 13 with the beginning of ii. 1, and as Mr. Stewart thinks, if I understand him rightly, that the two Books were not written by the same person, there is less need for him to attempt to do so. How he does it may be seen pretty well from the opening words of a note on ii. 1, 'οὐδεμία τῶν ἡθικῶν ἀρετῶν φύσει ἡμῖν ἐγγίνεται] i.e. only those ἀρεταί are called ἡθικαί which result from training under νόμος; for there are φυσικαί ἀρεταί (see E.N. vi. 13). The difference, however, between φυσικὴ ἀρετὴ and ἡθικὴ ἀρετὴ is that the former does not, like the latter, involve the whole man.' From the note on vi. 13, 1 it appears that he lays stress on the words πεφυκόσι...δέξασθαι αὐτάς in ii. 1, 3. But I take it ἡθικὴ cannot reasonably be identified, as on this explanation it is, with κυρία. 'Αρετὴ φυσικὴ is just as much ἡθικὴ as ἀρετὴ κυρία is. 'Ἡθικὴ cannot connote the degree or power of ἀρετὴ: it connotes nothing in the world but that part of a man's nature with which the excellence has to do, and more especially by antithesis that it is not a matter, or not mainly a matter, of intellect, not διανοητική. As for the δύναμις (according to Mr. Stewart more than a δύναμις) spoken of in πεφυκόσι δέξασθαι αὐτάς, it is a δύναμις, which human beings possess and animals do not, of both virtue and vice. Aristotle in this place would have said just as readily that we were πεφυκότες δέξασθαι the vices, meaning that mere animal nature is incapable of either virtue or vice, while men are 'of a nature to acquire' one or the other or something of both, and this is indeed what he goes on to explain with perfect clearness in the rest of the chapter. Nothing in Book vi. or in the *Hist. Anim.* viii. 1 can upset the evident

meaning of this chapter, and we are not to give it an unnatural interpretation because the theory seems to us too strongly stated.

In regard to Book vi. another matter may be mentioned on which I venture to differ from Mr. Stewart—the question of the number of the intellectual excellences. Mr. Stewart with Zeller holds them to be five in number. But Pranti and Rassow seem more correct in maintaining that, strictly speaking, there are only two, σοφία and φρόνησις. Of the five ζῆσις these are the only two which are explicitly called ἀρεταί in Book vi.: they are spoken of especially and together in the last part of the Book: and it is distinctly implied in vi. 1, 7 that there is only one βελτίστη ζῆσις for each of the 'parts' of which the writer is speaking. As to νοῦς and ἐπιστήμη, which are the components of σοφία, no difficulty arises. Neither is by itself fully ἀρετή, because each needs to be supplemented by the other and is imperfect, is not the βελτίστη ζῆσις of its part, without the other. I admit the difficulty of disposing of τέχνη according to this scheme; but it does not outweigh the considerations on the other side. It is not the only point about τέχνη on which the Aristotelian theory seems incomplete. In Book v. a word of protest seems proper against Mr. Stewart's treatment of τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθός, or justice in exchange, as a part of distributive justice. It is true of course that 'particular justice' is at first explicitly divided into two parts only, corrective and distributive, and we might therefore think that commercial justice, if I may so call τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθός, must be included under one or the other of these. But, considering the shocking condition of Book v. (whether this is due to misadventure or to the original writing), we cannot lay much stress on such an argument as this, and everything else, I should say, points to τὸ ἀντιπεπονηθός being a third subdivision side by side with the other two. Mr. Stewart maintains (i. p. 449) that 'this view errs in failing to recognize in ἡ ἐκόντιος ἀλλαγὴ the most important instance of ἡ διανομή ἀπὸ τῶν κοινῶν—that in which the "distribution of wealth" is made according to "economic laws" which express the "will of the state," or reveal its essence, more significantly than any legislative or executive measures dealing with "distribution" can do,' and he writes elsewhere (i. p. 418) 'the farmer receives the reward of his labour in the form of the coat which a settled social system allows him to get in exchange for his corn from the tailor.' Whether this is the right way of viewing the

matter in itself, we have not now to ask. Our only question is whether this is what Aristotle, or the writer of Book v., meant, and I cannot myself see any reason for supposing him to have meant it. Distributive justice deals with common property, that which is no one man's property until the distribution has been made: commercial justice (according to the writer) deals with the terms on which individuals should exchange those things in which each of them respectively has a property which may be called absolute. It is only by a loose or at least an equivocal use of words that we speak of the various possessions of individuals as composing in the aggregate the 'national wealth' or 'the wealth of the country.' The word 'distribution' is equally equivocal, for 'the distribution of wealth' in the mouth of an economist no more implies a distributor or distributing agency than 'the distribution of species' implies it to a biologist. Of course Mr. Stewart is perfectly aware of these obvious truths and finds them unconvincing. But what positive evidence can he allege in favour of his own view? There is not a word about 'distribution' in the chapter on commercial justice, and the definition of distributive justice in v. 2, 12 evidently (I should say) refers to things that are common and divisible in the strictest or, if Mr. Stewart prefers it, in the narrowest sense, and does not cover property that is already in individual hands. On another point, the precise sphere of corrective justice in relation to *ἐκούσια συναλλάγματα*, Mr. Stewart has not convinced me that 'the judicial rectification of the terms themselves' of a bargain was any part of the writer's meaning: nor can I agree with him and Dr. Jackson in thinking that the *ἀπλῶς δίκαιον* and the *πολιτικὸν δίκαιον* of v. 6, 4 are to be distinguished from one another. To mention one or two other matters in other parts of the *Ethics*—he uses rather ambiguous language on what seems to me perfectly clear, that *βίος τέλειος* is an expression referring to duration of time and not including any reference to circumstances: his explanation of vii. 3, 14 is to my mind very doubtful: he is surely wrong in assuming that *ἐκ τῶν συνηγμένων πολιτειῶν* in x. 9, 23 necessarily means 'the constitutions collected by me': and, though he may be right in thinking with Susemihl (Mr. Newman seems

not to agree with them) that the two concluding sections of the *Ethics* are spurious, it can hardly be the case that the *Ethics* stopped short at §21 without an explicit statement of what the whole chapter is leading up to, namely the necessity of working out some principles for ourselves; in other words, if the two sections are spurious, they must have taken the place of something which was genuine.

If I may call attention to a few things that strike me as omissions, I would suggest that some analysis of the Aristotelian expression 'parts of the soul' is wanted, and some further examination of the word *εὐδαιμονία*, which Mr. Stewart still renders without much explanation by the very misleading 'happiness': that the doctrine of the mean would admit of fuller and clearer statement: and that in particular Aristotle's own admission that there are some actions and feelings which do not admit of the mean should be corrected as an obvious fallacy. But there are many comparatively small things, on which notes would be useful, and which are here passed over. In so bulky a book a much more copious index would be welcome.

I have said nothing about Mr. Stewart's treatment of the text or interpretation of difficult Greek, because these are of less general interest. Following Bywater's text in the main, though differing from it now and then, he shows always a competent judgment of his own and has evidently given much time and trouble to textual matters. There would be some convenience in keeping the textual and the other notes distinct, but no doubt it would be difficult to manage satisfactorily. In explaining obscure places, there is always plenty of room for legitimate difference of opinion, and Mr. Stewart will not expect his readers always to agree with him, but here again his judgment is very careful and sound.

I should much regret if anything I have said suggests that I do not duly appreciate the great and sterling merits of the book. I appreciate them so much and think the book so capable of becoming an immense assistance to the study of Aristotle, that I should rejoice to see it in a shorter and simpler form.

HERBERT RICHARDS.

## RAABE'S APOLOGY OF ARISTIDES.

*Die Apologie des Aristides* by DR. R. RAABE  
(Harnack's *Texte u. Unters.* ix. 1, 1892).  
Mk. 8.50.

This valuable tract contains a translation into German of the Syriac version of the *Apology*, discovered by Mr. Rendel Harris at Mount Sinai and published in the first number of the Cambridge *Texts and Studies*. Dr. Raabe has given us at the same time an important study on the relation between the Syriac version, the fragment of the Armenian version, and the Greek text preserved in 'Barlaam and Josaphat'; and he has added a series of notes illustrating the *Apology* from classical and post-classical sources.

Thanks to the immense pains taken by Prof. Bensly, who not only revised the Syriac text by the aid of Mr. Harris's photographs but also allowed himself to be consulted at every point in the revision of the English translation, it was not to be expected that much new light would be thrown on the subject in the course of its translation into German, although Dr. Raabe's work is evidently done with the greatest care. He is probably right in his rendering (c. vii. *ad fin.*) 'zerstört durch die elemente,' as against 'more corrupted than the elements.' Dr. Nestle's important notes in Hilgenfeld's *Zeitschrift für wiss. Theol.* were not published in time to assist him, but it may be well to call attention to them here. Dr. Nestle quotes authorities to show that **ⲉⲛⲁⲛⲁ** in the second Title, although literally equivalent to *πατοκράτωρ*, is sometimes used as a rendering of *ἀντοκράτωρ*. This removes a serious difficulty and justifies the English as against the German translation. Dr. Nestle also suggests that **ⲛⲁⲓⲁⲗ** as an explanatory epithet of 'the Christians' (c. ii. *ad fin.*) is meant to correspond to *χρηστοί*. This is very tempting, but it is not clear that his references prove his point.

Dr. Raabe's greatest service is his independent examination of the comparative merits of the Syriac and Greek forms of the *Apology*. He shows I think conclusively that the Greek division into 'three races of men'—Idolaters (subdivided into Chaldeans, Greeks and Egyptians), Jews and Christians—must be the original classification, as opposed to the fourfold division of the Syriac and Armenian—Barbarians, Greeks,

Jews and Christians: because it corresponds to the whole plan of the book, whereas the latter arrangement does not. When we remember that the Jews are 'barbarians' even in Josephus (*B. J.* proem. i. 2), and that we have *τρίτῳ γένει* of the Christians in the 'Preaching of Peter,' which Aristides has used, we may accept this position as a firm basis for further criticism (cf. *Texts and Studies*, I. i. p. 90). We may go on with Dr. Raabe to regard the preliminary descriptions of the 'four races' in the Syriac as partly interpolated and partly displaced; and, as the Armenian fragment agrees with the Syriac at this point, we must probably also accept his conclusion that both these versions were made from a Greek form of the *Apology* which had been already considerably modified from the original. The effect of this criticism is to heighten considerably the value of the Greek text preserved in 'Barlaam and Josaphat.' After the elaborate and scholarly investigations of Dr. Raabe the Greek text must be regarded as by far the most trustworthy evidence to the original work. At a few points we can prove that the Greek has been modified by the author of 'Barlaam and Josaphat'; we can also prove by the aid of the 'Preaching of Peter' that several passages of the original are preserved in the Syriac and have been omitted from the Greek. But it must be hazardous to refer anything to the original on the sole authority of the Syriac, or even when the Syriac and Armenian coincide. This canon will condemn some beautiful sentences of the Syriac which embellish the picture of the early life of the Christian Society; but we are more than compensated by our increased confidence in the Greek text as giving us almost the entire *Apology* in the very words of Aristides himself.

Dr. Raabe's notes are a mine of information upon the mythological allusions which form so large a part of the *Apology*, and they again and again bear out his views with regard to the Syriac version. The Syriac supplements frequently break down under examination, and prove to be the work of a later writer insufficiently acquainted with heathen worship of the second century. The classical student of mythology will find much to interest him in the *Apology* itself and in these elucidations of it.



The circumstances under which the *Apology* was first published rendered it inevitable that there should be a certain conflict of opinion between Mr. Harris's Introduction and the Appendix. It is a matter of satisfaction that Dr. Raabe has adopted an entirely independent position, and has chosen to write as if nothing had been already said on the problems in question. As he does not reprint either the Syriac or the Greek text, it was surely necessary that he should state where each of these was to be looked for by students: for the Greek text he refers both to Boissonade and to the *Texts and Studies*; but he does not state where the Syriac text, from which he translates, may be found,

still less does he give its pagination as a help to readers who may wish to refer from the German to the Syriac; and, what is most extraordinary, he makes no mention of Mr. Rendel Harris as the scholar to whom the discovery was due. In fact Mr. Harris's name does not, I think, occur in the book at all, except in three foot-notes in which, by an odd coincidence, he is given credit for suggestions for which, as a more careful reading would have shown, he was not responsible. The very modest tone in which Dr. Raabe puts forth his own work is sufficient proof that this curious oversight is not intentional.

J. ARMITAGE ROBINSON.

#### WILKINS'S EDITION OF THE *DE ORATORE*.

IN 1879 Professor Wilkins published an edition of the first book of Cicero's *De Oratore*, with introduction and notes. The second book followed in 1881. Second editions of these works appeared in 1888 and 1890 respectively, showing that the editor had not forsaken his old love; else we might have despaired of seeing his recension of book third, with a like full commentary. At last this third part is in our hands, completing a task which deserves special and emphatic recognition. The three volumes bound together make an octavo of 573 pages, issued from the Clarendon Press.

Dr. Wilkins is peculiarly qualified for this task. He combines German thoroughness with English clear-sightedness. His previous studies and editorial work had prepared the way for this *magnum opus*. He was in touch with a company of English scholars, of like spirit and erudition with himself. Three of these are frequently named in his notes; Dr. Reid, Dr. Roby and Dr. Sandys. He has availed himself of the best and the latest results of German scholarship.

No inferior scholar should edit this treatise on Oratory. Cicero had a passion for teaching, as well as for speaking. He writes, not as a professor in the lecture-room, but as a soldier from the field. He is fond of alluding to his own triumphs, but he is eager to show others how to win a like success. Such teachings have a directness, a life-likeness, an authority, which give them an unrivalled interest. In the following

century Quintilian made a more complete and systematic presentation of the subject, and sought to preserve the Ciceronian style he so much admired. But one can feel the difference between the petted rhetorician and the practised political orator. Demosthenes left no guide-book to oratory. Chatham and Webster carried their secret to the grave. Cicero alone of the world's great orators patiently revealed the methods of his art. His exposition, in this fullest of his oratorical treatises, deserves the best attention of English scholarship—an attention which it has now received.

Dr. Wilkins's introduction to this edition is sufficiently full. He claims for the *De Oratore* a superlative rank among the manifold works of its author. Cicero was interested in philosophy, but he was much more interested in oratory. He elaborated this work with great care, and gave it the finish of his best style. The different parts are particularly adapted to the several interlocutors. Crassus and Antonius are the most prominent, and discourse on the chief 'parts of oratory': but others are brought in to impart life to the discussion, and to treat of minor themes. The introduction gives a satisfactory account of all these characters in the drama. Crassus heads the list, as the speaker most fully representing Cicero's own views. Antonius follows; then the younger men, Sulpicius and Cotta. These characters appear throughout the dialogue: the augur Scaevola takes part in the first book, Catulus and Caesar the orator

in the second and third. Of these seven men, four were put to death; another died from illness induced by political strife; another from a wound received in battle: Scaevola alone reached a peaceful old age. Cicero himself was to be a still more illustrious victim of the turbulent last century of the Roman Republic.

The most important portion of the introduction is the 'Sketch of the History of Rhetoric.' Here, of course, Greek eloquence receives the first and fullest treatment, as is the case in the *Orator* of Dr. Sandys. The list of Greeks who taught or practised oratory is a long one, from the Sicilian Corax down to the Rhodian Molon. These were accidental outlying *termini*: the culmination of Greek oratory could be nowhere else than at Athens. It was Athens that made Roman oratory possible. Cicero himself, in the *Brutus*, prefaced his account of Roman eloquence with an enumeration of Greek forerunners. The Attic Ten, and most of all Demosthenes, were standing models for public speakers at Rome, especially from the time of Crassus.

Dr. Wilkins's account of the rise of Roman eloquence deals less with persons than with treatises: the *Brutus* suffices for the former. Especially full is his analysis of the treatise *ad Herennium*, long incorrectly attributed to Cicero, whose name is now displaced by that of Cornificius. This analysis, including comparisons with Hermagoras, Aristotle, and other Greek writers, and still more with Cicero and Quintilian, occupies eight of these full pages, and shows how formal and dry was the rhetorical teaching at Rome till Cicero gave it life.

Before Rome had an oratory of its own, the Greeks had themselves lapsed from the Attic standard. As at a later time the Silver Age marked degeneration at Rome, so in the Greek-speaking world there was a decadence from the liberty and the healthful political activity of the golden era. Oratory could not but share this decadence. The new type was named Asiatic, but it was not confined to Asia. Athens itself was no longer Attic. This degenerate eloquence was nearer to Cicero's time, and might easily have swept him into its train, as it did Hortensius. It is more to his credit than we are apt to think that he resisted its false attractions, and fixed his gaze on the earlier and purer models. He was indeed criticized by younger contemporaries as not conforming to the best standards; but he shows in the *Brutus* how flexible and

various were the Attic exemplars, and proves his right to the Attic name. Landor may be quoted: 'Asiatic never was Cicero, though he sometimes wore at the bottom of his rhetorician robe a flounce too many.' Drs. Wilkins and Sandys both deny a separate standing to the school of Rhodes.

Our editor gives a satisfactory history of the text of the *De Oratore*, naming the various MSS. available for collation. These were all imperfect (*codices mutili*) up to Landriani's great discovery at Lodi, in 1422. The copy which he found was lost by Barziza of Milan, and it is uncertain how much of it was transcribed. It supplied the missing portions of the work; but the *codices mutili* still retain the higher authority. Dr. Wilkins prints the chief variations in connection with his text, and in the notes devotes considerable space to the most knotty passages. In a few instances, e.g. 1. 202, he is compelled to say, 'The reading of the MSS. makes no sense.' He does not hesitate to dispute the judgment of preceding editors, and often supplements his own opinion by a 'happy conjecture' of Dr. Reid.

In general the notes show abundantly the editor's ability and industry. More than this, they gave evidence of rare editorial sanity. In dealing with such varied and confusing material, it needs a sound judgment to take invariably the right path, and to avoid pointless digressions. For the *De Oratore* there is no safer guide than Dr. Wilkins.

Much attention has been given to points of history, of biography, of government and law, of customs, and of literary allusion. Cicero's writings bristle with references to all these things, and his expounder must patiently follow in many byways. Even where the author only stopped to glance at a name, a fact, a common-place of tradition or imagination, or threw in a striking figure of speech, the editor must show what it was that invited the pause, or suggested the allusion. Such side-paths make his task laborious. Notice e.g. in the first book, the explanation of *decursus honorum* (1), *urbanae tribus* (38), *centumviri* (173) still left obscure, *pater patratus* (181), *duodecim scripta* (217), *hastae amentatae* (242); in the second book, *Persium non curo legere* (25), *suscipere* and *recipere causam* (101) [cf. the more general *accipere* (114)], *lex Thoria* (284): in the third book, the schools of the Academy (68), *politici philosophi* (109), Cicero's periods (186), the mask of Roscius (221). There

are full citations relating to the stock figures of speech.

The notes are not less ample in their treatment of word-meanings, and to the scholar this is one of their chief merits. There is no undue display of derivations, though the editor does not hesitate to criticize what he deems a wrong conjecture. Where the etymology is not in doubt, there is often an opportunity for nice discriminations of meaning, in the uses of single words, and in the comparison of so-called synonyms. Out of very many instances the following may serve as specimens: in book i., *callidus* and *peritus* (48 and 109), *perurbatus* (72), *probare* and *probabilis* (129), the words for wit and humour (159), *recordatio* and *memoria* (228), *importunus* (230), *hebes* and *rudis* (248). Perhaps the nicest of these discriminations is s.v. *subtilis* (17). In the second book, we may note *importare* (53), *reverens* (122), *educere* and *educare* (124), *claudicare* (249), *notatio* (358). In Book iii. *depulsus* (11), *vetus* and *antiquus* (28), *mendicus* (92) *recuperare* and *usurpare* (110), *obsoletum* [verbum] (150), *obtinere* (224). *Adhaerescere* (37) scarcely needs the label of a 'curious use,' for so natural a metaphor. In books i. and ii. the number of words translated is largely increased in the second editions, and the renderings are always helpful.

The notes have little to say of the common-places of grammar. Orthography is occasionally discussed, as in *quattuor* (i. 97), *uti* (119), *eloquenti* (259). Syntactical constructions are sparingly noticed, as with *concedere* (i. 56), *suadere* (i. 251), the 'precipitation of verbs' (i. 100), *laborare* (ii. 8) [cf. *Brut.* 184], *implorare* (ii. 144), *auribus accidere* (iii. 29), *iungere* (iii. 55), *multum maius* (iii. 92), *meminisse* (iii. 333). Questions on the border line of the indicative and the subjunctive moods receive little discussion. (There is a vacillation between the terms subjunctive and conjunctive.) Dr. Wilkins is conservative on the point of the 'subjunctive of repeated action' in Cicero: see Hale's 'cum constructions,' p. 232, and the increased list of examples in the German translation, p. 284. Though not agreeing with the American professor, he mentions his production with respect, and quotes the phrase 'character of the situation' (ii. 2).

The notes are enlivened by illustrations from things modern and English: e.g. the House of Commons (ii. 333), the actor Liston (289). In connection with i. 85 (*bene moratae*) there might well be a reference to ii. 184. Under ii. 233 there is a needless repetition from i. 38.

A glance at the very full and excellent Index shows the varying uses and combinations of Cicero's words. See e.g. *agere*, *artes*, *caput*, *causa*, *commentatio*, *discrepare*, *efferre*, *fides*, *fugere*, *genus*, *locus*, *modus*, *numerus*, *occupare*, *oratio*, *os*, *partes*, *ponere*, *princeps*, *prudentia*, *quaestio*, *ratio*, *referre*, *sensus*, *sequi*, *studium*, *tempus*, *tenere*, *vis*. The index is well nigh a lexicon, translating many more words than are touched on in the notes.

Dr. Wilkins's straightforwardness leads him into some harshness of animadversion, which seems to have grown upon him in the notes of the third book. Is it an unconscious infection from certain German philologists? A 'very bad mistake' is attributed to Calvert (11). (The succeeding note acknowledges an error of his own in the introduction.) Under 62 Piderit makes a 'strange slip,' and Sorof 'blunders as badly.' In 139 the latter is guilty of an 'extraordinary oversight.' Lewis and Short's Lexicon is soundly rated: 'not as L. and S. absurdly put it' (86); an L. and S. rendering in 200 is 'quite erroneous'; 'L. and S. are quite wrong here' (208). A rule of good Dr. Reid is 'upset,' in treating of *memini* (i. 33). Why need the faulty work of others be mentioned at all? In annotating an immortal treatise, may not ephemeral personalities be wholly eliminated?

We note a few errors of the printer, or oversights in re-editing. References to the re-written introduction are incorrectly given under i. 10, 14, 16, 17, 18, 22, 47, 86 *bis*, 142, 143; ii. 32, 160, 307. Introduction, p. 9, for *Brut.* 44, read 43; under i. 32, for *cogita*, read *cogitata*; 40, for *Brut.* 27. 10, read 27. 105; 114, for *Brut.* 47. 114, read 174; ii. 37, for *ui*, read *vi*; 320, strike out i. after *Brut.*; 316. 366, for sc. read i.e.: iis. 9 n., for *Catullus*, read *Catulus*; 21, for *Brut.* 35. 152, read 132; 220, for *Brut.* 151, read 141. In index, s.v. *urbanitas*, for i. 77, read i. 72. In i. 44 *probabilis* (of thing, not of person) would find closer parallels in 63 and 240. Under i. 141 the editor must be asked for the meaning intended in the phrase 'the general exception of some word.' 'Firstly' does not look well under iii. 144. As a whole, Dr. Wilkins's work is marked by unusual accuracy—not only in the Latin sense (i. 38), but in the English sense as well.

Some of us remember the time when the best editions of the *De Oratore* had a very meagre outfit of annotation, scant introductions, and no index. Professor Kingsley's

for example had short Latin 'Arguments,' four duodecimo pages of introduction, hardly more than two dozen pages of notes. There was a fear lest the student should receive too much assistance. The change to the present superb edition is most striking. Here the student is not lifted over all the difficult places: he is led to do more hard work by finding before him the most tempting lines of research. He does more than translate so many pages of Latin: he learns to compare the treatise with kindred writings of Cicero himself and of other rhetoricians, Greek and Roman; to trace the history of a noble art, through noble exemplars; to understand the troubled times in which the orator lived, and the studies to which he resorted for consolation; to meet his teachers

and contemporaries; to scan anew the historical and literary setting of this valuable work; to see what perils of oblivion it has survived; to appreciate the labour required in searching out and clarifying the original text; to understand the principles of sound criticism and interpretation.

We have to thank Dr. Wilkins for his wise directions in these and other lines of study. We congratulate him on the completion of a helpful and noble work. It is in itself a reward to link his name, for this generation at least, with the completest oratorical treatise of the greatest Roman orator.

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#### ST. GEORGE STOCK'S EDITION OF THE *PRO SEXTO ROSCIO*.

*Cicero pro Sex. Roscio*: with Introduction and Notes: by ST. GEORGE STOCK, M.A. (Clarendon Press, 1890). 3s. 6d.

THIS is a good piece of work, complete in all its parts. The introduction contains a section on Rhetoric which will be found useful by students who have not already traversed the same ground under the fuller guidance of Prof. A. S. Wilkins (introd. to *de Oratore* I.). The statement that Cicero belonged to the 'Rhodian School' of oratory is somewhat crude. Blass (as quoted by Landgraf, *pro S. Rosc.* p. 121) combats the existence of such a school as intermediate between the Attic and Asiatic schools. The Rhodians are indebted to Cicero (e.g. *Brut.* § 51) for this erection into independence. Gratitude to his master Molon prompted it: and further, it was natural that having identified the 'genus grande dicendi' and 'genus tenue' with the Asiatic and Attic schools respectively, he should attribute the 'genus medium' to the Rhodians. But Dionysius Halic. tells us that the latter took the Attic Hyperides as their model; and they may best be regarded as 'part of the Atticizing reaction against the degenerate Asiatic style of their day' (Sandys, *Orator* p. xxxvii., also notes on §§ 20, 25). In his rhetoric, as in other things, Cicero himself belongs to the 'eclectic school.'

A word on a few points in the notes. In § 15, a reference to Quint. iv. 2, 129 would have indicated this 'initium a persona

factum' as a normal opening of a narratio. In § 57 *litteram illam...ita vehementer ad caput adfigent*, the Schol. Gronov. refers the letter K to the 'condemno' of the jurors' voting-tablet, the 'littera tristis' of *Mil.* § 15. It is generally explained by a hypothesis, which lacks all other support (v. Ernesti, *Clav. Ciceron.* sub voc. *lex Remmia*), that calumniatores were literally branded with a K. But the diction seems remote from the usual phrases *inurere*, *inscriptio frontis* (*Sen. de ira* iii. 3, 6): and is surely chosen merely for the sake of a humorous antithesis to 'crura suffringent': *caput* referring in actual fact only to the civil disabling of false accusers. So in *Cluent.* § 129 *ensoriae severitatis nota inuretur*; where a literal branding is out of the question. In § 64 *servus quisquam*, it must be by a lapsus calami that *quisquam* is called a subst.; cp. notes on §§ 74, 94 on its adjectival use. In § 65 it is misleading to compare the use of *non modo* before *ne...* quidem with *οὐχ ὅπως*, which can be translated 'not only not' even before the positive *ἀλλὰ καί* (Goodwin § 707, 8). The imperf. subj. used as a past potential, to express a case possible in the past, occurs more than once without receiving its true explanation. In § 92 *impellerent* is explained as dependent on *esse* 'an imperfect infin.' We prefer to call this, with possent of § 91 and *poneret* of § 102 (these two verbs are under the regimen of *ut* and receive no explanation from Mr. Stock), and finally § 103



(wrongly explained) Africanus...si sua res ageretur, testimonium non diceret, a *potential* denoting a case possible in the past; in fact the analogue of the pres. subj. in protasis and apodosis in primary time. (Since writing this I have read Prof. Sonnenschein's paper on the Prospective Subjunctive, *Classical Review*, February 1893, with which I think I am here in general accord.) In § 112 Mr. Stock accepts Kayser's insertion of *non* before posse: not so Landgraf, who reads minime leve for minime grave, suspecting that grave is a gloss which has displaced leve in the text. Certainly Cicero represents the commission given to T. Roscius Capito by his fellow-townsmen as a very important one. But the antithesis between grave and leve is quite Ciceronian. The sense of the ordinary text is—'You undertake a responsibility which you think you can meet, and which seems far from grave to those who are

serious enough themselves: [and yet you fail to fulfil it]. So you are false to your trust.' A link seems wanting in the thought, whatever reading we take.

In § 139 nostri isti nobiles, a depth of meaning is discovered in the words, of which Cicero himself was certainly unconscious: 'this combination of two pronouns of different persons exactly expressing Cicero's position on the outside of the aristocratical party.' The wave of the hand with which he spoke must have been as significant as Lord Burleigh's memorable nod. Equally questionable is the suggestion in § 23 of the Vergilian meaning 'corpse' for funus; and the derivation in § 38 of nequam ('ne quam frugem habet'), which should surely be regarded as originally a negative adverb formation (cp. perquam) giving the same sense as O.E. a 'nothing,' Greek οὐδείς, οὐδέν.

W. YORKE FAUSSET.

#### SKENE'S 'ANTE AGAMEMNONA.'

'*Ante Agamemnona*': a new departure in philology. Nos. i. ii. iii. iv. (*to be continued*). By ANDREW PHILIP SKENE, of Skene, and of Hallyards-Fife, Scotland; Chief of the name; also of Skenesborough, North America. Oxford and London. 1892. Pp. 118. 3s. 6d.

'At the bottom of Greek,—therefore of course of all the cognate tongues,—lies the strange monosyllable ιβδ, preserved almost in Greek alone, and which must have meant "fluid" in general, since it is found not only in ιβδης, βάπτω, λάπτω, κ.τ.λ., but (minus the vowel) in βδάλλω, βδέλλα, βδελλίον, πτύω, κ.τ.λ., each of which relates to a fluid other than water.'

'No word in Archaean Greek expressed "wet," nor is any idea traced from it, unless it were composed of this monosyllable no matter how changed (αβδ, ομδ, εγδ, κ.τ.λ.), and another, λ preceded by a vowel.'

'No word expressed "not wet," nor is any idea traced from it, unless composed of this monosyllable and another, ρ preceded by a vowel, so that λ apparently meant "yes" or "plus," and ρ "no" or minus.'

'There are, so to speak, no phonetic changes at all, save that μ is a bad β, ν a bad μ and λ; and σ a substitute for any consonant, which had no existence at all in Archaean Greek; labials and gutturals

interchanging of course according to dialect, but dentals never interchanging with them.'

These are Mr. Skene's main principles, all quoted from pp. 7 and 8. Incidentally, he makes many other remarkable discoveries; the Homeric forms in -σκον are not iteratives but simple imperfects, every one of them from a present in -σκω, -σκ- being a Greek substitution for -κτ-, and -κτ- being one of the forms of the Protean ιβδ (pp. 48—66); ϖ is a doubled γ, and therefore it is called Digamma, and so the Gortynian KATAFEA-MENON is καταγγεμένων ('in D. without augment' where D. probably means Doric), and the meaning is 'the citizens having been informed'; (p. 84) θαάζειν means 'to purify' or 'atone,' but purification was accompanied with wailing, so τίνας ποθ' εἶδρας τάσδε μοι θαάζετε; means 'what temples, pray, are ye re-consecrating that ye wail so?' and ἵπ' ἀρχᾶς δ' οὐτινος θαάζων means 'rules, not singing small, not covering before any higher power' (p. 113). And the triumphs of Mr. Skene's method are not confined to Greek. By the mere light of nature he can put Mr. Sayce right on Assyrian etymology (p. 114). He says that Tiglath-Pileser is ιπτ-ιγδ-ιλ-απτ-ιλ-επτ-ερ; Mr. Sayce says that it is *Tulsul-ti-pal-es-ira*, 'the servant of the son of E-sira,' whereupon Mr. Skene goes on: 'I perfectly see that Mr. Sayce's interpretation of T. may be correct [his own Italics]. I

doubt, however, whether the one I arrived at previously be not the right one . . . Which is the more likely title for the Assyrian monarch, Mr. Sayce's or mine? And then he carries his victorious arms through the linguistic universe. Pharaoh is  $\pi\tau\tau\text{-}\alpha\rho\text{-}\alpha\phi\text{-}\sigma\pi\tau = \pi\tau\tau\epsilon\text{-}\epsilon\rho\text{-}\alpha\mu\beta$  ( $\tau\upsilon\rho\alpha\nu\nu\sigma$ ) or  $\pi\tau\tau\epsilon\text{-}\epsilon\rho\text{-}\alpha\mu\delta$  ( $\kappa\omicron\iota\rho\alpha\nu\sigma$ ). Abraham is  $\alpha\beta\delta\text{-}\epsilon\rho\text{-}\alpha\phi\text{-}\alpha\mu\delta$ . 'No names are better Greek, or more simple variants of Elis, Delphi, Thera, &c. than are Magdala, Zanzibar, Zulu, Lhassa' (and nine more, ranging from China to Peru), (p. 117).

If only De Morgan was alive and knew comparative philology! Indeed, the second wish is hardly necessary, for Mr. Skene could get into the *Budget of Paradoxes* as it stands; in his time he has made discoveries in astronomy, in opposition to Sir George Airy and Mr. Proctor, and found them confirmed, to his own satisfaction, by later authorities (pp. 44, 45). In many ways, he is like the immortal James Smith of the *Budget*; he is as fertile in expedients, as irrepressible, as irrefutable. But the differences are all on the side of Mr. Skene. His modesty, his candour, his good temper, are beyond all praise. He gives himself no airs on the strength of his achievements; rather, he is humbly grateful to have been the unworthy instrument of such great things. 'It appeared so unlikely that to me, an indifferent scholar, and a very bad mathematician, should have been revealed the real meaning of the component parts of words...that I debated within myself for long whether I should not do more wisely to spare myself the toil of working it out, the certainty of being snubbed and laughed at, and the probability of dying actively despised, instead of passively obscure....I trust this avowal of my excessive self-distrust at first will partly atone for any occasional arrogance and petulance there may be found in the foregoing pages, as well as enhance the value of my present absolute confidence in the truth—and I will dare to add even the *exhaustive finality* almost—of my present conclusions.' Could anybody better exemplify Mr. Ruskin's canon, 'The self-assertion of the great man is the assertion not of I but of It'? And more unique (among his kind) than his personal modesty is his gentleness to the unbelieving scholars who are blind to the light. 'The men who, when I am to be judged, will profit by the crowd's cry, *Non hunc, sed Barabbam*.' "We don't know you; therefore you know nothing." That is what they say. These are the only places where he speaks

with any personal bitterness, and there is only one passage where he suggests any bad faith; and those who know the ways of paradoxers will agree that only three outbreaks in 118 pages are a saintly height of forbearance. And then, Mr. Skene has a lively fancy and a sense of humour, which continually take him away from his subject; and as soon as he gets away from it, he is delightful. Even his title-page is a piece of biography, and his narrative of his dealings with professors and editors is full of entertainment. Even in the midst of his disquisitions he abounds in *obiter dicta* like these (objecting to the explanations of the Elean  $\kappa\alpha\tau\alpha\rho\alpha\nu\epsilon\upsilon\epsilon$  as 'imprecate'): 'Unfair protection of ladies and foreigners....[or] unfair neglect of do. do., and in either case direct encouragement to profane swearing' (p. 107). 'In Greek (*me duce*) the same word connotes 'slave' and 'lord': both mean 'water'; the first, because his office was to draw; the second, because *his* office was originally to preside at the drawing' (p. 114). 'There are reasons for believing that speech began at the sea-side....[After two linguistic reasons] Heart-disease is rarer by the sea than elsewhere; therefore the brain of  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\rho\alpha\lambda\omicron\iota$  is better nourished, and should be quicker than that of  $\pi\epsilon\delta\iota\alpha\iota\omicron\iota$ ' (p. 24). 'It seems unfair for a journal to announce a root  $\omega\pi = \text{water}$  for one man....and to burke a root  $\alpha\pi\tau = \text{water}$  for another' (p. 10).

Mr. Skene will say that I have 'held' his opinions 'up to derision,' without making any attempt to show why they are wrong; and indeed there is nothing else to be done. It is possible to argue where both sides have common canons of evidence, but without them both sides can only assert. As soon as Mr. Skene begins to quote a Greek word, he begins to make statements about its sounds, which he does not support by any evidence, and which conflict with evidence that other people accept as cogent. ' $\mu$  is a bad  $\beta$ .' Where, except before a  $\nu$ ? ' $\nu$  is a bad  $\mu$  and  $\lambda$ .' Where? ' $\sigma$  a substitute for any consonant.' Where, except when either (1) other dialects of Greek show  $\tau$ , or (2) other languages show a voiceless consonant followed by a consonantal  $i$  (Mr. Skene will have none of  $i$ , but we really cannot do without it). ' $\theta = \pi\tau, \kappa\tau, \beta\delta, \gamma\delta, \mu\delta, \phi\delta$ .' Where? All Mr. Skene's answer consists in quoting long lists of Greek words, strung together on these and similar principles. ' $\phi\iota\lambda\omicron\tau\iota\varsigma, \sigma\iota\lambda\iota\varsigma$ , are also equivalents,  $\pi\tau\iota\text{-}\epsilon\text{-}\iota\text{-}\lambda\text{-}\pi\tau\text{-}\iota\beta\delta, \pi\tau\text{-}\iota\text{-}\epsilon\text{-}\iota\text{-}\lambda\text{-}\iota\beta\delta$  ( $\pi\tau\iota\text{-}\epsilon\text{-}\iota\text{-}\lambda\text{-}\iota\beta\delta$ ), also  $\epsilon\upsilon\nu\acute{\omega}, \acute{\alpha}\lambda\iota\omicron\varsigma, \acute{\iota}\alpha\lambda\iota\omicron\varsigma$  ( $\epsilon\mu\delta\epsilon\text{-}\epsilon\text{-}\lambda\text{-}\pi\tau\text{-}\alpha\lambda\text{-}\pi\tau\text{-}\iota$ ) i.g.  $\iota\sigma\mu\acute{\iota}\nu$  ( $\pi\tau\epsilon\text{-}\epsilon\text{-}\mu\delta\epsilon\text{-}\iota\text{-}\lambda\text{-}\iota\beta\delta$ )

α)' (p. 19). This is an average specimen. Mr. Skene says 'λ becomes ν.' We say 'prove it,' and he answers 'the *n* of *sanguis* was once an *l*.' In short, when we ask Mr. Skene to prove to us that chalk is cheese, he unloads a capacious pocket, full of chalk fragments, and says 'This bit is cheese, and this bit is cheese, and this bit,' and so on to the end.

Mr. Skene appeals to two arguments which have often misled the inexperienced in more subjects than comparative philology. One of these is the success of the outsider, the other is the disagreement of the experts.

(1). Mr. Skene puts on his title-page some words from the *Saturday Review*: 'A sound general ignorance of what has been done before is not a bad equipment for an observer, especially when his subject is one where fallacies have had a wider currency than facts.' The emphatic word in that sentence is the word 'observer.' The 'sound general ignorance' can only be useful where the facts are all there, and visible to the naked eye, but the use of the naked eye has gone out of fashion with the experts,—when the philosophers give reasons why the bucket is no heavier with the fish put in, and the plain man weighs it to see. But these are the very rarest cases. How many cases in the history of knowledge can Mr. Skene or the *Saturday Review* produce, where the unlearned man has set the learned right? For a man is not unlearned because he is unprofessional. Goethe was a respectable physiologist, Kant was a respectable astronomer, before they suggested the inter-maxillary bone and the consolidation of nebulae. As a rule, the man who makes discoveries is the expert. Even where the 'currency of fallacies' was the 'widest,' in mediaeval medicine, the awakening came from the professional physicians. Further, if we grant the value of ignorance to the observer, Mr. Skene has not taken the part of an observer, but the part of a theorist. In language the only 'observer' is the man who records usage as it stands, the man who makes lists of words and grammatical forms, and occurrences of sounds in given connexions, and usages of syntax,—the man who tells us what is the earliest instance of *-aus*, and how the Latin inscriptions spell preposition-compounds, and how many times *ov* can be found in Greek prose, and how many kinds of *r*-sounds there are in Northumberland. In the nature of the case, etymology is a theory founded on observation, not a fact of the observation itself, and Mr. Skene must excuse us if we say that until he has read

other people's theories he is not qualified to theorize.

(2). Here we come to Mr. Skene's second fallacy. He thinks that he is absolved from reading the comparative philologists (of course he says 'philologists' *simpliciter*) because the earlier authorities are contradicted by the later ones. Amurath to Amurath succeeds. Schleicher and Curtius superseded Bopp, and Brugmann has superseded Schleicher. Mr. Skene has made a pretty collection *de repugnantibus grammatistis*, how Mr. Wilkins says that 'a teacher who now contents himself with reproducing the doctrines of Schleicher and Curtius' will teach 'baseless theories' and 'exploded speculations,' how Mr. Wharton says that Bopp's 'account of the letters is wholly untrustworthy,' how Mr. Sayce writes to him personally that 'there never was a parent-Aryan,' how Mr. Monro finds 'solutions confessedly incomplete' and facts that 'cannot be explained.' Well, it is all true. We contradict our predecessors, and each other; and our successors will contradict us, and each other. But our subject is like all others; the outsider hears the controversies and he does not hear the agreement. It is intelligible, though scarcely reasonable, to say that because the authorities differ you will leave comparative philology alone. But to say that because they differ you will publish your opinion on comparative philology without reading them, is like saying that because Hebraists differ you will publish your opinion on the date of the Pentateuch without learning Hebrew. And as to the supposed contradictions, what are the facts? All that is new in the most modern books comes from developing the principles of the older books, distinguishing phenomena that they lumped together (*e.g.* the different qualities of gutturals, the Indo-European vowels), defining observations that they left vague (*e.g.* the scope of phonetic laws), re-adjusting the relative proportions of different components of causation (*e.g.* phonetic succession, analogical re-formation). And of the older masters themselves, nearly all who have lived into our time have gone on with the movement. Because Schleicher died too soon, and Curtius held back, and Max Müller is only half-convinced, the English public which knows only those names imagines that all the old men say *katvárams* and the young men are divided between *q'tvrrms* and *qetvórms* and other grisly phantoms. They do not know how Johannes Schmidt and Fick and Gustav Meyer and Delbrück and Hübschmann and Bugge and

Bezenberger and Schweitzer-Sidler, and many another who was committed to the old by many a written word, have given their hands to efficacious science. But let Mr. Skene neglect everything new, if he chooses, and read only books written before 1877. He will find many points left vague, many rules that break down at a pinch, many explanations that contradict each other. But, if he

will only search with a tenth part of the diligence that he has devoted to stringing the Greek lexicon into chains of linkless incongruity, he will find abundant evidence to prove that whatever may be the truth about the Indo-European language, at least it did not consist of the syllable  $\iota\beta\delta$ .

T. C. SNOW.

#### KLOTZ ON THE BASIS OF OLD ROMAN METRE.

*Grundzüge altrömischer Metrik*, by RICHARD KLOTZ (Teubner, Leipzig, 1890). 12 Mk.

THE review of a book like this, which contains nearly 600 pages of matter demanding close attention and to a large extent based upon an original point of view, is a task involving no little labour and responsibility, especially as the author has worked under conditions which make it almost a marvel that he should have produced such a book at all. Amid the heavy labours of a teacher of the highest form at a Leipzig Gymnasium Klotz has proposed to himself the ambitious task of demonstrating that a single principle runs through the scansion of all the various metres employed by the old Latin dramatists, and that the peculiarities of so-called Plautine versification are not a retrograde movement, but a natural development and joint-product of Greek and native Roman art. It is therefore no matter of surprise that errors due to haste are to be found in this work. But it is inevitable that under these circumstances much time and care is required of the reviewer if his judgment is to be of any value: indeed every reader is bound to test every statement made before accepting it, and to control the instances given by reference to his own collections or to other authorities.

The difficulty of the reviewer is increased by the fact that in spite of many patent defects the work of Klotz is of high value. New points of view are opened up, and old doctrines are presented in a new light. Whether one agrees with the author or not, one feels that one is to a greater or less extent his debtor. Klotz is an original thinker and he possesses special qualifications for the present task in his intimate acquaintance with Greek metres and a fine ear. From such a man the minute analysis of Plautine rhythms comes very well: per-

haps it will give pause to those whose ideas of prosody and metre are derived entirely from later models to be reminded that shortenings like *Polliō*, *mentiō*, *dicerō*, *quomodō*, *palūs*, etc., are to be found in Horace, and that Plautus would have retorted the charge of cacophony upon the author of

*Suis et ipsa Roma uiribus ruit.*

To do justice to this stimulating book and at the same time to point out its shortcomings is no easy task.

The need of further light upon the subject of Plautine prosody is startlingly shown by the diverse ways in which the subject is treated in the introductions which editors prefix to separate plays. Of recent English editors scarcely two are entirely agreed upon some of the cardinal doctrines, and the state of mind of the beginner who studies these treatises in succession is not to be envied—for example in regard to the question of shortened syllables, which Klotz puts in the first place in his work. The various theories which have been advanced on this point may be divided into two great classes—(i) those which explain shortenings as due to pronunciation *out of relation to metre*, and (ii) those which throw the burden of explanation upon the *metrical ictus*. The first class comprises many varieties of theory: some, like Ritschl, believe in syncope or ecclipsis, synzesis, loss of final consonants, etc. Others, like Corssen, appeal to the influence of the ‘Hochton’ or prose accent. Those who belong to either branch of this class generally, though not necessarily, hold, either explicitly or implicitly, that the language of Plautus represents the ‘vulgar Latin’ of his day, or as Bentley said a ‘popularis pronuntiandi mos’—a view against which Klotz protests, and I believe rightly; for the same peculiarities as are found in comedy appear also in



the tragedy of the period, where vulgarisms cannot well have found place; and real vulgarisms such as *caballus* for 'horse' are conspicuous by their absence from Plautus and still more from Terence. 'The language of the Roman drama is essentially the conversational speech of the upper classes' (*der vornehme Umgangston*; Klotz, p. 22). We must not confuse occasional grossness of thought with vulgarism of diction.—Corssen was followed in the main by Wagner and Brix, these treating the ictus of the verse, or as Wagner called it the 'rhythmical accent,' as an *equivalent* for the prose accent (Wagn. *Intr.* to Aul. 2nd ed., pp. 51–58; Brix, *Intr.* to Trin., p. 16).—The second great class is chiefly represented by C. F. W. Müller, who in his *Plautinische Prosodie* pp. 83–85 calls attention to the fact that the shortenings in question are found only under certain metrical conditions, *i.e.* always in a certain relation to the *ictus metricus*: the law is that the shortened syllable must always make up, together with the short syllable which must precede it, the arsis or thesis of a foot; for example *uidē* must always form either an arsis (*uidē nunc*) or a thesis (*uidē nūc*). Müller's book was an attempt to substitute a single metrical rule for a multiplicity of prosodical considerations affecting particular words or groups of words.

It is to the latter school that Klotz belongs. But his law of metrical shortening is in some respects wider, in others more limited, than the law of Müller. "In iambic and cretic words the final syllable, whether long by nature or by position, is shortened<sup>1</sup> when it falls together with a preceding short syllable in a resolvable arsis of any metre, or a thesis of anapaestic metre, or an 'outer thesis' of iambic or trochaic metre (except the 7th of the iambic septenarius)": Klotz, pp. 54, 59. Later on he extends the law to bacchiac and cretic metres *mutatis mutandis*. It will be observed that Klotz rightly includes under the law cretic words like *obsecro, impera*, as well as iambic words (cf. Rud. 944a *Enēcās iam me odio, quisquis es*); on the other hand he limits the operation of the law to resolvable arses and certain theses. By the excellent term 'outer thesis' he means a thesis which comes *immediately before* the principal ictus of a dipody—in iambs the 1st, 3rd, 5th ( $\overset{1}{\text{—}} \text{ } \overset{3}{\text{—}} \text{ } \overset{5}{\text{—}}$ ), in trochaics the 2nd, 4th, 6th ( $\overset{2}{\text{—}} \text{ } \overset{4}{\text{—}} \text{ } \overset{6}{\text{—}}$ );

<sup>1</sup> It does not follow that it became *as* short as an ordinary short syllable. Klotz has some good remarks about half-short syllables.

( $\overset{6}{\text{—}} \text{ } \overset{4}{\text{—}} \text{ } \overset{2}{\text{—}}$ ); by 'inner thesis' he means a thesis which comes *immediately after* the principal ictus of a dipody. That the inner thesis were kept comparatively pure is *a priori* likely from the analogy of Greek verse, and I think Klotz has in the main established his point, though he probably goes too far when he says that the shortening of iambic words in these places was 'fast ganz ausgeschlossen'; on p. 76 he admits iambic groups like *ubi ēc-casio*, and in many places of his book he quotes instances with iambic words, like *uidē nunc*, in inner thesis. Further the same principle is shown to apply *under like conditions* to all the various metres; the Roman dramatists, having found or developed a certain usage in one metre, immediately extended it to others. For example, the shortening of cretic words is shown to be no special peculiarity of anapaestic verse; the reason why it is comparatively rare in iambs and trochaics is that the dactylic word is equally inadmissible (except under certain special conditions); wherever Plautus could admit *abdērē* he could admit *ābdīdī*. Whether it is quite true that anapaests stand in all respects on the same footing as iambs and trochaics, I do not feel prepared to say. But it is at any rate no small merit on the part of Klotz to have disposed of a great many of the supposed anomalies, and to have exhibited a unity of principle running through the whole field of versification (*Einheitlichkeit der Technik*). The advance made by him is seen in the scansion of such an anapaestic tetrameter as Persa 797. Müller (p. 405) scanned it

Iūrgium hīnc aūfērās | si sápias :: At | tu  
bóna libérta | haec scīvistī

a scansion which perhaps justified my expression that Müller employed the anapaestic metre as a 'Home for Incurables.' Klotz scans

Iūrgium hīnc aūfērās | etc., which is conceivable, though still harsh (a cretic group and a cretic word, both with final syllables shortened).

The main point however lies in shifting the burden of explanation on to the metrical ictus. Here the view of Müller and Klotz presents some obvious advantages.<sup>2</sup> Word-

<sup>2</sup> Whether the 'Kürzungsgesetz' (law of shortening) should be called with Klotz a metrical phenomenon pure and simple, or a linguistic phenomenon, as Skutsch calls it in his *Forschungen*, recently noticed by Mr. W. M. Lindsay in the *Classical Review* (vi. 9), is another question, and the answer depends on how we understand these terms. If by 'linguistic' is meant such as reproduces the prose accent, then such scansions as *obsecrō* resist

accent no doubt was the basis on which the Roman dramatists founded their practice, and it came in as a prohibitive force to bar certain metrical collocations, such as two iambic words at the end of a senarius (*locum dabo*<sup>1</sup>); again it is adequate to explain a great number of shortenings, such as *ueni*. But it will not explain them all, e.g. *obsecro*, unless we greatly extend the scope of its influence; and moreover it affords no explanation of the fact that we find in Plautus side by side with *abi*, *décént*, *potéstatem*, etc., the classical scansions *abi*, *décént*, *potéstatem*, etc. Whether the syllables in question are short or long in Plautus depends entirely upon their relation to the ictus metricus; thus Men. 289 *nunc obsônâtû*, 278 *ego obsônâbô*, but Bacch. 97 *ego obsônâbô*. The ictus metricus on the other hand will explain all cases, if we admit as we ought that its influence extended backward as well as forward,<sup>2</sup> and that the secondary ictus of the dipody is equal in shortening power to the principal one. Where the ictus and the word-accent coincide, as in *abi*, the latter need not be considered.

If then Klotz had confined himself to stating the law of metrical shortening as above, there would have been little to criticize and much to approve. But he has gone further, and, as it seems to me, got himself the application of the term. On the other hand if by 'metrical' is meant a mere arbitrary shortening by the scenic poets of syllables which by the laws of speech were long, then it would certainly be hazardous to employ it. All that we can say is that the verse ictus often overrides the prose accent: when they come into conflict, the prose accent is sacrificed in the interests of the metre. But this sacrifice need not have involved a violation of the laws of sound: *obsecro* is after all a very similar phenomenon to *ueni*. One thing seems clear, that we must be very cautious about altering the text merely because the metrical ictus falls upon an unusual place of a word. Thus when Mr. Lindsay (*C.R.* vi. 8, p. 342) wishes to emend Asin. 241 *Portitorum simillumae sunt iamuae lenoniae* because in other passages (Asin. 215, Bacch. 913, Cist. 81) Plautus writes *simillumus*, he is on very uncertain ground: merely in order to get rid of an easily explicable phenomenon he has to assume a wholly unknown form or pronunciation (*Portorum* or *Portorum* for *Portitorum*). Moreover I should like to see the evidence of Mr. Lindsay's statement that all superlatives uniformly have the ictus on the antepenultimate in Plautus. What does he say to *Anl. ii. 1. 19 optâma*, *Pers. 543 sed optume*, *Most. 410 uel optumô uel pessumo*, to say nothing of cases like *Amph. 552, 561 sceléstissimus*, where the principal ictus is on the second syllable?

<sup>1</sup> I employ the dot above the syllable to indicate the word-accent; the acute accent to indicate the principle ictus of the dipody; the grave accent to indicate the secondary ictus of the dipody.

<sup>2</sup> Klotz (p. 65) speaks of a 'Kräftiger Einsatz' as explaining *brevia an longinquo* at the beginning of a line; but this is quite inapplicable to the middle of a line. On p. 94 he admits an 'Anlehnung an das Folgende.'

into serious difficulties. He limits the words which can suffer shortening of an end-syllable under his law to the following classes. 1. Iambic words (*uidê*, *uidént*), and equivalent groups formed of two monosyllables (*et â*, *in hânc*) or a monosyllable followed by a preposition in composition (*quid abs-tulisti*). 2. Cretic words (*obsecrô*, *obsecrânt*), and, as equivalents, words of the form of the 4th Paeon (*maritumis*, rare), and trochaic words followed by a monosyllable or a preposition in composition (*iurgium hînc*, *obuiam ig-nobilis*). Also words with cretic ending (*indignior*) and words with trochaic ending followed by a monosyllable or by a preposition in composition (*excuratus in-cessisti*). Among words which can shorten a middle syllable he admits only words of at least four syllables of which the first two form an iambus (*uerëbamini*, *magistratus*, *iuuentutem*), and groups containing the same elements (*noño ornatu*, *pessume ornatus*). See pp. 53-96.

Unfortunately however these classes do not cover all the words which have to be taken into account. Even if we admit with Klotz that cases like *in-diligenter*, *op-tume*, *obsonabo*, *ar-gentum*, are due to the working of analogy, and grant that *um-quam*, *ergo* may have been still felt as compounds(1), where shall we bring in *ecum*, *inter*, *interest*, *interpellatio*, *estis*, *usque*, *uxor*, *hercle*, etc., and a number of trisyllabic words with the second syllable shortened, like *profecto*, *delisti*, *senecta*, *sagitta*? Many of these Klotz simply ignores, others he attempts to explain away or has recourse to alterations of the text. Thus when the last syllable of *hercle*, *profecto* etc. is elided (*vel hercle ênica*, *Rud. 1401*) he says *vel hercl'* = an iambus; but this will not help us in such cases as *Trin. 58, 559 meus quidem hercle numquam fiet*; he admits *profec-to* ut *Mil. 185 b*, but not *profecto uidi* *Mil. 290*; *scelést-ae* hæc *Most. 504*, but not *sceléstae* or *sceléstus*; *dedistin* he says may be paralleled by *magistratus*, because it is short for *dedistina*, but he has no room for *dedisti* or *dedisti*. He can countenance *sagittâtus*, but not *sagittâ*. In dealing with *uxor* he is particularly unfortunate: he arbitrarily selects five instances out of a large number in which the evidence points to *uxor*, and ignores the rest; of his five one is a man of straw (*Rud. 904*) and he easily demolishes it; in three he cuts the knot by proposing to emend merely on account of the scansion (*Rud. 895*,<sup>3</sup> *Cas. 227*, *Phorm. 776*); one he

<sup>3</sup> He proposes *Sed me uxor scelêrata* for *Sed uxor scelêta*. Observe that he is debarred from *Sed uxor scelêta* by his own act.

admits and explains it as forming with the preceding monosyllable a group = *magistratus* (Merc. 244 ad me domum intro *ad uxorem* ducturum meam, MSS.). No doubt he would explain *sibi uxorem* Aul. Prol. 32, and Cas. 574, Hec. 514 in the same way; but how about *sed uxor* Cas. 1000? [*mea uxor* Amph. 522, Cas. 304, *tua uxor* Cas. 329, *eam uxorem* Cist. i. 1, 104, *ea uxor* ii. 3, 69 might be scanned with synizesis and elision.]

The reason why Klotz has here adopted a method of procedure which stands in surprising contrast to the main object of his book, substituting as he does a multiplicity of isolated cases for the homogeneous rule of Brix, is probably to be found in the fact that he employs, side by side with his metrical test, a second and wholly different test as to the admissibility of certain shortenings. This dualism of treatment runs through the whole of his first part: instead of boldly admitting that the ictus overrides considerations of prose pronunciation wherever shortening is in question, he tries everywhere to find a 'sprachliche Erklärung' of the phenomenon, i.e. he tests it by linguistic canons. In some cases he is successful enough, e.g. when he explains the accentuation *uoluptas mea* by the enclitic character of the possessive adjective.<sup>1</sup> But in other cases his linguistic canons are of an arbitrary nature: *sed uxor* appears to him incredible because of the non-coincidence of the ictus with the word-accent; *sed uxor* appears to him less strange because the first syllable of *uxor* forms part of the arsis. I do not admit the sufficiency of the explanation; but the main point is that a new element has been introduced into the question, and without any explicit recognition or justification of it. He would seem to hold that in cases where a syllable is shortened ictus and word-accent must not pull against one another; in *tacē* they pull together, in *tacē nūc* they work from opposite directions to produce the same effect, and *enīcās* may possibly be treated in a similar way. But how does Klotz deal with numbers of cases like *quīs arripit, uel ēptumo, fōrem ōbdo*, which he

<sup>1</sup> This explains only the accentuation, not the quantity; the statement (p. 92) that the shortened *uolūptās* appears only in the phrase *uolūptās mea* at the end of a verse may easily mislead: it is true only of the Nominative Singular; the oblique cases are frequently shortened in the middle of a line, e.g. Amph. 939 *Cāpīant uolūptātes, cāpīent rūrsum miserias*, Merc. 543 *Volūptātē*, Cas. 426 and Epid. 557 *uolūptatēm*, etc. Mr. Lindsay's statement (*C.R.* vi. 8, p. 342) must also be taken subject to the same limitation. It would be strange indeed if *uolūptās* stood on a different footing from *uolūptas*.

admits under his law of shortening (pp. 73, 75)? Here the word-accent, if we admitted its force, would create just the same difficulty as in *sed uxor*. And I cannot see the least difference on the ground of accentuation between *scelēstas* which he rejects and *scelēstas hāe* which he allows.<sup>2</sup> A similarly futile attempt on the part of Klotz to find a 'sprachliche Erklärung' is seen on p. 76f. He has just been explaining the fact that *in hōc* and *quid abs(tulisti)* come to be equivalent to an iambic word by appealing to the close connexion between the preposition and its case and the semi-separable character of the preposition in composition; he has found no difficulty in *et ā* (me), *quid ā* (nobis), p. 69; but on p. 76 cases like *modo ē* (Dāuo) excite scruples.<sup>3</sup> Why? Because the preposition is a proclitic (*modo eDāuo*). Hence he finds himself compelled to say that *mōdo ē Dāuo* is equivalent to a single word like *rēcubare*, though he has not yet explained cases like *magistratus* and therefore his argument is premature. In regard to all such explanations I would remind Klotz of the saying of Bacon, 'Non multiplicandae sunt hypotheses praeter necessitatem.' Again his attempt at a 'sprachliche Erklärung' of the well-known fact that *ille, iste, unde, inde, nempe* and some other words have the first syllable shortened in cases which cannot be accounted for by the operation of the ictus (e.g. in *ille quī, illic hīc abiit*) will not hold water; Klotz says on p. 45 ff. quite rightly that they stand on a different footing from *abī* etc. in which the second syllable is 'prosodically long and only metrically shortened'; but when he says that in *ille* the first syllable is 'prosodically short' he is clearly going too far; for we find *ille* in Plautus more often than *ille*.<sup>4</sup> I fear I must add that among his examples of *ipse, ipsus* (pp. 46 f.) not a single one is conclusive; Capt. 580 may be scanned with *praetēr* (cf. the instances on p. 210); cases like *sed ipse, ego ipsus* may be regarded as coming under the influence of the ictus, though Klotz has no place for them in his list of words that suffer shortening; Capt. 810, Pers. 650, Andr. 202, 359 may be scanned with *ipse*. In proof of *istic* Klotz quotes Rud. 572 where *istic ubi uis* is admissible; Trin. 522 is uncertain: he wholly

<sup>2</sup> That an elided syllable is not entirely obliterated is of course obvious and several times explicitly stated by Klotz.

<sup>3</sup> Merc. 176 *Tū quidem ēx ore* might have been easily got rid of by reading *Tūquidem ēx ore*: see Bücheler in Archiv. iii. pp. 144-146.

<sup>4</sup> A new explanation of this phenomenon is given by Skutsch, *Forschungen* (see *Class. Rev.* vi. 9).

omits the really pertinent examples Men. 146 (MSS.), Poen. 925, where I do not think we need accept Luchs' *istic'at* (Studemund's *Studien*, i. 2, p. 363), and Cas. 184. And why does Klotz omit *iste* which is unassailable in Pers. 520?

I defer the consideration of Klotz's treatment of Hiatus, 'Metrik' and 'Rhythmik' to a subsequent article.

E. A. SONNENSCHNEIN.

#### OMAN ON THE BYZANTINE EMPIRE.

*The Story of the Nations.—The Byzantine Empire*, by C. W. C. OMAN, M.A., Fellow of All Souls' College, Oxford. London, Fisher Unwin. 1892. 5s.

MR. OMAN's work is one of the best in the whole series. He sketches first the earlier history of Byzantium, then tells its later history, from the first to the last Constantine, 'in the spirit of Finlay and Bury, not in that of Gibbon,' and compresses the whole into a clear outline of 350 pages, with the right points (except the Council of Chalcedon)

almost always fairly emphasized. In other respects the general accuracy and scrupulous fairness of the work leave little room for criticism—yet surely it is a serious error to trace back the legislation of the emperors against immorality to Theodosius instead of Constantine. Amongst the best parts of the work may be mentioned the accounts of Nicephorus Phocas and Alexius Comnenus (which bring out the writer's special study of military affairs), and of the buildings round the Augustaeum at Constantinople.

H. M. GWATKIN.

#### PRINCIPAL PETERSON'S INDEBTEDNESS TO PROFESSOR FRIEZE: A REPLY.

FROM the February number of the *Classical Review* it appears that Mr. Edwin Post, of the De Pauw University, has been giving my notes on the text of Quintilian x. what he calls a 'somewhat hasty perusal.' It might occur to me to ask why Mr. Post hurried: my commentary contains enough, in all conscience, to keep an ordinary reader from tripping nimbly along. And I am not sure whether my critic really intends to make it a grievance that my mention of the late Professor Frieze's edition comes in 'at the end of' my list of editions, tractates, and books of reference: or that I assign the book to the year 1889 whereas, according to Mr. Post, it appeared in 1890. As regards the first point, the stern laws of chronology allowed me no alternative. There were editors of Quintilian's Tenth Book before Professor Frieze: in my list he appears as the last of a noble band of twelve, to which (for reasons which Mr. Post ingenuously contrives to ignore) I have had the temerity to add myself. As to the second point, I have to state that the edition now before me is entitled a 'New Edition, Revised and Improved,' and was

published at New York in 1889. If the American people called for another new edition in 1890, I can only say that Quintilian must be more popular with them than he is with us.

Mr. Post is of opinion that 'fairness demands some mention of the fact that, though Principal Peterson has seen fit to draw upon Professor Frieze's book, he has for some reason not seen fit except in rare cases to acknowledge his obligation.'

The answer is really contained in the statement which I have made above, viz., that there were editors of Quintilian's Tenth Book before Professor Frieze. His edition, like the handy little German editions on which it is admittedly based,<sup>1</sup> is a

<sup>1</sup> The following sentences are quoted from Professor Frieze's Prefaces. 'Whatever merit the present edition may possess, either in the text or the notes, is chiefly due to the labors of those German scholars, who have for so many years devoted themselves to the clearing up of doubtful points, both in the text and in the interpretation of this author..... These eminent scholars, gathering up and by their own researches greatly enriching all that had been previously accomplished, have left little further to be desired in the elucidation of Quintilian' (1865). In the interval between 1865 and 1888 Professor Frieze



work of modest proportions and of very limited scope; and it is therefore only in connection with the comparatively easy task of explaining the meaning of the text that he and I can be mentioned together. On examination, I find that I have referred to Professor Frieze wherever it seemed to me that I was indebted to him for anything, even a phrase, *that he had not taken from Spalding, or Bonnell, or (most of all) from Krüger*. If his hero had been at my critic's elbow, in the Pauw University, he would assuredly have hastily possessed himself of the hasty results of Mr. Post's hasty 'perusal' of my commentary; and remembering the not unintelligible candour with which he had acknowledged his own editorial obligations, he would have heaved a gentle sigh of relief as he congratulated himself on how he had 'saved himself from his friends'!

In justice to myself, and to the late Professor Frieze, I desire again to indicate here the extent to which I availed myself of Mr. Frieze's labours for the purposes of a book altogether different in scope and character from his. Mr. Post alleges that I have made 'scant recognition' of my indebtedness: he also speaks of the 'rare cases' in which I have made any acknowledgment whatever. To his *three* examples (x. 4, 1: 5, 12: 7, 7) I can at once add *eight* more (x. 1, 16: 1, 38: 1, 44: 1, 46: 1, 83: 7, 11: 7, 19: also *crit. note* on 1, 30). To such minute detail do I carry the work of acknowledgment, that on 1, 83, approving of Frieze's rendering of 'elegantia,' I make my note run as follows: "*elegantia*, § 114, 2 § 19: 'chaste simplicity' Frieze." And so appreciative am I of merit, when I find it, that on § 7, 11 I remark that Frieze 'alone of the commentators seems to have felt any difficulty.' Truly, American notions of literary property must be undergoing a welcome change when this can be spoken of as 'scant recognition'!

Now as to Mr. Post's parallel passages. In dealing with them, I shall begin with those by which he obviously intended to do most harm, viz. the list of 'further examples,' cited on p. 29 of last month's number, which English readers must have been quite unable to verify for themselves.

And first I take x. 1, 51 *clarissima comparatio*. Here the extent of the implied plagiarism is that the late Professor Frieze seems to know of nothing except Halm's new text and Krüger's second edition, to the latter of which he refers in these words: 'Much assistance has also been derived, in the preparation of the notes of the tenth book, from the excellent and scholarly edition of Krüger' (1888).

and I agreed to translate these simple words in the same simple way, viz. 'the contrast is most striking.' Among other curious information which I am ready to put at Mr. Post's disposal is the fact that we were really anticipated, as regards this, by the excellent Mr. Bohn; and what I want to know from Mr. Post is whether he can suggest any improvement.

x. 1, 49 *amplificationes*. Frieze has 'The various rhetorical means of amplifying or expanding and enforcing ideas are discussed in viii. 4, 3 *sqq.*.....' Krüger had already explained 'Erweiterungen der Vorstellung durch Steigerung oder Häufung des Ausdrucks.' Beispiele giebt Quint. viii, 4, 3 ff.' Those who can refer to my note will find, without surprise, that I am here in substantial agreement with both my predecessors, while I add something new.

x. 1, 73. The first part of my note on *tyrannos insectatus* is as follows. 'These were Myrsilus and Pittacus, by the latter of whom Alcaeus was driven into banishment. Those of his poems which relate to the ten years' civil war waged against the tyrants were called *σπαιρωτικά*.' Frieze has (quite naturally) a very similar note, out of which Mr. Post seeks to make capital against me, as if the late Professor's copyright extended even to the facts of history: 'These were Myrsilus and Pittacus. That portion of the lyrics (*parte operis*) of Alcaeus, which relates to the ten years' civil war waged against these tyrants, was called *σπαιρωτικά*.' The amusing thing here is that Krüger has a note in *precisely similar terms*, which however I forbear to quote.

After such examples of the method pursued by Mr. Edwin Post, the editor of the *Classical Review* may feel inclined to call on me to halt, on the well-known principle *Ex uno disce omnes*. It must be evident that Mr. Post has, to say the least, overdone his task. But as his allegations will have stood for a whole month unchallenged before this paper can see the light, I must claim the satisfaction of making my refutation complete.

Here are two passages which I may quote without a word of comment: no impartial reader will fail to see that they belong to the category of casual, and inevitable, coincidences.

x. 7, 29 *nescio an...utrumque...invicem prosit*. My note is as follows: 'nescio an' = fortasse, as at 6 § 1; see on 1 § 65. Tr. 'and I rather think that there is this reciprocal advantage, viz. that etc.' Frieze has

'ac...prosit,' 'and I rather think there is a reciprocal advantage; that each helps the other.'—x. 7, 30 *subitis*: 'emergencies,' unforeseen developments, e.g. questions and objections by the other side. Cp. Plin. *Ep.* iii. 9, 16 *vir exercitatus et quamlibet subitis paratus*.—So runs my note: Frieze has '*subitis*, "for emergencies;" unforeseen questions, or developments in the course of the trial.'

x. 5, 22 *materias dividere permittit* i.e. 'he will allow the subject to be treated of in parts on successive declamation days.'—The foregoing is my note. Frieze also speaks of 'successive declamation-days,' and the expression is an obvious reproduction of Wolff's note 'ut de materiae ad scribendum propositae partibus, de alia alio die, declamationes afferantur.' Cp. Krüger: 'kann nur von der Verteilung des Stoffes auf mehrere Tagen verstanden werden': Hild 'si une seule séance ne suffit pas à entendre un sujet entier, on le coupera en deux ou trois réitations': Dossou 'de consacrer plus d'un jour à cet exercice de la déclamation.'

On x. 7, 26 *diligentius....componitur*. Frieze has a short note, and I have a long one. Both set forth the distinction, given by every previous editor, between the grammatical and the logical subject: see Bonnell. Frieze says 'the verb is chosen with reference to the speech itself, or to the train of thought, on which the mind is exercised.' In the course of his task, the eagle eye of Mr. Edwin Post must have lighted on the following in my book: 'the verb is chosen with reference to the train of thought which the mind is exercised in pursuing.' Why not? Spalding had already explained: 'cum exercitatio ipsa dicitur componi, intelligendus est animus eius qui se exercet.'

x. 1, 34 a *litigatore* 'from the client': from him the essential facts of the case must be learned (Frieze). My note is similar: so is Krüger's 'welcher den seine Sache führenden Redner über alles dahin gehörende instruieren muss.' I turn to Zambaldi and find that even Italy may dispute with the United States of America this really profound interpretation: 'chi fa la lite fornisce all' oratore le prove delle sue ragioni.'

But I must endeavour to be brief. On x. i. 11 (τροπικῶς, by a 'trope') the matter common to both editors consists in the words 'by a "turn" or change of application.' In 1, 46 I have specifically acknowledged my obligation. As to 1, 48, Mr. Post seems to think that the late Professor Frieze was the

first to establish the difference between ᾗθῳ and πᾶθῳ, just as at 2, 27 he appears to believe that to America is due the credit of laying down the five constituent parts of a speech (introduction, narrative, proof, refutation, peroration): I shall recur to this hallucination below, when I come to deal with the first of the parallel passages which Mr. Post has given at length. At 1, 49 I have (again as part of a longer note) *testimonia* 'illustrations,' confirmatory examples. With the help of a microscope, I have discovered these words in Frieze. But they are also elsewhere; see Bonnell and Dossou. In 7, 14 the parallelism consists in the use of 'a lively imagination' to explain 'recentes rerum imagines' ('Vorstellungen,' Bonnell and Krüger). With regard to 5, 19, I cannot admit that the late Professor Frieze had any exclusive right to explain that the well-known terms *inventio* and *elocutio* 'express the whole compass (or, as my note has it, "cover the whole field") of theoretical rhetoric': cp. my longer notes on 1, 1 and 1, 106. The same will apply to 5, 14 (of *orationes* as opposed to *declamationes*) 'real speeches made in court': cp. 1, 70 and 1, 71. At 1, 44 I have a long note, full of parallel passages, on *sana et vere Attica*, and in speaking of those who interpret the term 'Attic' too narrowly, I say 'it comprehends the best examples of all three genera.' Frieze says the same thing; but then so also does Krüger, 'in dieser sind alle drei genera dicendi begriffen.' Cp. 1, 57 and 58. My notes on 7, 12 and 31 contain an obvious periphrasis of the meaning of the text, which I invite Mr. Post to compare with Bonnell and Krüger. I do not care to dispute with Prof. Frieze the profound explanations given on 1, 40 and 2, 11: and in connection with the four lines on which my note on 2, 6 (*in id solum student*) agrees substantially with his, I should have been glad to mention his name, had he not been indebted for what he says to Spalding.

This exhausts the formidable-looking list of alleged plagiarisms which Mr. Post left English readers to verify for themselves, in the confident belief that they would have no difficulty in reaching down the late Professor Frieze's edition from the shelves of their libraries. With the shorter passages quoted on the same page I can more easily deal. On x. 1, 23, it is impossible to see how any other note could suggest itself: to the German translator Lindner, 'egisse' at once presents itself as 'wirklich gehalten,' or 'actually delivered,' as opposed to 'scripsisse.' The citation from 1, 36, is too utterly

trivial; those who know the context will easily understand the necessity of allusions to philosophy, poetry, history, and even law. At l. 60, the note characterizing the 'subject-matter' (*materia*) of Archilochus, which Mr. Post again seems to regard as American property, may be found in both Dosson and Zambaldi.

I come now to the extracts which have been exhibited to readers of the *Classical Review* in parallel columns, and in regard to which my critic evidently thinks that his case is strongest. From the first of these (x. l. 44) it might appear as if Mr. Post had now for the first time made acquaintance with the well-known division of style into three *genera*; and his pious attachment to the memory of the late Professor Frieze is such that he is prepared to go the length of believing that it was originally formulated by him. But Professor Frieze no more invented this division than he invented the familiar antithesis between the formal rhetoric of Latin and the simple naturalness of Greek (cp. my note on x. l. 105) which Mr. Post makes the subject of his second parallel extract. On the contrary, all the editors (each of whom I have no doubt that I consulted, including Professor Frieze) found their explanation of x. l. 44, on the passage of Quintilian,<sup>1</sup> which is certainly the basis of that small portion of my note which the perverse ingenuity of Mr. Post has extracted from an ample context. As to the English words used to represent the Latin technical terms, it seems to me that they are those which would naturally suggest themselves to two different translators, with two exceptions ('flowing' and 'plastic') for which I now gladly record my obligation. I venture to think, however, that Professor Frieze would have been very well satisfied with the direct quotation from his notes which I make (under his name) in another part of the very same section. For the remaining parallelism cp. once more Krüger's note *ad loc.*: 'in dieser (*i.e.* the *rectum genus dicendi*) sind aber alle drei *genera dicendi* begriffen, welche Quint. xii. 10, 58 ff. behandelt, und als verschiedene *recte dicendi genera* bezeichnet.' As I have already, perhaps sufficiently,

<sup>1</sup> Altera est divisio, quae in tres partes et ipsa discedit ('it is itself divided into three *genera*) qua discerni posse etiam recte dicendi genera inter se videntur. Namque unum *subtile*, quod *ἰσχνόν* vocant, alterum *grande* atque *robustum*, quod *ἄρπν* dicunt, constituunt, tertium alii *medium* ex duobus alii *floridum* (namque id *ἀνθρπν* appellant) addiderunt (xii. 10, 58).

indicated, originality is perhaps the last quality which the late Professor Frieze would have claimed for his work. His own note on the passage under discussion begins with the words 'Those who are partisans neither of the *veteres* nor of the *novi*,'—a pretty literal translation of Krüger's 'welche also weder den Alten noch den Neuen . . . den Vorzug geben.'—As to the third extract, Mr. Post should first have looked at the Latin, and then compared Krüger: 'in so fern . . . etwas zu ihrer Entschuldigung gesagt ist für den Fall einer Vergleichung mit den *commentariis* anderer.'

My frequent references to Krüger may make it advisable for me to repeat here the acknowledgment made in my own preface. After stating that 'a reference to the list of authorities consulted will show the extent of the obligations incurred to other editors [including Frieze] and critics,' I add 'Krüger's third edition has been especially useful.' It is, in fact, to Krüger, not to Frieze, that I am mainly indebted for that portion of my commentary which represents what I may call the 'tralatitician' element,—the *ἀναγκαιότητα* of textual interpretation. Quintilian's Tenth Book has been edited now for upwards of 300 years. If I had had nothing new to say about it, I should never have taken it in hand, nor would my book (I may be pardoned for adding) have merited the unanimous commendation which it has received both in this country and from those German scholars (Meister, Becher, and Kiderlin) who have made Quintilian a life study. But of all this Mr. Edwin Post, of the De Pauw University, seems to know nothing. He even goes the length of sententiously observing, with reference to the 'appreciative review' which Professor A. S. Wilkins contributed to a former number of this *Journal*: 'with most of the opinions therein expressed I have nothing here to do.' He 'could an' if he would' demolish Mr. Wilkins and his 'opinions.' Courageous Mr. Post! Such a paper, from him, would be of far greater interest to me than the mechanical collection of seeming parallelisms and casual identities of expression for which he has so minutely searched, extending as they do to less than one page in a volume of 300. It would also give him a much better opportunity of showing the extent of his acquaintance with the literature of Quintilian.


W. PETERSON.

## ARCHAEOLOGY.

## THE ARCHERMUS INSCRIPTION.

THIS inscription, discovered by M. Homolle in Delos in 1880, is of unique importance from its early date and its reference to artists whose names are preserved to us by literary tradition; and it gains still more interest from its association with the early winged figure which was found near it, and which probably, though not certainly, once stood upon it. It is not strange that numerous attempts have been made to decipher, restore, and interpret the three hexameters of which the inscription consists, and after the high authorities who have made these attempts it may seem rash or superfluous to add one more to the many and various readings which have been

suggested. The interpretation which I have to offer differs however in two essential points from all that I have yet seen. It takes into account every trace which is visible upon a careful examination of the original stone; and some of these traces or portions of lost letters absolutely preclude many of the readings hitherto suggested. And it also assumes that the forms representing  $\sigma$  and  $\omega$  are used consistently upon the stone. Every previous interpretation has assumed that they are used inconsistently; an unwarranted assumption, which cannot be justified by the quotation of any analogous example. I proceed first to record the traces of lost letters, or the forms of doubtful ones, upon the stone.



Line 1. The first word is beyond any doubt the name of the sculptor Micciades, but, the last three letters being entirely broken away, it is impossible to decide in what case it stood. A gap, which, reckoning from the  $\alpha$  of Micciades' name to the  $\mu$  (exclusive of these two), corresponds to eight or nine letters in the lower lines, follows next; and it is to be noted that the first line where preserved shows more crowded lettering than the second, so that at least nine letters must be supplied. Of the last of these a piece is left on the edge of the stone, which can only belong to  $\alpha$ ,  $\gamma$ ,  $\epsilon$ ,  $\kappa$ ,  $\mu$ ,  $\sigma$ , or  $\chi$ ; thus conjecture is limited, the common reading  $\acute{\alpha}\gamma\alpha\lambda\mu\alpha$  being impossible.  $\acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha$ , the only other word suggested, would do, but is very hard to fit in; none of those who have restored it allow anything like enough space before it; by no device can  $\text{Μικκιάδης τε } \acute{\alpha}\mu\alpha$  be made long enough. All readings I have seen accept one or other of these two alternatives; and we see now that both are inadmissible. The  $\Omega$  in the next word is perfectly clear; at the end of the line there can hardly be a doubt that the  $\nu$  is rightly restored by all previous

writers; but a trace of another letter after it is just visible, and is ignored by some: it can belong to any letter which begins with a vertical or nearly vertical stroke.

Line 2. The first letter is lost, but cannot be doubtful; the  $\Omega$  following  $\mu$  is quite clear; but after the  $\sigma$ , just before the break, is a much damaged letter. It curves too much to be a  $\beta$ , like the last letter but one in the same line; and so it seems at first to be  $\Omega$  ( $=\omega$ ); but the stone is so worn that either  $\phi$  or  $\theta$  is not impossible; the circle is not complete below, and there are traces beneath which may belong to  $\Omega$  ( $=\sigma$  or  $\sigma\nu$ ). One letter suffices to fill the gap, and the letter which follows, before the  $\epsilon$ , can hardly be anything but  $\iota$ . The rest of the line is perfectly clear, and requires no comment as to the forms of letters.

Line 3. The first  $\sigma$  comes directly beneath the first  $\rho$  of Archermus' name, and so cannot well be the first letter of the line; thus the reading  $\tau\omega \text{ Χίω}$  is quite certain; it is required also by the use of  $\Omega$  ( $=\omega$ ). Then, after  $\mu\epsilon$  follows a letter rightly read by M. Homolle in his first publication as  $\gamma$ ; it cannot possibly be anything but this or



δ or α, unless perhaps it were combined with the following letter to form a μ. A desire to read the name of Melas into this place has most unaccountably led all other editors to make it a λ, although it has no resemblance to the form of λ in line 1. The next letter again can only be α, γ, or δ. It is followed by a faint and uncertain trace on the corner of the fracture, which is hardly clear enough to tell for or against any restoration. Then comes, on the right half of the stone, a circular letter which is not quite clear below; it is almost certainly O (= ω); but Ω (= o or ov) is perhaps not impossible. Then to the end every letter is perfectly clear.

I have indicated as clearly as possible the limits within which conjectures are admissible, and have incidentally pointed out the facts which preclude the possibility of all previous restorations in one point or another. I now proceed to suggest one or two readings which conform to the conditions established; these cannot claim to be certain restorations, but they are possible, and in a case like the present one can hardly expect more. It will be observed that I keep to the distinction Ω = o or ov, O = ω, which our inscription shares with the alphabets of Paros, Siphnos, and Thasos: no inconsistency in the use of this distinction has ever yet been discovered, and so we are bound to assume it to be consistent here also, unless there are insuperable difficulties in the way. On the other hand the use of E and H for ε, ἐ, and η seems to show some uncertainty; but this uncertainty is well known upon Naxian inscriptions, and therefore is quite on a different footing. A probable reading may be suggested as follows:—

- (1) Μικκιά[δεω τέχνας]μα, καλῶν [κάλλιστα  
τελεσθῆν  
Ἀρχέρμου σο[φ]ίησιν, Ἐκηβόλε, δέξο  
--- (τῷ δέινι)  
τῷ Χίῳ, μεγάλως πατρώϊον ἄστυ κλέοντι.

Or, on the other hand, if the use of E for η in σοφίησιν be held to violate not only the usual distinction, but also the Naxian rule, by which H is used for original h, E for original e, we may read:—

- (2) Μικκιά[δεω τέχνας]μα Κάλων [ἀνέθηκε  
τελέσας  
Ἀρχερμός θ[υ]ίεις, ἱν' Ἐκηβόλος, Ἰλαος  
οἰκῶ  
τῷ Χίῳ, μεγάλως πατρώϊον ἄστυ φυλάξῃ.

This is open to the objection of introducing a new artist, Calon, of whom we

know nothing; I therefore prefer the first reading; but my chief object is to show that there is no difficulty in restoring the inscription without violating any customary rules.

I append translation of the two readings, for the sake of clearness.

(1) 'This design of Micciades, of all his beautiful works most beautifully fashioned by the cunning of Archermus, accept, O Far-darting Apollo, at the hands of... the Chian, who thus spreads the fame of his native city.'

Thus the dedicator would be some prominent Chian, who was proud of his fellow-citizens' attainments in sculpture, and held 'non tam vitibus censeri Chion quam operibus Archermi <filiorum>.'

(2) 'This design of Micciades his sons Calon and Archermus dedicated, having completed it, praying that the Far-darting Apollo, showing favour to their Chian family, may mightily protect their native city.'

Previous readings are so numerous that it does not seem necessary to acknowledge what I have in common with any of them. Almost every one of those who have attacked the problem has contributed some help to its elucidation. If as much can be said of the present paper, my object in publishing it will be satisfied; in any case I trust that my definition of the limits within which conjecture is possible may be accepted.

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## MONTHLY RECORD.

### ITALY.

IN the valley of the upper Adige, on the right bank, between Trent and Roveredo, an inscription has been found belonging to some tomb probably on the high road between Verona and Tridentum. If the tomb was on this road, a portion of its course would thereby be ascertained. The inscription runs as follows: D. M. Caeciliae Firminae L. Valerius Valerianus h(unc) l(ocum) c(oncessit) coningi b(ene) m(erenti).<sup>1</sup>

Rome.—On the Corso fragments of a portico have been discovered, consisting of an arch supported on a pilaster with travertine capital. The site on which they were found must have been that of the Porticus Vipsania, which was constructed by M. Vipsanius Agrippa as part of his plan for improving the Campus Martius. This portico was near the Virgo aqueduct, and on the border of the Campus (Martialis iv. 18). In the Via Cavour, in the mound on which S. Pietro in Vincoli stands, remains of an ancient building have been found, consisting of five vaulted

<sup>1</sup> *Athenaeum*, 21 Jan. 1893.

enambers communicating with a corridor, partly constructed, and partly cut out of the bare rock and lined with stucco. Two stamps of A.D. 123 were also found. On the top of Monte Mario near the Vatican remains of a Roman villa have come to light, and lower down a *piscina* cut into the rock. The walls of the villa are of *opus reticulatum* of the Augustan age, with arches of tufa, the columns of red tufa with coloured stucco and marble Attic bases. A fine mosaic pavement was discovered, two lamps, one stamped L MAMIT, and various specimens of pottery, including a washing basin stamped IJVL PRISC. The house is remarkable for the number and variety of the marbles used in its ornamentation. In the Via Nomentana a lead pipe has been discovered, inscribed with the name of P. Luplius (?) Aelius Coeranus; two persons of this name are known, one exiled for his friendship to Plautianus (Dio Cass. lxxvi. 5), the other proconsul of Macedonia in 213. Another interesting inscription from a marble architrave found in the Campagna, probably part of a domestic shrine, runs: FORTVNAE TARVT-TENIAE PAVLINAE. Tarutteniae is probably a mistake for *Tarrutenia*, a gentile name known at Tivoli (C.I.L. xv. 3517). A Tarrutenius Maximilianus was *vicarius urbis* in the fifth century (C.I.L. vi. 1767), and another was *praefectus urbi* in 409. The dedication probably refers to the Fortuna worshipped at Praeneste in the neighbourhood; for similar dedications see C.I.L. vi. 186—189, 204, 3679.<sup>1</sup>

## GREECE.

*Athens*.—Recent acquisitions of the National Museum: a sepulchral lekythos of marble, with relief of a seated female figure and a hoplite; behind the latter an old man with a staff which has been painted; behind the former, a youth with a strigil; good preservation. The results of the excavations in the Heraion at Argos, including the head of Hera. Three engraved gems: (1) Nike standing, (2) Nike in a chariot, (3) a bearded head. A series of nine lekythoi, from Eretria, all but one with polychrome figures on white ground, the other having red figures. The subjects are of the usual type, all sepulchral. A very fine red-figured vase from Eretria, with two friezes of figures, unfortunately much obliterated; the upper frieze represents the rape of Thetis by Peleus, in the presence of the nymphs Eulimene, Altis, Melite, Aura and Neo, and of Nereus. All the figures are inscribed. On the lower row in the centre is a female figure seated on a couch seen through the open door of a house, inscribed 'Αλκιστις. On the left are two figures inscribed 'Ιππολύτη and 'Ασπερόπη, followed by a female figure with a *λουτροφόρος*, inscribed Θεανώ, and two others, Εδρώπη and Θεά. On the right are Aphrodite, Eros, Harmonia, Peitho, Kore, Hebe and Himeros, all inscribed. On the top of the vase is a beautiful female figure in terra cotta, with remains of colouring.<sup>2</sup>

Dr. Dörpfeld has continued his excavations between the Pnyx and Areopagus, and has unearthed a statue of a river-god of Roman date, which may have had some connection with the neighbouring reservoir. There is no doubt that this was a common reservoir, and not the 'Ενέακρουρος, which lay in the neighbourhood of the Ilissos. Two wells have since been found, dating certainly from the sixth century B.C., containing geometrical vases and other varieties of the same date, but none later;

they were therefore probably superseded in the time of Peisistratos.<sup>3</sup>

Two inscriptions have been found in the centre of the city, near the new railway station, engraved on two marble blocks, the larger of which probably formed the base of a statue or sarcophagus. It names a physician Dionysos Eukarpas of Phyle, and his wife, a daughter of Phalereus. On the smaller block one Tauriskos, son of Polyektos, and his wife Hierokleia, daughter of Euainetos of Alopeke, are mentioned.<sup>3</sup>

Part of the ancient city-wall has come to light near the Acharnian gate, consisting of large regular blocks, extending some sixteen feet, and on the north of this wall, outside the city, was found an ancient tomb of white marble slabs.<sup>4</sup>

During the construction of the new railway in the city a metope was found belonging to a large temple or other Doric building, with triglyphs on either side. The subject represented is unique for a metope, namely, three mourners closely draped, carved in low relief. It must have formed part of a sepulchral monument.<sup>3</sup>

Excavations have been continued near Daphnae on the Sacred Way, and an archaic torso of a youth discovered; also a fragment of a relief of Eros(?) holding a *thymiaterion*, three fragments of inscriptions, and a relief of good style, representing two goddesses in long chitons, probably Aphrodite and Peitho, as one supports a small Eros with one hand, and the other holds a sceptre.

*Epidauros*. An inscribed marble altar has been found, also an inscription giving a catalogue of the *θεαρόδοκοι* of Asklepios in Acaernania and Italy; also another with a catalogue of *εἰσφοραὶ* collected for sacrifices, a system known as *δλοκαύτησις*. Further, an archaic dedicatory inscription τῷ φίλῳ 'Ασκληπίῳ, and some inscriptions with lapidaries' signatures have been found, the most interesting being: Ξερόφιλος καὶ Σπράτων ἐποίησαν (cf. Loewy, *Inscr. Gr. Bildh.* 261-2); they are mentioned by Pausanias, ii. 23, 4. On the east of the stadium has been found a square chamber with columns, of the time of the Antonines; on the roof is a terracotta pyramid inscribed ΑΝΤΩΝΕΙΝ. This may be the *στοὰ Κόντος* mentioned by Pausanias (ii. 27, 6).<sup>3</sup>

*Nauplia*. About thirty pre-Hellenic graves have been found, one containing a Mycenaean vase, on each handle of which is incised a character resembling H. This seems to imply that writing was known at this date, or else it is similar to the *σήματα λυγρὰ* of Il. vi. 68. It was probably used as a kind of trade-or price-mark in this case.<sup>3</sup>

*Delos*. The *εἰσόδος* of the theatre has been brought to light, also a private house of Roman date, the sill of the door of which appears to be of older, Hellenic, date as it bears the inscription 'Απόλλωνι, 'Αρτέμιδι, Ἀθηναί.

H. B. WALTERS.

*Archäologisches Jahrbuch*. 1892. Part 2. Berlin.

1. Michaelis; Roman sketch-books of Northern artists of the sixteenth century: iii. the Basle sketch-book; iv. three by Melchior Loreh; v. the Cambridge book. Corrections and addenda to parts i. and ii.; and index to the five books: one cut. 2. Winter; traces the development of the palmette ornament beneath the handles of kylikes, from those of the 'Kleinmeister' downwards through the fifth

<sup>1</sup> *Bull. Comm. Arch.* Oct.—Dec. 1892.

<sup>2</sup> *Δελτίον*, June—August, 1892.

<sup>3</sup> *Berl. Phil. Woch.* 14 and 28 Jan. and 4 Feb. 1892.

cent., comparing the ornaments on the marble stelae, and noting the usages of individual artists by which, in the application and form of their palmette, their unsigned works may be recognized: eighteen cuts. 3. Hartwig; publishes two more replicas of the Silenos on the kline, both from the interior of cups of the Epiktetic school: two cuts.

*Anzeiger.* Jahresbericht of the Institute. Acquisitions of the Kaiserhaus in Vienna; of various collections in West Germany; and of the Boston Museum. Meetings of the Archäol. Gesellschaft, (February, March, April). News etc. Notes on publications of the Institute. Bibliography.

C. S.

*The same.* 1892. Part 3.

1. Kekule; since the inscribed bust of Anacreon was found in Trastevere in 1884, the identification of his portraits is no longer in doubt: besides the two already known, three fresh ones are here described, the finest of which (plate 3) is in the Berlin Museum; the original type from which portraits of Anacreon are inspired is probably the statue on the Akropolis referred to by Pausanias; probably this statue and that of Perikles which inspired e.g. the B.M. term, were by Kresilas. 2. Kalkmann; publishes an archaic bronze statue in the Louvre, of an athlete throwing a spear, belonging to the period of the Aegina pediments, though not quite so advanced in style; from a comparison with other sculptures of this epoch, it would seem to be a work of old Aeginetan art; this art influenced strongly Attic sculpture between the period of the pre-Persian pediment and the Tyrannoktonoi, and, directly or indirectly, the strong r.f. vase-painting of the same period: plate and six cuts. 3. Klein; gives two instances in which vase-painters have altered a design by painting over it; one is the cut published by Studniczka, *ante*, 1891, p. 258; the other is the Munich Krater Jahn, No. 299; a third is the b.f. lekythos in Benndorf, *Gr. u. Sic. Vas.* pl. 42, 3; and compares parallel instances in sculpture: one cut. 4. Studniczka; replies that Klein is mistaken as to the cup; his informant had been misled by the sketch marks, and the artist had not altered his design. 5. Körte; publishes an Attic bell-krater in the Sturmond Museum with a representation connected with a torch-race; and discusses the lampadodromiai at Athens: one cut. 6. Hartwig; publishes a painting of the death of Pentheus on the lid of a pyxis in the Louvre, and another on a fragmentary psykter in the Bourguignon collection; and compares them with other representations of the same myth: plate, two cuts. 7. Winter; by a critical examination of the Apollo Belvedere concludes that this statue cannot be assigned to the Hellenistic period or the beginning of the third century; that both in its idealized conception and also in form and

detail it bears close relation to a group of sculptures from the Mausoleum; by a comparison with the Ganymede of Leochares the best analogy is found both of composition and of movement, and the writer would assign the original of the Apollo to that artist: two cuts.

*Anzeiger.* Acquisitions of Berlin; of the Kaiserhaus in Vienna (continued). Meetings of the Archäol. Gesellschaft (May, July). News, &c., Bibliography.

C. S.

*The Same.* 1892. Part 4.

1. Kieseritzky; publishes (pl. 6) an alabaster statuette obtained in Cairo in 1887 by Herr Golenischew; from comparison with Petrie's *Naukratis* 1, pl. 1, 4, and with two fragments in Boston (two cuts) he identifies it as the Apollo of Naukratis,<sup>1</sup> and compares it with early types of Apollo. 2. J. Six; by a comparison with the design on a lekythos of the Laynes collection (cut) shows the form of the figure which Pausanias (i. 23, 3, 4) saw on the vase signed by Kresilas, and which he, misreading the inscription, thought was a statue of Diitrephes; it was really a statue of Hermolykos, who won the prize of bravery at Mykale in 479: the style shows analogy with works of Myron: cut of a lekythos in Naples for comparison of technique. 3. Mayer; Mycenaean notes (ii.). On dress and culture at Mycenae: various cuts. 4. Milchhoefer; identifies the statue from Epidauros of a draped woman with a sword-belt across her body ('Εφρη. 1886, pl. 13) as Dike: she stood to Themis and Zeus in the same analogy as Nike to Athena and Zeus; at Epidauros was a cult of Dikaionne. The statue may well be an original, and dates from the beginning of the fourth century: cut. 5. Wernicke; publishes (two cuts) a fragment of strong r. f. style in the Louvre, probably part of the handle of a krater: on it are two scenes, Theseus and Skiron, and Theseus wrestling with Ker]KVANEVΞ. This name is an epiklesis of Apollo, whose connection with the palaestra is well known; Theseus is a 'Poseidonian' hero; and the contest is thus really between Poseidon and Apollo.

*Anzeiger.* Statement as to the Reichslimeskommission. Acquisitions; Dresden, Kaiserhaus at Vienna, British Museum. News. Note on forgeries of the Europa terra-cotta (*Anz.* iv. p. 158). Bibliography.

C. S.

<sup>1</sup> He does not appear to be aware that there are in the British Museum several replicas of this type, statuettes in marble and alabaster from Naukratis (see *Catalogue* by A. H. Smith, Nos. 200 foll.).

## LIST OF NEW BOOKS.

### ENGLISH BOOKS.

- Ancient Greek Inscriptions in British Museum. Part 4. Sect. I. Folio. British Museum. 10s.  
*Aeschylus.* Prometheus Bound, translated by Henry Howard Molyneux, Fourth Earl of Carnarvon. Crown 8vo. 80 pp. Murray. 6s.  
*Cicero.* Cato Major, De Senectute, edited with notes by Leonard Huxley, introduction, text and notes. New edition revised. 12mo. 48 pp. Frowde. 2s.  
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- Homer and the Epic, by Andrew Lang. Crown 8vo. xi, 424 pp. Longman & Co. 9s. net.
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## FOREIGN BOOKS.

- Apollonius Pergaeus*. Quae graece exstant cum commentariis antiquis. Editus et latine interpretatus est J. L. Heiberg. Vol. II. (Finis). 12mo. lxxxv, 361 pp. Leipzig, Teubner. 4 Mk. 50.
- Bucherer* (F.) Kritische Beiträge zu Damascius Leben des Isidorus. Pr. Wertheim 92. 22 S. 4to.
- Cicero*. De oratore libri III. Recensuit T. Stangl. 12mo. 232 pp. Leipzig, Teubner. 1 Mk. 25.
- Daremberg et Saglio*. Dictionnaire des antiquités grecques et romaines fascicule 17. Eup.—Fas. 4to. 857—1010 pp. Paris, Hachette et Cie. 5 fr. each.
- Dieulafoy*. L'Acropole de Suse d'après les fouilles exécutées en 1884, 1885 et 1886. Quatrième partie: L'Apadana et L'Agadana. 4to. 323—446 pp. Paris, Hachette et Cie. 25 fr.
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- Goebel* (E.) Homerische Blätter II. Lexilogische, kritische und exegetische Beiträge zu Homer. Pr. Fulda 93. 20 S. 4to.
- Goetz* (G.) De divi Hadriani sententiis et epistulis commentariolum. Pr. Jena 92. 8 S. 4to.
- Hermes*. Zeitschrift für klassische Philologie herausgegeben von G. Kaibel und C. Robert. Generalregister zu Band I—XXV. Bearbeitet von M. Wellmann. 8vo. 182 pp. Berlin, Weidmann. 7 Mk.
- Hoffmann* (O.) Die griechischen Dialekte in ihrem historischen Zusammenhange mit den wichtigsten ihrer Quellen. Band II. Der nord-achäische Dialekt. 8vo. xii, 608 pp. Göttingen, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht. 14 Mk.
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- Paur* (H.) Observationes ad Flavii Josephi elocutionem. Pr. Nürnberg 92. 32 S. 8vo.
- Psichari* (J.) Études de philologie néogrecque, recherches sur le développement historique du grec 8vo. ccxii, 386 pp. Paris, Bouillon.
- [Bibliothèque de l'école des hautes études. Fasc. 92.]
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- [Abhandlungen des archaeologisch-epigraphischen Seminars der Universität Wien. Heft 9.]
- Ullmann* (C. T.) Proprietates sermonis Aeschylei quatenus e diverbio perspectae sunt. IV. Pr. Donaueschingen 92. 16 S. 4to.
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- Witkowski* (S.) De vocibus hybridis apud antiquos poetas romanos. 8vo. 29 pp. Krakau, Buchhandlung der polnischen Verlagsgesellschaft. 1 Mk. 20.
- [Extract: Sitzungsbericht der Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Krakau.]